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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Political Economy
by
Imil Nurutdinov
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Leslie Nicole Johns, Co­Chair
Professor Ronald L. Rogowski, Co­Chair
This dissertation studies the determinants of political institutions and their impact on economic
development in various historical contexts. The first chapter focuses on the Catholic Church, which for
centuries determined the political, economic, and cultural development of Europe and was the greatest
andmost enduring rival to the nation­state. Why did the Church’s power decline earlier in Northwestern
Europe than in the East and South? I argue that to a large extent the differential political influence of
the Church can be explained by differential demand for collective security in the face of the possible
invasion by the militarily superior “infidels.” Catholic states had to cooperate to achieve military
success. To mitigate the interstate collective action problem, Catholic states voluntarily delegated
legal and fiscal authorities to a common non­territorial jurisdiction, which was the Church. States in
Northwestern Europe had lower demand for protection against the “infidels,” therefore, commitment
to the Church was weaker. To measure the Church’s political power across time and space at the
subnational (diocesan) level, I have assembled a novel dataset on appointments of bishops between
1198 and 1517, the beginning of the Protestant Reformation. Using historical GIS data, I find that in
the dioceses located closer to the territory of the “infidels,” bishops were differentially more likely to
be selected by the pope or cathedral chapters than by secular rulers, compared to the dioceses that were
secure from external military threats. This finding is inconsistent with Charles Tilly’s thesis that “war
made states.” It also emphasizes that the Reformation was not a watershed in the state­Church relations
but was rather an organic development.
ii
The second chapter examines the economic origins of discrimination against Jewish entrepreneurs
in the Russian Empire. Prior to 1889, a large share of Russian private capital was invested in state and
state­subsidized assets that yielded a fixed return and were deemed safe. After the government received
access to new external sovereign debt markets with lower interest rates, it forcefully converted bonds
on the domestic market. Combined with other policy changes between 1889 and 1894, this shock freed
large amounts of domestic private capital that now had to be reinvested in the equity market. I explore
the relationship between anti­Jewish restrictions in the equity market that began around the same time,
in 1890, and capital intensity of 3­digit manufacturing industries (SIC). Russian law required all cor­
porate charters to be approved by the central government, which was also used as an opportunity to
target specific corporations and to preclude Jews from creating and/or investing in them. Using the
RUSCORP database of all manufacturing corporations created in 1891–1902 (Owen, 1992) and novel
data on all Russian factories in 1890, I find a positive association between capital intensity and the
probability of restrictions. I address some of the possible alternative explanations for the observed
pattern using the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange data and the data on major merchant guilds.
In the third and final chapter, I study the role of labor mobility restrictions, that existed under
serfdom, in shaping economic development. In the Russian Empire, twenty­three million people, who
were serfs in 1858 and were not allowed to move to cities, were freed in the following twelve years.
Was removal of the mobility restrictions a major factor in the subsequent urban growth? I develop
a structural model of rural­urban migration incorporating restrictions on mobility for different types
of peasants, features of the countryside and hypothetical urban destinations, and the travel costs for
different modes of transportation. I estimate this model using novel detailed data on peasants, cities,
and railroads in the Russian Empire, covering the period from 1811 to 1910. The estimated parameters
suggest that moving to cities was not advantageous to peasants in and of itself. Instead, construction of
railroads was the single most important factor explaining rural­urban migration. This is likely because
allocation of rural labor was not efficient historically, independently from the impact of serfdom. My
within­model calculations suggest that by 1910, the total urban population enabled by the railroad
network was comparable to that in a counterfactual scenario in which serfdom never existed.
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CHAPTER 1
From Christendom to Nation­State: How the Decline of External
Military Threats Led to Secularization in Europe, 1198–1517
1.1 Introduction
The Catholic Church was a pivotal actor in the political and economic development of pre­modern
Europe. It was the largest landowner in a still overwhelmingly agrarian society. The Church’s doctrine
regulated public morality by claiming monopoly of knowledge and banning usury. Popes crowned
Holy Roman Emperors and imposed trade embargoes on entire regions. What explains the rise and
fall of the Catholic Church as a political actor? Why did the Church’s power decline more quickly in
some regions than others? Was the Protestant Reformation (1517) a turning point in the state­Church
relations or continuation of the previous trend?
I argue that the influence of the Church lasted to a large extent because of demand for collective
security against external military threats. For a long time after the fall of the Roman Empire, European
polities were fragmented. At different points in time, the military capacity of the Lithuanians, Moors,
Turks, and other non­Christians exceeded that of any oneCatholic state, hence cooperationwas required
to achieve military success. As a public good, collective security tends to be underprovided, because
states have incentives to free ride (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). I argue that an effective and enduring
alliance of Catholic states required partial delegation of legal and fiscal authorities to a common non­
territorial jurisdiction, which was the Church. These authorities were locally exercised by bishops, who
limited rulers’ discretionary power over domestic and international affairs, and papal collectors, who
transferred clerical taxes from dioceses to the Curia starting with the pontificate of Pope Innocent III
(1198–1216). Unlike individual Catholic rulers, the Church internalized the potential loss of followers
to the “infidels” in other states and had incentives to take preemptive military action to defend its
1
position in the “religious market.” In addition, warfare led by the Church was funded from the proceeds
of taxes on the clergy, which was less politically problematic than lay taxation by secular rulers. The
latter was coercive in nature and required sensitive political concessions on the part of rulers, whereas
the Church effectively acted as a corporation that distributed the rents among its “shareholders.”
To test my argument empirically, I leverage the geographic and temporal variation in the identity
and location of the “infidels.” To construct a measure of external military threats, I have created GIS
maps of all the “infidel” states in Europe and the adjacent regions in the Middle East and North Africa
using the Centennia Historical Atlas (Clockwork Mapping, 2018). Based on these GIS maps, I define
vulnerability of a given diocese in a given period as the shortest distance from the “infidels” in the
previous period. Tomeasure the political power of the Church across time and space, I examinewhether
a bishop in a given diocese­year was appointed by the sovereign, rather than being chosen by the
cathedral chapter or the pope. Bishoprics were endowed with land and movable wealth. Additionally,
bishops played a major role in the feudal hierarchy and state and religious administration. Therefore,
other things equal, both the Church and sovereigns sought to influence appointments of bishops. I
interpret observed non­interference in the appointment process by sovereigns as a sign of a quid pro
quo and investigate whether protection from external military threats by the Church can serve as a
plausible mechanism. Using dozens of diocese­specific sources, I have assembled a novel dataset on
appointments of bishops of 63 dioceses in fifteen present­day European states. Combined with the GIS
maps, for most dioceses the resulting annual panel covers the period between 1198 and 1517.
The data granularity allows me to study the impact of external military threats on the Church’s
political power not only cross­nationally but also subnationally (at the diocesan level). This is particu­
larly important in the context of medieval Europe, in which states such as France and the Holy Roman
Empire were only nominally ruled by a single sovereign. Using a panel regression with diocese and
time fixed effects and diocese­specific trends, I have shown that bishops were more likely to be ap­
pointed independently from the sovereign in more vulnerable dioceses. By contrast, in less vulnerable
dioceses, bishops were more likely to be appointed by secular rulers, which likely indicates lower de­
mand for military cooperation. In that sense, the Reformation was not a watershed in the Church­state
relations but was rather an organic development. The association between external military threats and
the Church’s political power is present in the short and medium term but gradually decreases with time
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and generally vanishes at panel intervals longer than twenty­five years.
To further illuminate the mechanism, I conduct a case study using the actual conflict data as an “in­
dependent variable” instead of military threats. Analyzing episcopal appointments in Poland between
1198 and 1517, I find that the political power of the Church did not change monotonically over time
but instead closely followed the dynamics of Lithuanian raids prior to the Christianization of Lithua­
nia (1387), with a higher frequency of the past raids associated with a larger percentage of bishops
appointed without interference by Polish rulers. Once the Lithuanian threat to Poland disappeared,
Polish rulers increasingly appointed bishops themselves. I complement this case study with historical
evidence on interactions between the Church and rulers in a neighboring state, Pomerania, that was
relatively secure from Lithuanian attacks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review the related literature. In Sections 1.4
and 3.2, I discuss the historical context and propose a theoretical framework that helps explain the role
of the Church in medieval military alliances. In Section 1.5, I present the data. Section 1.6 describes
the empirical strategy and results. I conduct a historical case study to provide additional support for
the relationship between the Church’s power and collective warfare in Section 1.7. In Section 1.8, I
link my main empirical findings to the debate on the origins of the Protestant Reformation and its role
in European development. The final section concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is closely linked to the literature on state formation (Besley and Persson, 2009; Gennaioli
and Voth, 2015). Tilly (1992) has famously argued that “states made war, and war made states.” The
later literature has made this argument more nuanced and context­specific in an attempt to explain why
certain European states failed to centralize, despite the war pressure, or even disappeared altogether.
Gennaioli and Voth (2015) have suggested that the costs of state centralization were differential across
states, depending on the initial level of fractionalization (e.g., linguistic or ethnic). What remains
unclear is why at different points in history non­territorial governance structures, such as the Catholic
Church, dominated European politics. In a seminal work, Spruyt (1996) alludes to this puzzle but
does not provide an explanation. Crucially, the state formation debate originated by Tilly (1992) has
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exclusively focused on how military conflict affects domestic institutions, omitting the possibility—
and challenge—of interstate cooperation. By studying governmental structures beyond the nation­
state, such as the Church, and by focusing on military alliances, my analysis offers a more realistic
model of state formation. My main finding that the Church was stronger when the danger of foreign
invasion was imminent goes against the prediction of Tilly’s (1992) model of state formation: if one
considers investment in state capacity as the only possible response to addressing external military
threats, making the Church subordinate to the sovereign by appointing loyal bishops would be a natural
step in the process of strengthening the state.
Because warfare was the single most important type of expenditure in the pre­modern period, dis­
agreements over war financing constituted major distributional conflict in every state. It has been
argued that specific institutional designs, whereby the military was recruited and maintained, could
be linked to regime stability (Blaydes and Chaney, 2013) and political representation (Karaman and
Pamuk, 2013) in pre­modern states. In turn, as Acemoglu et al. (2005) pointed out, institutions that
were created before 1500 tended to persist in the subsequent period, which resulted in a significant
divergence of per capita income before the Industrial Revolution.1 In this literature, the set of relevant
political actors tends to be domestic—it typically includes kings (the landed elite) and merchants (the
commercial class).2 My study is the first to emphasize the role of a large foreign interest group, the
clergy, in making prolonged, large­scale warfare possible. Governed by canon law, at least nominally,
the pre­Reformation clergy was not subject to “domestic” (royal) laws. Therefore, the degree to which
rulers exercised control over the Church could shape domestic institutions via the fiscal­military chan­
nel, although the net effect is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, if protection from external
military threats could be provided externally to some extent, conflict over taxation with domestic sub­
jects would become less acute. On the other hand, given the sheer size of the Church’s wealth, the
clergy had great bargaining power of their own. In the very first provision of Magna Carta (1215),
King John declared that “the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and
1A recent paper by Angelucci et al. (2018) also stresses the persistent nature of medieval institutions studying the case
of England.
2One—indirect—way whereby “interactions” with foreign states could be incorporated in the political calculus of rulers
is to allow for the possibility of exit by those who otherwise would be taxed (see Dincecco and Wang, 2018, for a version
of this argument with applications to various historical contexts). By contrast, I study the involvement of foreign actors in
domestic politics more directly.
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its liberties unimpaired.”3 Therefore, the net effect of the Church’s power on domestic institutions is
theoretically ambiguous: it could have strengthened sovereigns in some cases and constrained them in
others, depending on whether the Church’s interests aligned with those of domestic actors.
The Church could also shape domestic institutions through its primary activity, i.e., the religious
channel. Historically, religion seems to have played an important role in failed political transitions,
and hence it contributed to the persistence of bad institutions (Belloc et al., 2016; Chaney, 2013; Rubin,
2017). The specific mechanisms and scope conditions are not clear, however. Themain assertion in this
literature is that in the absence of ideological competition, religious authorities enjoy a unique type of
political power—spiritual, or “legitimizing.” As I have shown, the relative power of the Church varied
greatly during the Middle Ages, even though its doctrine remained (mostly) unchallenged. Therefore,
selection and control of religious leaders ought to be investigated further to improve the understanding
of the link between religion and political institutions.
Because the late medieval Church made claims that extended far beyond the Papal States in Italy,
this study also illuminates the debate on the origins of modern international relations. Krasner (1993)
wrote that while “all European thinkers accepted the concept of Christendom, a unified society that was
governed by divine law,” the exact content of divine law and whowas the supreme leader “were matters
of continuous dispute” (p. 255). Philpott (2000) places the Church­state relations at the center of the
international order prior to the Protestant Reformation (1517). He goes so far as to argue that, “had the
Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have arrived, at least not in the same
form or in the same era” (p. 206).4 I focus on a major claim that the Church insisted upon—the right
to appoint bishops independently—and offer one of the first, to my knowledge, thorough empirical
investigations of conflicts between the Church and secular rulers prior to the Reformation.5 Echoing
Krasner (1993) to some extent, it could be concluded that there was no single point of transition from
3https://www.bl.uk/magna­carta/articles/magna­carta­english­translation. Accessed on December 3, 2018.
4Philpott’s (2000) argument is based on the idea of sovereignty. Nexon (2009) offers a different explanation for the role
that the Reformation played in the rise of the nation­state—the resulting religious differentiation made it even harder for
rulers to claim power, given that their legitimacy depended on complex dynastic relationships.
5A recent paper by Bueno de Mesquita and Bueno de Mesquita (2018) also aims at this, by comparing the background
(“alignment”) of appointed bishops before and after the Concordat of Worms (1122), leveraging the divergent implications
of the Concordat for wealthy and poor dioceses. By contrast, I focus on a later period and a different set of dioceses, study
the selection procedure rather than the identity of bishops, and do not investigate the role of the wealth per se.
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medieval fragmentation to the modern system of sovereign states. Rather, European rulers conceded
sovereignty to the Church and claimed it back when it was politically and economically beneficial to
them.
1.3 Historical Background
1.3.1 Late Medieval Warfare: The Unsustainable Costs and Necessity of Cooperation
The costs of recruitment of troops, transportation, and food supply in late medieval Europe were high
compared to revenues that sovereigns had at their disposal. Prolonged, large­scale warfare was too
expensive for any individual European state. It is estimated that in 1187–1190, the annual revenue of
the king of England was between £22,000 and £28,000, which included extraordinary taxation intended
for the Third Crusade (Tyerman, 1988, p. 79). For the crusade itself, an annual pay of just 790 soldiers
on thirty­three ships came to £2,400 in 1190 (ibid., p. 80).6 The ever increasing military spending
of the thirteenth­ and fourteenth­century English monarchs required sensitive political concessions to
towns and the Parliament (Angelucci et al., 2018) and borrowing from external agents, namely Italian
bankers (Ormrod, 1999).7
To give another example, consider Hungary, one of the largest and most militant medieval states. It
is estimated that in 1454, the “traditional” sources of King Ladislaus V yielded around 250,000 florins
annually, whereas the maintenance of 10,000 soldiers was worth between 200,000–300,000 florins
per year, which does not include the maintenance of fortifications (Engel, 2001, p. 310).8 Through
extraordinary taxation of the peasantry, the total annual revenue of the king rose to 650,000 florins a
year by 1476. By comparison, the annual revenue of the Ottoman Empire, the most serious threat to
6This figure does not include the cost of buying and maintaining ships, paying the wages of crew, and the costs of any
later repairs, equipment, and food. Importantly, the high cost of the maintenance of a medieval army, expressed in annual
terms, is not peculiar to the crusades per se; due to their prominence, however, crusading expenditures happen to be better
and more consistently documented.
7Even so, “the scale of royal borrowing was often out of all proportion to the real value of the taxes, and the crown’s
refusal to keep faith with its foreign creditors contributed to the collapse of several of the Italian firms” (Ormrod, 1999,
p. 36).
8As for the latter, 150,000–200,000 florins “constituted the minimal amount required annually for the upkeep of the
southern defence perimeter” (Bak, 2004, p. 126).
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Hungary, during the same period was almost three times as large (ibid., p. 311).
Naval warfare was particularly expensive. Unlike land warfare, which was often fought by mer­
cenaries, who could resort to looting if the sovereign defaulted on his obligations, naval operations
required upfront payments. Maintaining ten war galleys in the first half of the fourteenth century
would cost one approximately 100,000 florins annually (Housley, 2003, pp. 47–48). A combination of
naval and land operations, planned for a crusade to Egypt in the 1320s, with 15,000 infantry and 900
cavalry that would land in the Nile delta, was supposed to exceed 2,100,000 florins (ibid.). It is useful
to mention in this context that the annual revenue of Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV (1346–1378)
is estimated at 164,000 florins (Isenmann, 1999, p. 260). The revenue of Venice, the wealthiest state,
by the end of the century was significantly larger than that of the emperor—over 1,000,000 florins
(Isenmann, 1999, p. 261)—yet still less than necessary for the defense of her commercial interests in
the Eastern Mediterranean.
1.3.2 Catholic Alliances: From the Reconquest of Jerusalem to Warfare at Home
In 1095, Pope Urban II calledWestern Christians to assist the Byzantine emperor in his struggle against
the Seljuq Turks and to recapture Jerusalem. The crusades that followed “were, perhaps, the largest­
scale military mobilizations of the medieval period” (Blaydes and Paik, 2016, pp. 551). The first two
crusades, while not lacking structure, did not have a single leader and were mostly based on religious
enthusiasm (Housley, 2010, pp. 291–292). After the achievements of the First Crusade were reversed
by Saladin’s capture of Jerusalem in 1187, it became clear that a stronger financial and political com­
mitment to the protection of the Holy Land was necessary for enduring success. The Third Crusade
involved careful planning with an important administrative innovation: the Saladin tithe, levied in 1188
by King Henry II in England and by King Philip II in France. In England, this tax was collected from
the laity and religious orders by royal officials with much scrutiny and resulted in a significant sum. By
contrast, the French king “almost had to apologise [to his magnates] for having proposed the levy in the
first place” (Tyerman, 1988, p. 77). In Germany, collection was not even attempted (Housley, 2010,
p. 295). Despite serving as a major precedent of direct income taxation in England and the religious
importance of the proposed cause, the Saladin tithe was not consequential for the crusading movement
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from a military perspective.9
Yet the crusades continued. The pontificate of Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) marked two signifi­
cant changes in the nature of the crusades and their organization. First, the crusades were increasingly
framed as warfare at the “domestic” front—against the Moors in Iberia, the Tatars and Lithuanians in
Eastern Europe, the Turks in the Mediterranean. In the fourteenth century, all the crusades that materi­
alized were focused on one of these fronts, while the passagium generale—the reconquest of the Holy
Land—became impractical (Housley, 1986). Second, the burden of financing shifted from the laity to
the clergy, with the first crusade tax of Pope Innocent III in 1199. During the pontificate of Pope Hono­
rius III (1216–1227), the financial office of the papacy, the Apostolic Chamber (Camera Apostolica),
started systematic collection of taxes employing papal agents and Italian bankers throughout Europe.
In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, papal assessors created valuations of all benefices
(districts) of the Church, known as taxatio. With some revisions, these valuations remained in place for
the rest of the Middle Ages, being the basis for future taxes (Lunt, 1934).10 In the fourteenth century,
the system of papal taxation became even more centralized and sophisticated.11 The major sources of
clerical income at the local level were tithes (the payment of which had to be made before any other
form of tax), fees for church services, and generous lay donations (Resl, 2007). Additionally, religious
houses accumulated vast amounts of land through bequests (Burton, 2007). As a result, the economic
base of the Church, which was already substantial by the pontificate of Pope Innocent III, grew even
stronger in the period preceding the Reformation. For example, at the beginning of the fourteenth cen­
tury, the Church owned 53.4% of landed incomes in England (Campbell, 2005, p. 12). In Norway,
by the middle of the same century, “the Church controlled more than 40% of the total value of land”
(Emanuelsson, 2005, p. 260).12
9This is not to say that the crusading efforts of European monarchs had no impact at all. Blaydes and Paik (2016) discuss
some of the long­term effects of the crusades as a secular enterprise.
10Not all taxes on clergy were levied with the explicit purpose of crusade financing, yet there are no reasons to think that
popes did not combine revenues from different sources.
11Simultaneously, the fourteenth­century popes elaborated theological arguments whereby they claimed the right of
appointment to the ever increasing number of dioceses and smaller benefices, known as the right of provision (Weakland,
1968).
12Though reduced during the Reformation, the value of the Church’s assets remained significant until the Napoleonic
Wars, when remnants thereof were transferred to secular rulers. In the Holy Roman Empire alone, between 1803 and 1806
the Church lost territory inhabited by 3.2 million persons, or one­seventh of the Empire’s population (Brady, 2009, p. 410).
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Papal taxation of the clergy provedmuchmore successful than the Saladin tithe that was imposed on
the laity. For example, approximately two­thirds—950,000 livres—of the costs of the Seventh Crusade
(1248–1254), led by King Louis IX of France against Egypt, were funded from the proceeds of Church
taxation (Housley, 2010, p. 296). The Avignonese popes maintained a separate war chest: “[T]he sum
of over a million florins in gold was handed on from John XXII to Benedict XII, and from Benedict
XII to his successor, with the intention that this treasure should be preserved in order to finance a future
crusade in the Levant” (Partner, 1980, p. 31). Besides this sum, Pope Clement VI contributed between
112,000 and 145,000 florins to the Smyrna Crusade (1343–1349), which resulted in the emergence of
the only Christian outpost in Western Anatolia (Housley, 1986).
After the prolonged Great Western Schism (1378–1418), the Council of Constance (1414–1418)
eliminated some of the papal taxes and altered collection of others (Stump, 1989). As a frontier Catholic
state, Hungary enjoyed special treatment in the fifteenth century. According to one source, between
August 1464 and the spring of 1466, King Matthias Corvinus received more than 100,000 ducats di­
rectly from the papacy.13 “There were further payments in 1467–9, directly to the king or indirectly to
his captains” (Housley, 2010, p. 304). To fund anti­Turkish warfare, in 1462 the pope imposed a tenth
on the archdiocese of Santiago de Compostella in Galicia (Spain). We do not know the exact value of
the total income of Santiago de Compostella at the time, but it is known that the crusade tax negotiated
by the papal legate was 100,000 florins. Due to further resistance of the clergy of the archdiocese, this
sum was reduced to 35,000 florins, which was to be paid in two installments between 1474 and 1475
(Vázquez Bertomeu, 2002, p. 66). Even this reduced sum is striking in proportion to the aforemen­
tioned budget of the King of Hungary during the same period, considering that Galicia was relatively
remote from the Ottoman Empire (though close to the other “infidels” in Granada and North Africa)
and that it was just one of the many church provinces in which the tenth was levied.
Collection of revenues from the clergy continued after the beginning of the Reformation (1517),
even showing the signs of a “resurgence” by the end of the century.14 Likewise, the papacy continued
13The content of gold in ducats and florins was similar.
14“[I]n the second half of the sixteenth century there was a certain resurgence of the collectories in Spain, Portugal, the
Kingdom of Naples and (modestly) in the rest of Italy. By 1592 these sources were reckoned to be counted on for something
approaching 100,000 silver scudi annually, and similarly in 1619–23” (Partner, 1980, p. 48).
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subsidizing Catholic warfare. Pope Sixtus V (1585–1590) accumulated large sums that were supposed
to be used for a “future crusade against the Turks, or in case of […] the imminent occupation by heretics
or infidels of a Catholic country” (Partner, 1980, p. 30). During the Great Turkish War, Pope Innocent
XI (1676–1689) donated a total of 1,562,500 gold ducats to Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I. This
amount is roughly equivalent to 470 mln Ottoman akçes. By comparison, in 1660 the total salary
payments of the Ottoman army amounted to 286 mln akçes (Murphey, 2001, p. 17).
1.4 Theoretical Framework
1.4.1 Towards a Theory of Interstate Cooperation
In this section, I propose a theoretical framework that helps explain why the Church was better posi­
tioned to facilitate collective warfare against the “infidels” than individual Catholic rulers. Addressing
major security challenges, and providing global public goods more generally, requires cooperation
among many states. In the absence of international enforcement, a participating state has an incen­
tive to renege on its promises and free ride. Indeed, it was the commitment problem that undermined
medieval alliances, e.g., the Hanseatic League of northern German cities (Spruyt, 1996, pp. 163–164).
Alliances such as the NATO can be sustained in the long run if a hegemon, such as the US, bears a dis­
proportionate share of the burden. However, no state could play such a role in late medieval Europe.15
As discussed in the previous section, Catholic states, especially those located in the periphery,
had to cooperate to achieve military success. Why did not Catholic alliances break down, unlike the
Hanseatic League?16 I argue that alliances against the “infidels” proved enduring because rulers of the
member states voluntarily constrained discretionary power over domestic and international affairs.17
15Building on historical and climatic evidence, Stasavage (2016) attributes the small size of medieval European states
to the “accidental” nature of the barbaric invasions that destroyed the Roman Empire. The Carolingian Empire was an
exception, although it was short­lived.
16In a strict sense, they did break down, of course, as evident from numerous conflicts between England and France, or
Poland and the Teutonic Order. However, in a broader sense, Catholic military alliances existed from the time of the First
Crusade (1095) until the anti­Ottoman Holy League of 1717.
17Interestingly, conversion of pagans to Catholicism could also be motivated by security concerns. “[T]he possibility
cannot be excluded that the conversion [of Cumans] had been requested in the aftermath of the crushing defeat that the
Mongols had inflicted upon Cumans and Rus’ at Kalka, in the summer of 1223. The campaign led by Jebe and Sübedei
north of the Caucasus Mountains and deep into the steppe lands north of the Black Sea provoked much turmoil among the
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Honoring Church liberties in the form of exemption from royal taxation and non­interference in ap­
pointments of bishops served as a commitment device.
Two related aspects of the functioning of Catholic alliances need to be explained further: Why
did it have to be the Church and not some other organization? If the papacy were to lead alliances
on behalf of Christendom, why was its legal and fiscal power, however substantial it may have been,
confined to the clergy?18 The key to the answer lies in the interaction between the religious, political,
and economic roles of the Church. Unlike individual rulers, the Church also operated in the market for
religious services, or salvation (Ekelund et al., 2006). Therefore, the Church had a private incentive to
lead collective warfare: it internalized the potential loss of followers to the “infidels” and therefore had
incentives to act preemptively.19 So long as war was fought against the “infidels,” the cause that was
deemed as pious as rational, it was possible to induce positive selective incentives of the laity, in the
form of donating to the Church or not expropriating its possessions.20 Relatedly, if funds for crusading
were to be raised by secular rulers instead of the Church, they would not be able to credibly commit
not to use the tax proceeds against their Catholic neighbors, giving rise to the “security dilemma” and
undermining the very purpose of collective warfare. The case of the aforementioned Saladin tithe
(1187) is illustrative in this regard. It is hard to tell what share of the collected tithe King Richard I of
England actually spent on the Third Crusade, but he did take his time to conquer the Christian kingdom
of Sicily en route to the Holy Land in 1190 (Runciman, 1954).
The failure of the Saladin tithe, as an unpopular tax on the laity, also highlights the domestic politi­
cal economy conflict. While coercive, the Saladin tithe was practically hard to justify in the sense that
local nomads. […] That bleak perspective may have led some Cuman groups to seek protection from neighboring powers”
(Spinei, 2008, pp. 418–419).
18As far as litigation of a civil nature was concerned (e.g., property), canon law only applied to disputes among clerics
and to disputes between clerics and laymen. As for taxation of the laity, in 1274, at the Second Council of Lyons, Pope
Gregory X made the first and last attempt to impose a mandatory tax on all Christians to support crusading. There is no
evidence that it was collected anywhere (Housley, 2010, p. 295). While secular rulers, in turn, did tax the clergy, until the
Reformation this could not have happened without a formal authorization of a bishop or the pope.
19Along these lines, Ekelund et al. (2006) view the crusades as a form of “entry control.”
20The necessity of private rewards in large voluntary organizations was perhaps first emphasized by Olson (1965): “An
organization that did nothing except lobby to obtain a collective good for some large group would not have a source of
rewards or positive selective incentives it could offer potential members. Only an organization that also sold private or
noncollective products, or provided social or recreational benefits to individual members, would have a source of these
positive inducements” (p. 133).
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once the royal bureaucracy developed capacity to extract taxes, it would likely do so for non­crusading
activities as well.21 Scholars of state formation have modeled warfare as an example of a good that the
public might have incentives to fund under the “right” (i.e., democratic) type of political institutions
(Besley and Persson, 2009). At the same time, precisely because political representation took a long
time to develop (Angelucci et al., 2018), increasing state capacity, necessary to collect the Saladin
tithe and its would­be analogs, was met with suspicion and resistance of the laity. By contrast, papal
taxation of the clergy did not have this flaw, because joining the Church was a voluntary decision and
therefore must have been incentive­compatible.22
Besides the fiscal dimension, popes performed important functions in the sphere of diplomacy
and international law, which were also instrumental to the success of Catholic military alliances. To
protect the property of crusading monarchs and their claims to the throne, popes developed a legal
framework whereby compromising property rights of crusaders was punishable by excommunication;
royal regents, typically the spouses of kings, became a protected category under canon law (Park,
2018).23 Importantly, the degree to which such protections were enforced depended on the strength,
i.e., independence from the sovereign, of local ecclesiastical authorities.
To an extent, a durable alliance can be viewed as a substitute for the fiscal­military state, or even a
fiscal­military state operating on a different level. I argue that there are two major differences between
a nation­state and a supranational organization, such as the Church. First, relations between popes and
sovereigns were transactional rather than coercive. The availability of the “exit” option for the member
states means that the alliance is more credible the higher the perceived net benefits of participation;
depending on the present geopolitical circumstances and beliefs about the future states of the world,
the net benefits could be negative. By contrast, returns to investment in state capacity are typically
non­decreasing.24
Second, delegation of authority to a supranational organization coordinating the alliance (such as
the Church) and investment in fiscal capacity have different spillover effects, especially in the long
21Acemoglu et al. (2016) offer a theoretical model along these lines.
22Many clerical offices could be purchased against a fixed upfront payment or a stream of “dividends.”
23Similar legal protections existed for crusaders of lower rank and those who facilitated the crusades.
24Or at least they are conceptualized as such in the current literature (Besley and Persson, 2009).
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run. Supranational organizations are plagued by agency problems, and the Catholic Church was no
exception. Corruption of the popes, which among other things diverted resources from warfare, was
notorious. Also, the role of state capacity greatly increased with the development of military technol­
ogy (Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). It seems that monetary transfers from one Catholic state to another,
mediated by the papacy, were more effective in the era of mercenaries and less effective in the era of
standing armies, which required stable streams of revenue. Therefore, the states that chose to delegate
authority to the Church prior to the “Military Revolution,” could be locked in an inefficient equilibrium
ex post, even if they had acted rationally. Finally, strong state capacity proved essential to the growth
in the non­military sector, via better enforcement of contracts and property rights and better provision
of public goods.
Hypotheses To summarize, I expect that the Church enjoyed greater power in more vulnerable dio­
ceses. Additionally, I expect that demand for Church­provided collective security (monotonically)
decreased as non­Catholic military threats became distant not only spatially but also temporally. That
is, I expect that the impact of the proximity to the “infidels” was more pronounced over a five­year
period relative to a ten­year period, over ten years relative to twenty­five, and so on.
1.4.2 Appointments of Bishops as an Indicator of the Church’s Power
To test the empirical implications of my argument, a metric of the Church’s power in the late Middle
Ages is required. Such a metric should satisfy three conditions. First, it needs to be related to the
“primary” functions performed by the Church, namely, provision of religious services. Second, it needs
to be an outcome of bargaining between the sovereign and clergy, therefore, it should capture an asset
that is inherently valuable to both. Three, it needs to be defined, and measured, at the subnational level,
to account for the fact that medieval states were fragmented and sovereigns were constrained in their
ability to broadcast power.
I argue that the process whereby bishops were selected is a good candidate for such a metric. Bish­
ops were religious, political, and economic actors. In the first capacity, bishops had considerable
discretion in such matters as enforcing papal bulls, imposing interdicts, holding diocesan synods, im­
proving discipline of clergy. A bishop dedicated to clerical reform and pastoral work stayed in his
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diocese frequently, while a bishop serving the monarch was likely busy with diplomatic and other mis­
sions at the royal court.25 Additionally, archbishops had authority to investigate and confirm episcopal
elections in other dioceses, unless they were immediately subject to the Holy See.
As political actors, bishops were highly influential in state administration. Indeed, the choice of
a particular bishop could be consequential for internal political stability. Many bishops came from a
noble (and sometimes royal) background, therefore, they were well­positioned to organize a conspiracy
or uprising against the sovereign.26 The choice of archbishops was a particularly sensitive issue for
sovereigns, because archbishops had the exclusive right, granted by the pope, of crowning future kings.
In an electoral monarchy such as Poland, kings feared that the throne could be contested in the future, so
appointing a loyal person to the archdiocese of Gniezno could improve the odds of favorable succession.
A related concern for those involved in politics of the Holy Roman Empire was that the archbishops
of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier were among the seven imperial electors, and their vote could be decisive
in determining the succession of the imperial throne.
Finally, in their capacity as feudal lords, bishops ran large and wealthy estates, purchased cities,27
made investment in various business ventures, such as salt mines, issued their own currency,28 and
maintained their own armies.29 As economic agents of the Church, their responsibility was to preserve
the Church’s wealth and protect it against encroachments of other lords. Additionally, bishops could
impose and collect new local taxes on consumption goods, such as wine and beer, which often provoked
25Absenteeism of bishops was one of chief Martin Luther’s criticisms, which was addressed during the Council of Trent
(1545–1563).
26The origin of bishops seemed to matter. If a chapter was allowed to freely elect bishop, the pool of potential candidates
was not limited to that diocese or even that state. In such a case, the elected bishop could act in the interests of the pope
or another state. For example, in 1438 the chapter of Uppsala, which was antagonistic towards King Eric of Pomerania,
elected Nils Ragvaldsson as archbishop, who supported the plan of the Danish elite to replace Eric with Christopher of
Bavaria. The plan was successful (SRA, SBL26). On the other hand, papal appointments were made strategically as well.
In 1301, Boniface VIII translated Hugues de Chalon from Liège to Besançon to protect Burgundy against the pretensions
of the French king Philip the Fair (BHRR1, FEG4). Note: I use abbreviations to refer to primary sources. See the full list
in Appendix.
27In 1350, archbishop of Milan, Giovanni III Visconti, purchased the city of Bologna for 180,000 florins, which the pope
later punished by excommunication (VAB).
28For instance, archbishops of Reims had their own currency as late as the 1350s (FEG3).
29For example, in 1373, the private troops of Albert von Sternberg, the bishop of Litomysl, joined the army of the
Bohemian king during the invasion of Brandenburg (BHRR1).
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popular uprisings.30 From the perspective of sovereigns, dioceses, in addition to their tax value, were
viewed as an important patronage good that could be used to reward loyalists.31
1.5 Data
1.5.1 Dependent Variable: Appointments of Bishops
I use the beginning of the pontificate of Pope Innocent III (1198) as the starting point in my analysis
for two reasons. Many dioceses in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe were created during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, and organization of the cathedral chapter and demarcation of the dioce­
san boundaries took several decades. Also, the sources on France and the Holy Roman Empire I use
begin with the pontificate of Pope Innocent III. For consistency of analysis, and because the creation of
new dioceses could have been endogenous to the phenomena I study, I only include the dioceses that
existed by 1198. The beginning of the Protestant Reformation (1517) marks the end of my analysis
because many dioceses left the jurisdiction of the pope or were secularized.
I have created an original dataset on appointments of bishops using the most up­to­date, to my
knowledge, and authoritative printed sources available. For a bishop’s biography to be as complete
as possible, the researcher has to draw from accounts of contemporaries or chroniclers (if they exist),
the local (diocesan) archives, and the archives in the Vatican. The Archivio Segreto Vaticano became
open to the general public in 1881, and it has taken scholars decades of research to extract relevant
information (Boyle, 2001), a mission that is far from being complete. Therefore, with some exceptions,
I have discarded the sources published prior to the twentieth century, such as theGallia Christiana and
the first edition of the Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae. On the other hand, relying on the “official” papal
registers alone can lead to false conclusions. For instance, starting from the late thirteenth century,
what was de jure regarded as a papal appointment (provision) was, in a number of cases, confirmation
of a previously held capitular election or approval of a princely request. I provide the complete list of
30To give one example, Burchard von Schraplau, who was appointed by the pope to the archdiocese of Magdeburg in
1308, was not popular in the local community due to the new taxes on beer and salt. In 1328, he was arrested by citizens
and later murdered (BHRR1).
31Needless to say that clergy, and popes in particular, used wealthy bishoprics for patronage purposes as well.
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sources in Appendix.
For a bishop to be included in my dataset, the following pieces of information were required:
• the dates of the appointment, confirmation, and termination;
• the circumstances of the appointment and whether the diocese was contested;
• whether the bishop was actually able to take possession of the diocese;
• whether there were interruptions of the episcopate due to secular or papal interference.
In the dataset, I distinguish between bishops chosen by the cathedral chapter, pope, and what I
refer to as the “prince.” Those bishops whose appointment is only described in generic terms, without
a reference to a specific authority or legal procedure (e.g., election, nomination, papal provision), are
coded as missing values. The prince is a heterogeneous category, meaning a secular sovereign who
had de facto political power in the diocese. Depending on the local context, it could be the king, duke,
or city council. For a given diocese, the identity of the prince could change over time. For instance,
at various points appointments of bishops of Poitiers were influenced by dukes of Berry and later
by French kings. To give another example, dukes of Austria and Bavaria, as well as Holy Roman
Emperors, clashed over appointments of bishops of Passau during almost the entire period of study.
Because I am primarily interested in the political conflict between the Church and secular rulers as a
whole, I do not distinguish between the identities of the latter in my analysis. By default, vacancies are
coded as princely appointments,32 unless the identity of the temporary administrator is known (who
is then coded as a bishop). Historically, many administrators during sede vacante were appointed by
secular authorities. Sometimes bishops from the nearby jurisdictions acted as administrators, but they
were rarely, if at all, present in vacant dioceses. Also, such bishops could in turn be appointees of
princes.33
32The results in the empirical section are robust to this assumption.
33For instance, the archdiocese of Bremen was vacant from 1463–1496, with Heinrich von Schwarzburg serving as an
administrator. After he was installed the bishop of Münster by the duke of Cleves in 1466, he constantly resided in his main
see. I conduct a robustness check by dropping vacant years below. The notable exception is the Bohemian archdiocese of
Prague, the Catholic administration in which was disrupted in 1421 over the course of the Hussite Wars. After the end of
the rebellion, the archdiocese was governed by administrators chosen by the chapters, some of which were confirmed by
the pope. Because Prague did not have an archbishop until 1561, it is dropped from the sample after 1421.
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I describe the construction of the dataset in detail in Appendix. To illustrate how bishops were
coded, consider the career of Marquard von Randeck (Randegg), who was born around 1300.34 Before
becoming a bishop, Marquard served at the court of Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria. On June 27, 1343, he
was elected bishop of Bamberg by part of the chapter against an unknown opponent. The pope did not
want to grant the bishopric to a partisan of the emperor, quashed the election, and appointed Friedrich
von Hohenlohe instead. Five years later, on May 5, 1348, the pope awarded Marquard the diocese of
Augsburg at the request of the new emperor, Charles IV of Luxembourg. While a bishop, Marquard
served at Charles IV’s court. On August 23, 1365, the pope translated (transferred) Marquard from
Augsburg to the Patriarchate of Aquileia. Although Marquard remained loyal to Charles IV, there is no
indication in the sources that this translation was requested by the emperor. Marquard effectively took
possession of Aquileia in December 1365. Therefore, I code Marquard as a princely appointee during
his Augsburg episcopate (from 6/27/1343–8/23/1365) and as a papal appointee during the patriarchate,
interrupted by his death (1365/8/23–1381/1/3).35 Because he did not exercise control over the diocese
of Bamberg, Marquard is omitted from the list of its bishops.
The resulting dataset includes 63 dioceses, covering the present­day Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK. While the sample is not representative of Latin Christendom, my goal was 1) to
ensure that the most important dioceses (archdioceses) from each state are included (e.g., Reims in
France, Cologne in Germany, Gniezno in Poland), and 2) to have sufficient geographic variation in
a cross section, subject to the data availability. The panel is unbalanced due to the data availability
or ambiguity in the sources. Certain already coded dioceses were excluded from the sample because
the total length of unambiguous appointments of bishops, including confirmed vacancies, was less
than half of the panel length (320 years). For most dioceses that are included in the sample, I have
uninterrupted observations between 1198–1517 (see Appendix). Figure 1.1 shows the sample dioceses
at four different points in time.
34Source: BHRR1.
35Aquileia itself is not in the sample because of the lack of information on other patriarchs.
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There are a total of 1,370 unique bishops in the dataset, who held 1,483 terms. Some bishops occu­
pied several dioceses; others left their first diocese and eventually returned. If secular administration
of a given diocese (“temporalities”) was taken over by the prince, or if the bishop was excommuni­
cated/suspended by the pope and could no longer effectively exercise his rights, the appointment is
considered terminated. If the temporalities were restored, or if the bishop was absolved, I code contin­
uation as a new term. The time interval between the suspension and restoration is coded as vacancy.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the distribution of bishops by the initiation and termination event, respec­
tively. The average term length is roughly between 10 and 12.5 years, with moderate variation by the
appointing authority and time period (Table 1.4).
Table 1.1: Bishops data coverage by the modern state (1198–1517)
Modern state N, unique bishops N, dioceses Total length, years
Austria 48 2 588
Belgium 21 1 316
Cyprus 14 1 161
Czech Republic 39 2 496
France 223 10 2,758
Germany 205 9 2,704
Hungary 29 1 281
Italy 149 7 1,768
Latvia 15 1 246
Netherlands 20 1 297
Poland 134 6 1,831
Spain 51 2 585
Sweden 49 2 592
Switzerland 54 2 557
UK 341 16 4,774
All 1,370 63 17,954
Note:
Periods of vacancy are not included in the total length.
1.5.2 Independent Variable: External Military Threats
To measure the degree of external military threats faced by medieval Catholic states, I utilize raster
maps from the Centennia Historical Atlas (Clockwork Mapping, 2018). These maps have been re­
19
Table 1.2: Bishops’ terms by the initiation event and century (1198–1517)
Initiation event / Century 13th 14th 15th 16th N, total
Elected 333 176 145 20 674
Appointed by pope 66 186 137 22 411
Translated 35 121 113 16 285
Appointed by prince 16 8 22 2 48
Postulated 6 4 6 1 17
Appointed by (arch­)bishop 10 3 2 – 15
Succeeded – 1 5 6 12
Custody granted by prince – 1 9 1 11
Changed allegiance 3 3 – – 6
Absolved by pope 2 1 1 – 4
All 471 504 440 68 1,483
Note:
Prince refers to the secular sovereign, the identity of which is
context­specific (the king, duke, city council, etc.). “Appointed”
is not equivalent to “nominated.” For more detail, see Appendix.
Century refers to the century of the initiation event. The years
1198 and 1199 are included in the thirteenth century.
cently used by Abramson and Carter (2016) and Abramson (2017).36 They indicate yearly territorial
changes and cover the entire period of 1198–1517. Conveniently, the Centennia Historical Atlas de­
picts actual territorial possessions and not territories claimed. I use the boundaries as of the beginning
of each year.
To identify the relevant population of the “infidels” in a given year, I record all non­Christian states
that were partly or fully located in Europe or in the regions adjacent to Europe at any point. If in some
year such a state was conquered or converted to Christianity (e.g., the Cumans from 1227 or Lithuania
from 1387), it is no longer considered an external threat for my purposes. Certain states, such as the
Timurid Empire, did not have recorded military encounters with Catholic states, but I still include
them in the sample for consistency, because other states that historically occupied Asia Minor did have
conflicts with the Catholics and were the target of the crusades. See Appendix for the full list of the
“infidels” used in the analysis.
I adopt a similar vectorization procedure to the one used in Abramson and Carter (2016) andAbram­
36I am grateful to Scott F. Abramson for sharing his GIS version of these maps.
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Table 1.3: Bishops’ terms by the termination event and century (1198–1517)
Termination event / Century 13th 14th 15th 16th N, total
Died 337 357 306 93 1,093
Translated 13 78 64 14 169
Resigned 26 25 35 12 98
Removed by pope 13 6 10 1 30
Elevated to cardinal 4 16 3 – 23
Suspended by prince 7 6 8 2 23
Removed by prince 4 3 4 – 11
Administration expired 4 4 1 – 9
Suspended by pope 5 3 1 – 9
Changed allegiance 3 3 – – 6
Excommunicated 3 2 – 1 6
Elevated to pope – 1 2 1 4
Diocese lost – – 1 1 2
All 419 504 435 125 1,483
Note:
Prince refers to the secular sovereign, the identity of which is
context­specific (the king, duke, city council, etc.). Century refers
to the century of the termination event. The years 1198 and 1199
are included in the thirteenth century.
Table 1.4: Bishops’ term length by the appointing authority and century (1198–1517)
Bishop chosen by / Century 13th 14th 15th 16th Total average, years
Chapter 12.5 12.8 14.7 17.6 13.3
Pope 11.2 9.3 12.1 13.0 10.9
Prince 12.4 12.8 11.5 16.6 12.7
Note:
Prince refers to the secular sovereign, the identity of which is context­specific
(the king, duke, city council, estates, etc.). Century refers to the century of
appointment. The years 1198 and 1199 are included in the thirteenth century.
son (2017), except I also include the states in the Middle East and North Africa and use annual, instead
of five­year, intervals. I use 141 cities in Europe and beyond for georeferencing, meaning that the coor­
dinates of those cities on the resulting vector maps and in the real world exactly coincide, and the areas
around them are interpolated using a cubic spline method. The list of the cities used for georeferencing
is provided in Appendix.
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1.6 Empirical Strategy and Results
To analyze the effect of external military threats on the probability of a diocese being governed by a
papal appointee, I consider the following regression model:
PrincelyAppointeeit =
5∑
k=1
βkInfidelski,t−1 + δi + λt + ψit+ ϵit, (1.1)
where i denotes the diocese and t denotes the year. The dependent variable, PrincelyAppointeeij, cap­
tures the institutional state: it is equal to 1 if diocese i in year t was governed by a bishop or arch­
bishop chosen by the sovereign and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the prelate was chosen by the pope or chapter).
Infidelski,t−1, k = 1, . . . , 5 is a set of indicator variables defined as:
Infidelskt−1 = I{lk−1 ≤ DistancetoInfidelsi,t−1 < lk}, k = 2, . . . , 5, (1.2)
with l1 = 0, l2 = 200, . . . , l5 = 1000 km.
DistancetoInfidelsi,t−1 is the shortest distance from diocese i to the closest non­Christian state
(“infidel”) at time t−1. More precisely, it is the great­circle distance between the episcopal see (location
of the cathedral) of diocese i and the polygons representing potential threats. Note that by construction,
the events defined by the indicator variables (1.2) are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the distance of
more than 1000 km between diocese i and the closest “infidel” serves as the reference group in my
analysis.37 The specification (1.2) is flexible in that it allows for a possibly heterogeneous impact of
external threats at different cutoff points. In other words, the “treatment” intensity could be different
when moving from 0 to 201 km and from 800 to 1001 km. The width of the intervals (200 km) was
chosen so as to have a sufficient number of dioceses between the cutoff points (see Table 1.5).
The coefficients βk capture the effect of the proximity (remoteness) of non­Christian security
threats on the likelihood of the (arch­)bishop being chosen by the secular sovereign. The diocese
fixed effect, δi, captures unobservable time­invariant characteristics of a particular region, such as the
37By construction, England and Scotland are included in the reference group during the entire period of study. My
calculations suggest that the shortest distance between London and the “infidels” in 1198, at the beginning of the panel, is
approximately 1,158 km.
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Table 1.5: Distribution of the sample dioceses by the distance to the “infidels” (1198–1517)
Distance, km Unique dioceses
0–200 7
200–400 15
400–600 26
600–800 32
800–1000 36
1000+ 37
Note:
For every diocese, distance is
defined as the great­circle dis­
tance between the episcopal see
(location of the cathedral) and
the nearest “infidel.”
The number of dioceses in the
second column does not sum
to the total number of dioceses
in the sample (63), because the
distance to the “infidels” from
any given diocese could change
over time.
pre­existing economic and political institutions and previous (pre­1198) religious and cultural trends,
which are likely correlated with appointments of bishops and the distance from the European periphery.
The term λt is the year fixed effect, which absorbs the events common to all dioceses in year t, including
the identity of the pope, whether the Curia was located at Rome or Avignon, and various conflicts and
reformist tendencies within the Church (e.g., the Conciliar movement in the fifteenth century). The
terms ψit are diocese­specific trends. These trends account for possible slow­moving social and cul­
tural variables that are heterogeneous across dioceses and correlate both with appointments of bishops
and the proximity to non­Catholic military threats. For instance, in the fifteenth century, the ideas of
Gallicanism spread over most of France, which resulted in the increased independence of the French
clergy from the pope and the reduction in the taxes paid to the Curia (Thomson, 1980). It is likely
that this shock to the self­perceived national identity of French bishops also improved the bargaining
position of the king. By its nature, however, the shock and the renegotiated tax levels were confined
to the territory of France (its northern and central part in particular). Therefore, the omission of the
diocese­specific trends would likely lead to a bias in the coefficients of interest. Finally, ϵit is the error
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term.
It is important to note that, implicitly, the variable on the left­hand side of Equation (1.1) is viewed
as an outcome of bargaining between the secular ruler and the Church, represented by the cathedral
chapter or Curia, at any given point in time. The fact that in a relatively large number of cases—26%
(see Table 1.3)—bishops’ term did not end due to a natural cause supports this assumption. Likewise,
I assume that the length of the interval between the appointment and confirmation of a new bishop,
which is regarded as vacancy, is also an equilibrium outcome.38 By design, Equation (1.1) does not
distinguish between papal appointments and elections by cathedral chapters, so long as those occurred
independently from the will of the sovereign. I do not assert that the interests of the pope and the local
clergy were perfectly aligned.39 Rather, I assume that they were “aligned enough” in the face of a
possible conflict with sovereigns.
At the core of my identification strategy is the parallel trends assumption, that is, I expect the
changes in the selection of bishops in different dioceses to be attributable to the changes in the degree
of external threat and not to other events associated with the proximity to the “infidels.” The inclu­
sion of the diocese­specific trends makes this approach more flexible. While the coefficients yielded
by estimation of Equation (1.1) should be regarded as suggestive rather than causal due to the non­
experimental nature of the data, I believe that my empirical strategy can highlight novel patterns about
the relationship between the Church’s power and non­Catholic military threats.
Considering the large number of fixed effects included, I estimate Equation (1.1) and its modifi­
cations using a linear probability model (LPM).40 Because episcopal sees are not distributed indepen­
dently across space, the inclusion of the distance variables on the right­hand side of the equation can
potentially induce spatial correlation in a cross section. I account for spatial correlation by adopting
Conley’s (1999) method to compute the standard errors. This method models error spatial dependence
38For instance, the pope could investigate a given election or appointment with scrutiny or confirm it quickly instead. In
turn, chapters, princes, and elected bishops themselves could request the pope to speed up the confirmation process.
39There were genuine, prolonged conflicts within the Church. The most serious crises, the Great Western Schism (1378–
1417) and the Conciliar movement following the Council of Constance (1414–1418), gave rise to several anti­popes, who
were viewed as legitimate by part of the clergy.
40Limited dependent variable models, such as logit and probit, suffer from the incidental parameter problem in the panel
data context (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 611). In addition, using a logit or probit model would lead to the loss of information on
dioceses that never had princely appointed bishops during the period of interest, such as Aberdeen and Cologne.
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assuming that it linearly decreases with distance from every given diocese and disappears completely
at a certain threshold. I choose 200 km as the threshold.41
In the main part of my analysis, I exclude the period of the Great Western Schism (1378–1417),
because at the time, there were two—and after the Council of Pisa (1409) three—rival popes. It is
likely that the bargaining process between princes and popes during this period was different. A second
rationale for excluding this period from the sample is that certain dioceses, such as Constance, were
simultaneously claimed (and effectively governed) by two rival bishops, appointed by the Avignonese
and Roman popes, with or without support of secular powers. Excluding such cases decreases the
likelihood of a measurement error.42
Due to the persistent nature of the state boundaries and institutions, and the “inertia” in the turnover
of bishops (as many of them remained in office until they passed away), I estimate Equation (1.1)
using data at different intervals: five, ten, twenty­five, and 50 years.43 With the panel length close
to or greater than the average length of episcopal appointments, within­bishop correlation in the error
terms in Equation (1.1) becomes less of a concern. Additionally, this strategy allows me to distinguish
between the short­, medium­, and long­term impact of external military threats on appointments of
bishops.
The results of estimation of Equation (1.1) are presented in Table 1.6. Columns (1)–(4) and (5)–
(8) provide the results without and with the diocese­specific trends, respectively. Note that given the
slow­moving nature of political institutions, and the fact that in certain periods the state borders were
essentially constant, the inclusion of the trends in the regression could be demanding.
The estimate in “Infidels,” 0—200 km in column (1) indicates that the effect of being located
within 200 km from the nearest “infidel” is ­34.6 p.p., relative to the baseline. In other words, having a
common border with the “infidels,” or being almost adjacent, is associated with a differential 34.6 p.p.
increase in the likelihood of the bishop being selected independently from the sovereign (by the pope
41The results below are robust to the choice of alternative threshold values.
42I still include the period of 1378–1417 as a robustness check below.
43As in other studies that use a similar empirical strategy (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2008), I do not average over these
intervals and use actual observations instead.
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or chapter).44 Given that the baseline probability is 31.1 percent, this is a substantively large effect.
Note that, because Table 1.6 includes the diocese fixed effects, and because I only analyze the dioceses
created before 1198, this effect cannot be explained by the location of certain dioceses in the European
periphery per se.
Consistently with the hypotheses above, as external military threats become more distant geograph­
ically, the Church’s political power decreases, almost monotonically. This is reflected in the magnitude
of the respective coefficients in “Infidels”, 200 to 1000 km. For example, the differential impact of
being located between 800 and 1000 km away from the closest “infidel”—compared to the dioceses
located more than 1000 km away—is only ­10.4 p.p., approximately a third of the baseline.
In columns (2)–(4), I estimate the same equation using data at larger intervals. With the exception of
the coefficients in “Infidels,” 0—200 km, the magnitude of the effect gradually diminishes as external
military threats are measured at a more distant point in time, and vanishes almost completely at the
interval of 50 years. It should be emphasized, however, that the statistical power also decreases as
the sample size shrinks, especially considering the number of the fixed effects included. Therefore,
the available data might not be adequate for detecting the impact of the presence of external military
threats on the Church­state relations at very large intervals.
The inclusion of the diocese­specific trends does not affect the results qualitatively for the 5­year
panel and distance up to 600 km, as indicated in column (5). Accounting for the unobserved slow­
moving changes in dioceses, the estimated impact of the distance from the “infidels” on the likelihood
of bishops being chosen independently from the sovereign varies between ­18.4 and ­15.1 p.p. As
columns (6)–(8) show, the estimates render imprecise and become statistically indistinguishable from
zero at larger intervals.45
I conduct two sets of robustness checks. First, in Table 1.7 I show that the results of the baseline
specification are not sensitive to the assumption of vacancies being treated as princely appointments.
Excluding all periods of episcopal vacancy (unless the identity of the temporary administrator and how
he was chosen is known), I find that, if anything, the effect of the distance from the “infidels” on
44Recall that the reference group is the dioceses located more than 1000 km away from the closest “infidel.”
45Column (8) is included for consistency. Given the number of the fixed effects and diocese­specific trends in the model,
the number of observations in the 50­year panel is not adequate for identification of the main variables of interest.
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appointments of bishops is even stronger at all intervals and distances (between ­35.6 and ­12.5 p.p.
in the five­year panel). At the same time, the baseline probability drops to 26.9 percent. Finally, I
re­estimate Equation (1.1) by including the period of the Great Western Schism (1378–1418) in the
sample (see Table 1.8). Reassuringly, the results are qualitatively similar to the main specification.
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1.7 Case Study: Episcopal Appointments in Poland Before and After the Chris­
tianization of Lithuania (1387)
In this section, I conduct a case study to further illuminate the mechanism relating appointments of
bishops to protection from external military threats. In large swaths of Central and Eastern Europe,
which were Christianized by 1000, monarchs enjoyed the exclusive right of nomination of bishops
until the thirteenth century and bargained with the pope to regain this right in the fifteenth century.46
Here I focus on the case of Poland, for which I have nearly complete data coverage. According to my
data, the first bishops that were appointed independently from Polish monarchs governed from 1212
in Poznań, from 1220 in Gniezno, from 1225 in Płock, and only from 1267 in Kraków,47 the capital of
the senior member of the ruling Piast dynasty.
I link the rise of the political power of the Church in thirteenth­century Poland to the rise of external
military threats at its eastern border. In 1241, Poland suffered from a major Tatar invasion in 1241;
subsequent Tatar invasions occurred in 1259, 1332, 1338, 1341.48 In addition, between 1248 and 1342
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania grew from a union of Baltic pagans to a powerful state, absorbing large
territories of the former Kievan Rus’ (see Figure 1.2). Błaszczyk (1998) records a total of 52 Lithuanian
raids against Poland between 1220 and 1376 (Figure 1.3). Internal political instability in Poland made
the matters even worse. Following the death of King Bolesław III Wrymouth (1138), Poland was
divided into five principalities. Dynastic rivalries among the members of the Piast dynasty led to the
decrease of the historical territory and to the weakness of the kingdom, making it vulnerable against
external threats (Frost, 2015).49
46To give an example from Bohemia, King Ottokar I agreed to recognize future elections of bishops of Olomouc in 1207.
The first independent appointment was made in 1241 (BHRR1).
47I do not have information on one remaining Polish diocese, Włocławek (Kujawy). The dioceses of Breslau (Wrocław)
and Kammin (Kamień Pomorski), for which I do have data, were under the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire during
the period of study.
48Sources: PBK for 1241 and 1259, Knoll (1974) for 1332–1341.
49Note that political fragmentation was typical of other contemporary European states, such as the Holy Roman Empire
and France.
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Figure 1.2: Expansion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
Source of the image: adapted from Rowell (1995, p. XXV). The solid black line depicts the border of
the Duchy by the end of Gediminas’ reign (1315/1316–1341/1342). The shaded areas outside this line
represent Lithuania’s allies and dependent territories.
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Under such circumstances, Polish rulers had to seek help externally. Because the Tatars and Lithua­
nians were not Christians, warfare against them could be presented as a pious cause. For example, in
1363 King Casimir III wrote to the pope, re­iterating the previous requests and saying that the battle
“for the Kingdom of Poland, which is located near the perverse nations of unbelievers, is a defense of
the faith which ought to be supported by subsidies” (Knoll, 1974, p. 393).
The Church was responsive to these requests. On May 14, 1253, Pope Innocent IV proclaimed
a crusade “against the Tatars and their pagan allies” (Knoll, 1974, p. 386). In October 1343, Pope
Clement VI demanded the bishop of Kammin (in Pomerania), Johann von Sachsen­Lauenburg, to col­
lect the so­called Peter’s Pence and transfer it to the archbishop of Gniezno.50 It is important to mention
in this context that Pomerania did not have a common border with Lithuania, and therefore supporting
Poland in its struggle against the Lithuanians could be viewed as a waste of resources by Pomeranian
rulers. It is also worth emphasizing that Johann von Sachsen­Lauenburg had been appointed to the
diocese of Kammin by the pope, and not by the duke of Pomerania, in September 1343. In December
of the same year, the pope also ordered a levy of a two­year tithe from the diocese of Kammin in favor
of Casimir III to fight against the Tatars and Lithuanians.
The tensions between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities in Pomerania grew. In 1356, Duke
Bogislaw V of Pomerania­Wolgast forced the clergy of Kammin to sign a treaty requiring that elections
of future bishops would only occur with consent of the duke. Simultaneously, the diocesan possessions
were put under ducal protection. The first bishop of Kammin who was elected in accordance with the
treaty of 1356, Philipp von Rehberg, governed from 1371.51 Strikingly, in Poland itself, the overall
pattern of appointments of bishops closely followed the frequency of Lithuanian raids against Poland
before Lithuania’s Christianization in 1387, which marked the end of the crusades in Eastern Europe
(Figure 1.3). As Frost (2015) argues, nor the conversion of Lithuania to Catholicism, nor its eventual
union with Poland were inevitable from the perspective of contemporaries. The fact that the Church
simultaneously enjoyed political power in the two neighboring states, which faced the threat of invasion
by the common enemy to a varying degree, is indicative of the fact that the Church facilitated military
cooperation between them.
50Source: BHRR1.
51Source: BHRR1.
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1.8 Implications: The Protestant Reformation (1517) and European Develop­
ment
The ubiquity of the Church in all aspects of life in the late Middle Ages is manifested in the fact that
social scientists have studied its influence through what it was not, i.e., by focusing on the crises that
diminished the Church’s bargaining power vis­à­vis secular rulers. The Protestant Reformation (1517)
was the most serious crisis experienced by the Church, and its political and economic ramifications are
hard to overstate.52 Increased religious competition in the aftermath of the Reformation diminished the
“legitimizing” authority of the Church, and the papacy in particular, which incentivized rulers to turn to
other sources of legitimacy, such as assemblies and parliaments (Rubin, 2017).53 In the socioeconomic
sphere, the decline of the authority of the Roman Church not only led to higher religious competition
but also to secularization, in the form of the decreased attractiveness of religious education and more
resources allocated towards civil purposes (Cantoni et al., 2018). While the direct relationship between
the Reformation and economic prosperity is hard to establish due to the lack of contemporaneous data,
it seems that in the long run, at least, the Reformation indeed contributed to higher prosperity via
the spread of literacy (Becker and Woessmann, 2009).54 Scholars have also pointed out the negative
outcomes associated with the Reformation, such as the spread of anti­Semitism (Becker and Pascali,
2018).
Why did the Reformation begin when and where it did? The existing quantitative studies on the
origins of the Reformation tend to conceptualize it as a purely religious movement and focus on either
52It has been argued that the earlier crisis of the Church, the GreatWestern Schism (1378–1417), also had a lasting impact
on European development via the human capital channel (Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2014).
53“The decline of religious legitimacy following the Reformation paved the way for different propagating agents to
increase their say in governance. The agents in the best position to replace the Church were…merchants, urban commercial
interests, and the landed elite” (Rubin, 2017, p. 137).
54To the extent that reliable, if highly aggregated, economic indicators do exist for the pre­Reformation period (Fouquet
and Broadberry, 2015), there is at least suggestive evidence of England’s and Holland’s economies accelerating after 1500,
while Italy’s being stagnant. Using urbanization rates as an outcome, Acemoglu et al. (2005) reach the same conclusion,
although they emphasize a different mechanism in explaining post­1500 prosperity. The political impact of the Reformation
is similarly had to put in quantitative terms. Using the frequency of parliamentary meetings as one such metric, van Zanden
et al. (2012) document the rise of parliaments in most, though not all, Protestant lands after 1500, with some reversal in the
seventeenth century.
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the timing or the geography of the Reformation but not both.55 Iyigun (2008) investigates the temporal
margin and argues that the advance of the Turks in the sixteenth century “enabled” the Reformation
by diverting the resources of Catholic states and the Holy Roman Emperor in particular. Rubin (2014)
investigates the geographic margin and argues that the diffusion of the Reformation was associated with
the spread of the printing press. I do not argue that ideologywas not an important factor in the success of
the Reformation; combined with favorable external conditions (such as the advancement of the Turks
or the availability of the printing press in a particular location), Martin Luther’s 95 Theses indeed
could have sparked a much stronger reaction than Bohemian Hussitism a century earlier, for example.
However, the ideological appeal of Protestantism seemed to matter more in the Holy Roman Empire
than elsewhere.56 At the beginning of the Reformation in other Northern European states, particularly
in Sweden, conversion to Protestantism was not part of a popular movement but was rather a well­
calculated political decision.57 It is also unclear why Catholicism could not benefit from the spread of
the printing press to the same extent as Protestantism did. In fact, it was often the Catholic Church that
promoted the printing press. Saxony, the birthplace of the Reformation, was coincidentally one of the
major centers of Catholic printing, which only intensified after 1517 as Duke George of Saxony fought
a polemical battle against Luther using pamphlets (Volkmar, 2017).
To explain both the timing and the geography of the Reformation, one should focus on the political
context of converting to Protestantism. What did Northern European rulers find appealing about the
Reformation? I argue that the decision of the political elites in Northern European states to break ties
with the papacy was influenced by their relative security from external military threats in the sixteenth
century. As Luther wrote in his “Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation” (1520):58
Long ago the emperors and princes ofGermany allowed the Pope to claim the annates from
55See Becker et al. (2016) for a recent review of the literature.
56Cantoni (2012) suggests that the adoption of Protestantism by princes in the Holy Roman Empire was influenced by
the behavior of their neighbors, which might or might not have been ideologically motivated.
57“[T]he period of transition lasted for a greater number of years, approximating to an organic development rather than
a sudden break. Outside Stockholm the Reformation depended little on a popular awakening. The attitude of the king was
of first importance.” (Andersen, 1990, p. 156).
58Adapted from https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/luther­nobility.asp. Accessed on November 30, 2018. Emphasis
is mine. Annate is a tax that bishops, confirmed by the pope, were obliged to pay to the Curia. It was proportional to the
annual income of a diocese (roughly between one­third and one­half).
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all German benefices. The object of this concessionwas that the Pope should collect a fund
with all this money to fight against the Turks and infidels, and to protect Christendom.
[…] Even if it were proposed to collect any such treasure for use against the Turks, we
should be wise in future, and remember that the German nation is more fitted to take
charge of it than the Pope.
Somewhat ironically, according to historical accounts, the fiscal authority of the papacy in Northern
Europe had declined well before rulers converted to Protestantism: “In the financial field the Protes­
tant revolution […] terminated and legalized a process which was near its end when the revolution
broke out” (Partner, 1980, p. 49). In Denmark, kings increasingly shirked participation in the crusades
in Southern Europe by somewhat exaggerating the threat they faced in their lands: “The idea that
the heathens also attacked Christendom in the North and Danish kings had a crusade frontier of their
own—often preventing them from participating in the crusade against the Turk—was to be a standard
argument during the [fifteenth] century” (Jensen, 2007, p. 51). Since by that time the supposed pagan
“threat” in Northern Europe was virtually non­existent, the unwillingness of Danish kings to participate
in the crusades reflects the fact that Denmark would have been a net “donor” in the Catholic collective
security system.
The example of the relations between French kings and the papacy is also instructive. While French
kings did not convert to Protestantism, the political power of the Church in France was weak. In the
aftermath of the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438), most bishops in central and northern France
were nominated to chapters by the king, after which they were always “elected.” During the sixteenth
century, not only did France not participate in Catholic alliances against the Ottomans but King Francis
I even established his own alliance with Sultan Suleiman I in 1536. As Vaughan (1954) wrote, “the
geographical position of France sheltered her. […] Thus it was France who… grasped at the Turkish
sword to throw it into the scales of the European balance” (p. 104). In 1551, the royal council even
discussed establishment of a French patriarchate, with Cardinal Charles de Bourbon as the patriarch,
which terrified the pope. The cardinal, however, “curbed his ambition for the sake of Catholic unity
against the Protestants and the Turks” (Baumgartner, 1986, p. 17).
The examples of Denmark and France, along with the case study of Poland in the previous section,
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signify the importance of external security threats, or the lack thereof, in the state­Church relations
prior to the Reformation.
1.9 Conclusion
For centuries, the Catholic Church determined the political, economic, and cultural development of
medieval Europe. I argue that to a large extent, the differential decline in the influence of the Church
was because of differential demand for collective security. Popes coordinated military alliances against
the non­Catholic “infidels,” such as the Lithuanians, Moors, and Turks, which posed significant threat
to the states in Southern and Northeastern Europe but not in Northwestern Europe. I measure the
influence of the Church in a given diocese and period by asking whether the bishop was appointed
independently from the sovereign in that region. Using originally collected data, I provide evidence for
the inverse relationship between external military threats—and hence potential demand for interstate
cooperation—and the likelihood of the bishop being an appointee of the sovereign.
The main implication of the present study for the debates on the rise of centralized states and the
origins of the Reformation is that, unless one defines the decline of the Church in strictly theological
terms, it was not a “one­off” event: bishops that were subordinate to secular rulers emerged before the
Reformation. For instance, in the sixteenth century, France was on the verge of establishing its own
patriarchate, which could have been akin to the Church of England under King Henry VIII. Therefore,
arguments linking the Reformation to European political and economic development should either con­
sider an extended sample of states or rather focus on the more “immediate” theological and cultural
aspects of Protestantism. Somewhat speculatively, the Church­state equilibrium, resulting from the
asymmetry of external military threats, could partly explain why by 1500 England and the Nether­
lands became more prosperous than Italy and why they remained so before the onset of the Industrial
Revolution.
To conclude, it should be noted that as an international organization, the medieval Church was
plagued by agency problems. Corruption, nepotism, and luxurious lifestyle of popes, which among
other things diverted resources from warfare, were notorious. Therefore, it is better to think of dele­
gation of authority to the Church as a “second­best” solution to the collective security problem in the
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world in which interstate contractual obligations are otherwise hard to enforce. Overall, though, the
Church as a supranational institution was replaced with a system of sovereign states not long after it
became obsolete, and even burdensome, from a military perspective.
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1.10 Appendix: Data Sources and Description
1.10.1 Appointments of Bishops: Sources
Because over the course of their career many bishops moved from one diocese to another, the details
on their biography are often scattered across multiple sources. Below is the complete set of sources I
used, although some of the dioceses they are dedicated to are not included in the database.
For the sake of brevity, I cite entire volumes and not individual chapters. It should be noted, how­
ever, that in many cases articles on particular bishops, included in the same volume, are written by
different authors.
1.10.1.1 Castile and Navarre
AT Los arzobispos de Toledo en la Baja Edad Media (s. XII–XV)
HOP1 Historia de los obispos de Pamplona. Vol. I
HOP2 Historia de los obispos de Pamplona. Vol. II
1.10.1.2 Cyprus
Coureas1997 The Latin Church in Cyprus, 1195–1312
Coureas2010 The Latin Church in Cyprus, 1313–1378
EOHCC État et origine du haut clergé de Chypre avant le Grand Schisme d’après les Registres des
Papes du XIIIe et du XIVe siècle
HALIC Histoire des archevêques latins de l’île de Chypre
1.10.1.3 Denmark and Sweden
BLS Biskopar i Lunds stift 1060–1637
DBL4 Dansk biografisk Lexikon. Vol. 4
DBL6 Dansk biografisk Lexikon. Vol. 6
DBL8 Dansk biografisk Lexikon. Vol. 8
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DBL14 Dansk biografisk Lexikon. Vol. 14
DBL17 Dansk biografisk Lexikon. Vol. 17
NFB18 Nordisk familjebok. Vol. 18
SBL4 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 4
SBL16 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 16
SBL18 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 18
SBL20 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 20
SBL22 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 22
SBL26 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 26
SBL28 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 28
SBL29 Svenskt biografiskt lexikon. Vol. 29
SRA Svea rikes ärkebiskopar från 1164 till nuvarande tid
1.10.1.4 England (with Wales)
All Fasti volumes refer to the second edition.
FEA1bath Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 7, Bath and Wells
FEA2bath Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 8, Bath and Wells Diocese
FEA1chichester Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 5, Chichester
FEA2chichester Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 7, Chichester Diocese
FEA1coventry Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 11, Coventry and Lichfield
FEA2coventry Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 10, Coventry and Lichfield Diocese
FEA1exeter Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 10, Exeter
FEA2exeter Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 9, Exeter Diocese
FEA1hereford Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 8, Hereford
FEA2hereford Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 2, Hereford Diocese
FEA1lincoln Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 3, Lincoln
FEA2lincoln Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 1, Lincoln Diocese
FEA1london Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 1, St. Paul’s, London
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FEA2london Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 5, St Paul’s, London
FEA1monastic Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 2, Monastic Cathedrals (Northern
and Southern Provinces)
FEA2monastic Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 4, Monastic Cathedrals (Southern
Province)
FEA1salisbury Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 4, Salisbury
FEA2salisbury Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 3, Salisbury Diocese
FEA1welsh Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 9, the Welsh Cathedrals (Bangor,
Llandaff, St Asaph, St Davids)
FEA2welsh Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 11, the Welsh Dioceses (Bangor,
Llandaff, St Asaph, St Davids)
FEA1york Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066–1300: Volume 6, York
FEA2york Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300–1541: Volume 6, Northern Province (York, Carlisle and
Durham)
1.10.1.5 France
FEG1 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 1, Diocèse d’Amiens
FEG2 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 2, Diocèse de Rouen
FEG4 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 4, Diocèse de Besançon
FEG5 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 5, Diocèse d’Agen
FEG6 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 6, Diocèse de Rodez
FEG7 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 7, Diocèse d’Angers
FEG8 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 8, Diocèse de Mende
FEG10 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 10, Diocèse de Poitiers
FEG11 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 11, Diocèse de Sens
FEG12 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 12, Diocèse d’Autun
FEG13 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 13, Diocèse de Bordeaux
FEG14 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 14, Châlons­en­Champagne
FEG15 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 15, Diocèse de Chalon­sur­Saône
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FEG16 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 16, Diocèse d’Auxerre
FEG17 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Vol. 17, Diocèse de Toul
1.10.1.6 The Holy Roman Empire, Baltic, and Switzerland
BHRR1 Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches: 1198 bis 1448
BHRR2 Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches: 1448 bis 1648
HS13 Helvetia sacra. Vol. 1.3, Archidiocèses et diocèses. Le diocèse de Genève. L’archidiocèse de
Vienne en Dauphiné
HS15 Helvetia sacra. Vol. 1.5, Erzbistümer und bistümer/Archidiocèses et diocèses. Das bistum
Sitten/Le diocèse de Sion. L’archidiocèse de Tarentaise
1.10.1.7 Hungary
EE Esztergomi érsekek 1001–2003
KEE A kalocsai érsekek életrajza (1000–1526)
MES4 Monumenta Ecclesiae Strigoniensis. Volume 4
MVA1 Magyarország világi archontológiája 1000–1301
MVA2 Magyarország világi archontológiája 1301–1457
MVA3 Magyarország világi archontológiája 1458–1526
1.10.1.8 Italy
CCS Il cammino della Chiesa salernitana ­ nell’opera dei suoi vescovi (sec. V–XX). Vol. 1
CDCPT Cronotassi per le diocesi di Cremona, Pavia e Tortona nei secoli XIV e XV
CSSV La Chiesa di Siena e i suoi Vescovi
CVAP Cronotassi dei vescovi e arcivescovi di Pisa
CVDB Cronotassi dei vescovi della Diocesi di Bisignano (A.D. 744–1990)
VAB I Vescovi e gli Arcivescovi di Bologna, 2nd ed.
VAM Vescovi e arcevescovi di Milano, 2nd ed.
VM I Vescovi di Mileto
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VV I Vescovi di Verona
1.10.1.9 Poland
AGT Arcybiskupi gnieźnieńscy w tysiącleciu
DAP2 Dzieje Archidiecezji Poznańskiej. Vol. 2
EP Episkopat Płocki w latach 1075–2015
PBK Poczet biskupów krakowskich
1.10.1.10 Scotland
FES Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae Medii Aevi Ad Annum 1638
1.10.2 Appointments of Bishops: Construction of the Dataset
Due to significant contextual variation, the differential availability of primary sources, and differential
timing of publication, there is considerable heterogeneity in how episcopal appointments are described
across sources. Importantly, these accounts also vary by the period of study, which could reflect le­
gal and theological innovations of the Church, or changes in the Church­state relations, or both. For
instance, before 1300 most papal appointments are described in sources as “appointments” (proper),
whereas after 1300 many papal appointments are referred to as “provisions.” I have developed a con­
sistent and flexible coding protocol that homogenizes the cross­country and cross­period contextual
differences identified in the sources.
For every diocese, I classify all bishops as appointees of the pope, appointees of sovereigns, or as
being independently chosen by the chapter. The following cases are coded as papal appointees:
• The bishop was appointed (provided) by the pope, and there is no evidence that this appointment
was influenced by any secular authority. This category also includes the cases of indecisive
capitular elections, in which two or more candidates contested the diocese and the outcome of
which was decided by the pope.
• The bishop had previously served as bishop of a different see, and the pope translated (trans­
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ferred) him to the current diocese, provided that there is no indication of the translation being a
fulfillment of the prior request of the sovereign or the chapter.
• The bishop was elected by the chapter at the recommendation of the pope.
• The pope appointed the bishop as a coadjutor to his predecessor, whom he succeeded upon his
death or resignation.59
The category of bishops chosen by the chapter includes the following cases:
• The bishop was elected by the majority of the chapter without papal recommendation or request
of the sovereign. Royal assent was not sought or was not given.60 If the bishop was elected by
the minority of the chapter, it is assumed that he would not have been able to prevail without
external interference.61
• The bishop was postulated by the chapter without request of the sovereign.62 Royal assent was
not sought or was not given.
• The bishop was chosen as a coadjutor to his predecessor by the chapter, or by the predecessor
himself, whom he succeeded upon his death or resignation.63
• The bishop was translated from a different see at the request of the chapter, which was preceded
either by a free election or by postulation without interference of the sovereign.
• The bishop was appointed by the pope at the request of the chapter.
• The bishop was appointed by another bishop or archbishop, who had the right of nomination,
without request of the sovereign.64
59Assuming that appointment as a coadjutor was not influenced by the sovereign, as above.
60The latter case is interpreted as formal acknowledgment of the sovereign’s supremacy, though his assent seemingly
was not binding for the cathedral’s decision.
61Almost all cases of election by the minority indicate such interference, as well as the identity of the interfering secular
power or the pope.
62Postulation refers to the chapter’s request to appoint someone who otherwise could not be elected due to canon law
restrictions or other barriers. Examples of such cases include candidates that did not hold necessary dignities, lacked
education, were below the canonical age, were bishops elsewhere, etc.
63Again, assuming that this appointment was not influenced by the pope or by the sovereign.
64Historically, this type of appointments mostly concerned dioceses that had been created recently and did not yet have
a chapter (e.g., those in the Baltic) or that were under a direct jurisdiction of the archbishop (such as Seckau and Lavant in
Austria, which were under the jurisdiction of Archbishop of Salzburg). Although the right of nomination was given by the
pope, I place such appointments in this category because nor the pope nor the sovereign were directly involved.
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Finally, the following cases fall into the category of princely appointees:
• The bishop was directly appointed by the sovereign, avoiding a canonical procedure. This cat­
egory also includes bishops that were granted custody of the diocese by the sovereign before a
formal appointment by the chapter or by the pope took place.
• The bishop was elected or postulated by the chapter at the request of the sovereign or was elected
by the chapter’s minority that was aligned with the sovereign. This category also includes con­
tested elections in which the successful candidate would not have been able to prevail without
support of the sovereign. In addition, if the chapter sought royal assent after the election, and
this assent was given, the elected bishop is also coded as a princely appointee.
• The bishop was appointed or translated by the pope at the request of the sovereign. This category
also includes translations that required assent of the sovereign.
• The sovereign appointed the bishop as coadjutor to his predecessor, whom he succeeded upon
his death or resignation.
Unless the bishop was directly appointed by the pope, appointment of any new bishop required
confirmation. I use one of the following events as evidence of confirmation (whatever occurred earlier
or was appropriate for the corresponding appointment type):
• Appointment confirmed
• Consecrated
• Election confirmed
• Enthroned
• Oath received
• Postulation confirmed
• Provision bull issued
• Succession confirmed
• Temporalities restored
In most cases, the month, if not the exact day, of confirmation is available, and I trace bishops’
careers starting from that date to their death or other termination event (translation, suspension, removal,
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etc.). If the confirmation information is not available, I use the appointment date as the confirmation
date, given that there is no evidence that the appointed bishop could not exercise his authority. If
historians provide two or more alternative dates of the same event, I use the earliest, given that there
is no particular reason to prefer one over the other(s).
I exclude bishops that were appointed but were barred from entering the diocese or otherwise
experienced difficulty in taking possession. At the same time, I do include bishops that were confirmed
but did not manage to reach their see before death (e.g., if they died at the Curia). In certain cases,
bishops who were not able to exercise their authority due to resistance of the sovereign or disapproval
by the pope after the initial appointment were able to take possession of the diocese after they swore
allegiance to the pope or sovereign. I code such events as “changed allegiance.”65
65For example, in 1242, Heinrich von Bilversheim was imposed on the chapter of Bamberg by Emperor Frederick II,
despite the bishopric was reserved by the pope. Lacking papal confirmation, the bishop­elect could not take possession. In
the meantime, Pope Innocent IV ordered investigation of Heinrich’s election. Persuaded by the Duke of Bavaria, Heinrich
swore allegiance to the pope in August or September of 1245, after which he received episcopal consecration on October
1, 1245 (BHRR1).
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1.10.3 Creation of GIS Maps
To create vector maps based on raster images from the Centennia Historical Atlas (Clockwork Map­
ping, 2018), I first used 141 city for georeferencing:
Aberdeen, Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers, Amsterdam, Ankara, Annaba, Antalya, Arkhangel’sk,
Athens, Badajoz, Baghdad, Barcelona, Bari, Bejaia, Belgrade, Benghazi, Bergen, Berlin, Bilbao,
Bolzano, Bordeaux, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Caen, Cairo, Cartagena, Casablanca, Cologne,
Copenhagen, Cádiz, Damascus, Derbent, Dijon, Dublin, Durres, Edirne, Erfurt, Fes, Galway, Gdańsk,
Geneva, Genoa, Glasgow, Goteborg, Granada, Groningen, Ha’il, Hanover, Helsinki, Istanbul, Izmir,
Jerusalem, Kaliningrad, Karaman, Kazan, Kharkiv, Kiev, Klaipėda, Kosice, Krasnodar, La Rochelle,
Linz, Lisbon, London, Londonderry, Lubeck, Luxembourg, Lviv, Madrid, Malatya, Marrakesh,
Marseille, Melilla, Milan, Minsk, Moscow, Mosul, Munich, Naples, Nicosia, Nis, Nuremberg,
Odessa, Oporto, Oran, Oslo, Palermo, Paris, Perugia, Pisa, Plymouth, Poitiers, Posnan, Prague, Pskov,
Qazvin, Riga, Rostov­on­Don, Sarajevo, Saratov, Sevastopol, Sinop, Sivas, Smolensk, Sofia, Split,
St. Petersburg, Stavropol, Stockholm, Strasbourg, Swansea, Syracuse, Tallinn, Tangier, Thessaloniki,
Timisoara, Tlemsen, Tolouse, Trabzon, Trieste, Tripoli (Lebanon), Tripoli (Lybia), Trondheim, Tunis,
Tyre, Valencia, Valladolid, Veliky Novgorod, Vichy, Vienna, Vilnius, Vologda, Voronezh, Warsaw,
Wrocław, Yerevan, York, Zagreb, Zaragoza.
After georeferencing, I applied a cubic spline method to generate the vector polygons representing
the “infidels.”
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CHAPTER 2
Discrimination, Market Entry Barriers, and Corporations in
Imperial Russia
2.1 Introduction
In his seminal study, Gerschenkron (1962) argued that the lack of large­scale private capital was one of
the main causes of Russia’s underdevelopment before World War I. Recent scholarship has suggested
that to the extent that such capital was available, it was under­utilized, because firms failed to adopt
a corporate form of organization (Gregg, 2018). In this paper, we examine the political factors that
likely contributed to this failure by focusing on how a specific group of economic agents, Jewish
entrepreneurs, were restricted in their ability to create and invest in corporations due to discrimination.
In the Russian Empire, general incorporation law did not exist. Instead, every single corporate
charter had to be reviewed and approved by local authorities and the central government on the case­
by­case basis. At the end of this process, the charter was signed by the tsar. Further changes to charters
also required the government’s approval. If incorporation was so time­consuming and difficult, why
did firms incorporate at all? Gregg (2018) emphasizes the following benefits as the primary motives of
incorporation. First, owners of corporations, unlike other enterprise forms, enjoyed full limited liability.
Second, the corporate form made it easier to raise long­term capital, provided access to foreign and
domestic stock and bond markets, and allowed to lock in capital to make capital investments.
Starting from 1890, some newly issued and updated charters contained discriminatory clauses that
banned Jewish entrepreneurs from buying shares of such corporations and/or purchasing property (see
Figure 2.1 for an example). What explains the timing of discriminatory restrictions against Jewish
entrepreneurs? The rise in anti­Semitism alone fails to explain the variation in the number of discrimi­
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natory restrictions across different industries. Also, the government’s decision to restrict incorporation
for any particular group of agents is not theoretically obvious, assuming that it seeks to maximize tax
revenue and capital invested in strategic sectors.1 We argue that some producers sought to limit entry
of new firms on the market by limiting the potential entrants’ access to equity capital. To that end,
they appealed to nationalist rhetoric and lobbied the government to impose restrictions on creation and
investment in corporations by Jews.
What determined which industries were affected by anti­Jewish discrimination? Prior to 1889, a
large share of Russian private capital was invested in state and state­subsidized assets that yielded a
fixed return and were deemed safe. In the 1880s, the government received access to new external
sovereign debt markets with more favorable interest rates than on the domestic market. To decrease
its obligations, the government forcefully converted bonds on the domestic market between 1889 and
1894, offering lower interest rates to investors in government securities than before. During the same
period, the government forcefully repurchased shares of railroad companies, the rate of return on which
was guaranteed and was comparable to government securities. These two policy changes freed large
amounts of domestic private capital that now had to be reinvested in the private sector (the equity
market in particular). We argue that this inflow of capital unintentionally created competitive pressure
among firms, especially in the industries with relatively high entry costs before the shock, i.e., the
capital­intensive industries (see Figure 2.2).
We use the RUSCORP database of all corporations whose charters were approved (Owen, 1992)
and focus on the period between 1891–1902,2 for whichwe have information on anti­Jewish restrictions
at the corporation level (from Levin, 1902). To construct a measure of capital intensity, we assemble
a novel dataset on all factories in the Russian Empire in 1890. We manually classify every factory by
3­digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) industries. After that, we define an industry’s capital
intensity as the total machine power, the closest proxy for capital we can obtain, divided by the total
1Such as production of steel and heavy machinery, which are important for military purposes. This logic would work
under the assumption that elites do not fear replacement, or if there are significant external threats (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006).
2The first three corporate charters with anti­Jewish clauses were issued in 1890. We drop the 1890 cross section from
analysis because of the lack of variation in the dependent variable, and also because our main explanatory variables are
measured in 1890.
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Figure 2.1: Example of a charter: Minsk Distilling Co. (1894). Source of the image: the Russian
State Library website (http://www.rsl.ru). The preamble on the top image says, “Emperor reviewed
and approved this charter on the Tsarevna yacht on July 9th, 1894.” According to Section 8 of the
charter (bottom image), “Only Russian subjects of the Christian faith who are the owners and leasers
of the distilling factories can be shareholders of this corporation.”
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1: Change in government policy, 1889–1894
2: Increased access to capital after 1889
3: Increase in competition b/w Jew-
ish and non-Jewish producers,
esp. in capital-intensive industries
4: Lobbying by non-Jewish producers
5: Discrimination against Jewish
entrepreneurs in capital-intensive industries
6: Re-/Misallocation of capital by Jews and non-Jews
Figure 2.2: Steps of the theoretical argument
number of workers. To cross­validate this measure, we construct an analogous measure of capital in­
tensity for the U.S. using the 1890 Census of Manufacturers (although not all industries can be matched
across the two datasets). Using a probit model with year fixed effects, we show that restrictions against
Jewish entrepreneurs were more likely to be imposed in more capital­intensive industries.
We address two potential concerns related to our research design. A first is that the RUSCORP
database does not include charters of would­be corporations that were not approved, which can lead to
selection bias. Also, entrepreneurs might have been disincentivized from investing effort in creating
a corporation due to the risk of rejection or red tape. To create a pool of counterfactual entrepreneurs,
we utilize the fact that anyone seeking to establish a firm of a certain size, be it in a corporate or other
legal form, had to first register with a merchant guild by purchasing a certificate in every city where it
would have business activity. We collect information on all guild members registered in St. Petersburg,
Moscow, andOdessa, the threemajor cities of industry and commerce, as of 1890. This dataset includes
more than 11,000 individuals who had the legal right to establish a corporation in the respective city
(although they did not necessarily use this right). Then, wematch this samplewith the data on thosewho
actually established corporations between 1853 and 1913 (from the RUSCORP). Using the information
on ethnicity and national origin of guild members and founders of corporations, we ask whether guild
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members from Jewish background were differentially less likely to create a corporation in any industry
after 1890 in a differences­in­differences setting. If that were the case, our results from the pooled
regression would rather be indicative of a more general discrimination trend than discrimination in a
particular set of industries. However, we do not find evidence of Jewish guild members being overall
less likely to incorporate after 1890. Instead, anti­Jewish restrictions seem to have been targeted against
corporations in capital­intensive industries.
A second, related, concern is that we lack a counterfactual for would­be targeted corporations be­
fore the beginning of the capital shock in 1889. Because the first charter with anti­Jewish clauses was
issued in 1890, we cannot directly estimate the “treatment effect” of the change in government policy
at the industry level, holding unobserved time­invariant characteristics of industries fixed. Theoreti­
cally, discrimination could have been caused by some other process, correlated with capital intensity
and other observable variables. The central question is whether the lack of discriminatory “pre­trend”
before 1890 is evidence of Jewish entrepreneurs selecting into a different set of industries—compared
to the post­1890 period—or the conditions that caused discrimination had not yet been in place before
1890, as we argue. We cannot answer this question directly given the available data, but to the ex­
tent that other market participants observed a differential treatment of Jewish entrepreneurs after 1890,
that should have been reflected in market valuation of corporations in which Jews served as founders.
Using the data on 155 corporations whose shares were traded at the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange
between 1865 and 1913, we show that stock returns of corporations founded by Jews outperformed
stock returns of other corporations before 1890 but underperformed after. This finding suggests that
discrimination against Jewish entrepreneurs was likely not anticipated by the equity capital market.
To further explore the nature of competition between Jewish and non­Jewish entrepreneurs, we
test whether the former had a competitive advantage in technology and skills. Historians have argued
that minority businessmen—Germans, Jews, and Poles—had higher levels of human and social capital
because a disproportionately large share of these minority groups lived in cities, and also because
they maintained tight­knit networks (e.g., Rieber, 1982). With such a competitive advantage, Jewish
entrepreneurs would have disproportionately clustered in high capital­intensive industries before 1890.
Therefore, they could have become targets of discriminatory policy for the reasons unrelated to the
capital shock per se. We explore this possibility using a subsample of incorporated factories in 1890,
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for which we have information on ethnicity of their owners. Specifically, we test whether various
measures of factory productivity—revenue per worker, total factor productivity of revenue (TFPR), and
horsepower per worker—were systematically related to ethnicity of factory owners. We find that there
were no statistically significant differences in productivity between factories owned by Jews and non­
Jews in terms of revenue per worker and horsepower per worker; in terms of TFPR, factories owned
by Jews were somewhat less productive. This result provides additional support for the hypothesis that
discrimination against Jewish entrepreneurs originated in the capital shock rather than the technological
“catch­up” of their non­Jewish competitors.
While being focused on Imperial Russia, this paper contributes to the broader political economy
of development literature by documenting how certain firms and groups of agents can be selectively
excluded from participating in capital markets. At the country­industry level, at least, there seems to be
a positive association between how easy it is for firms to attract financial capital and the rate of industrial
growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).3 The “traditional” channel whereby legal systems influence the
size of capital markets is investor protections (La Porta et al., 1997). In our context, the issue of
protection of investors per se was less relevant considering that some investors—Jewish entrepreneurs
and their partners—were legally restricted from entering capital markets in the first place. Therefore,
our study further illuminates the potential mechanisms whereby political institutions and legal systems
can shape capital markets and, therefore, economic development.
More generally, we are not aware of any other empirical research that explicitly examines polit­
ical barriers to entry at the firm level.4 The lack of empirical evidence in the modern context is not
least because such barriers are not legal in most countries. Therefore, researchers have to rely on such
indicators of the regulation of entry as the number of procedures, official time, and official cost as
proxies for political barriers (Djankov et al., 2002); the main disadvantage of these measures is that
they are typically the same for the entire industry or country. The absence of general incorporation
law—and democratic norms—in the Russian Empire provides us with a unique research setting. Our
3It should be noted that the existing firm­level evidence on the independent contribution of the corporate form to growth
and productivity is limited (Gregg, 2018).
4Gregg and Nafziger (2017) and Gregg (2018) also study the process of incorporation in the Russian Empire, but they
do not investigate anti­Jewish restrictions nor political barriers more generally.
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main insight is the seemingly higher degree of short­sightedness of authoritarian rulers—the Russian
tsars—compared to the “stationary­bandit” view of dictatorships (Olson, 1993; Acemoglu and Robin­
son, 2006). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that “external threats often make incumbents more
pro­innovation” (p. 117); in this light, Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856) was “the turn­
ing point in the attitudes of the Russian state to economic development” (p. 128). We disagree with this
notion. Considering that anti­Jewish restrictions were more likely in more capital­intensive industries,
we reach a paradoxical conclusion: capitalists were blocked from entering the industries where capital
was most needed.5 Rather, the fact that the government seemingly weighed the interests of certain
producers against achieving the long­run developmental objectives is consistent with the “oligarchic”
model (Acemoglu, 2008; Cheremukhin et al., 2017). In this model, the ruling elite deliberately creates
entry barriers, impeding future innovation and growth, to secure current rents.
This paper also speaks to the growing number of studies on ethnic conflict and persecution of mi­
nority groups in various historical contexts. It has been argued that inter­ethnic relations are shaped
by the long­run division of labor between groups (Jha, 2013). The established norms of co­existence
can be adversely affected by external shocks that increase inter­ethnic competition (Becker and Pascali,
2019) or political uncertainty about the future (Grosfeld et al., 2018). The main difference between
these papers and ours is that discrimination against the minority (the Jews) in our setting did not occur
“spontaneously,” at the grassroots level, but with direct involvement of the state. Although competition
between Jewish and non­Jewish entrepreneurs does play a role in our explanation of anti­Jewish restric­
tions, it was ultimately the central government who decided the fate of each corporation. Curiously,
tsarist policy towards Jews was more “rational” in that it seemed to ration the degree of discrimination
from year to year and from industry to industry, in contrast to anti­Jewish pogroms in Germany and
Russia, which once began, were uncontrolled (Becker and Pascali, 2019; Grosfeld et al., 2018).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a brief overview of the state of markets,
social relations, and politics in late nineteenth­century Russia. In Section 2.3, we describe construc­
tion of the dataset. In Section 2.4, we present our main empirical findings and address some of the
alternative mechanisms. The final section concludes.
5Russia’s largely unsuccessful participation in World War I also demonstrated its technological inferiority.
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2.2 Historical Background
2.2.1 Capital and Capitalists in Late Nineteenth­Century Russia
The defeat in the Crimean War (1856) demonstrated the technological inferiority of Russia’s then­
feudal economy. The reforms initiated during the reign of Tsar Alexander II (1855–1881), including
the emancipation of serfs (1861), were meant to accelerate industrialization. However, the Russian
Empire remained a largely agricultural (“backward”) economy by the turn of the century, with large­
scale private capital being scarce (Gerschenkron, 1962). Cheremukhin et al. (2017) have put forward a
different explanation for Russia’s underdevelopment: high market entry barriers and monopoly power.
This could explain why capital appeared more limited than it might actually have been—if it was
under­utilized. The recent literature on the Russian economic history has explored specific frictions
that impeded firms’ ability to borrow and expand, in particular, the highly politicized process of incor­
poration (Gregg and Nafziger, 2017; Gregg, 2018).
On the other hand, a number of historical and sociological accounts of late Imperial Russia have
stressed the importance of anti­capitalist sentiments in Russian society, not least among the entrenched
merchant class (Rieber, 1982; Rogger, 1986; Löwe, 1993). From this perspective, ethnic and religious
minorities—Germans, Jews, Poles, and others—were viewed as unwelcome agents of change, whose
“cosmopolitan” values, incompatible with paternalism, undermined the moral fabric of the Russian
majority.
Before the late 1880s and early 1890s, the merchant class and nobility, the main owners of capital,
did not find it in their best interest to invest in the private sector because of the hypertrophied state sector.
The state diverted private investment by heavily subsidizing the construction of railroads, perceived as
a strategic necessity, and by issuing bonds on the domestic market with a relatively high interest (up to
5%). While not being a direct owner nor manager of railroad corporations, the government guaranteed
dividends payable to their stockholders, with the rate of return comparable to that of government bonds
(5%). The following quote of a contemporary, who lived in the second half of the nineteenth century,
reflects the prevailing business attitude of that age:
A medium­size [sugar] factory requires up to 2 million rubles of basic capital, and almost
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as much is needed for operations. […] However, this capital can be easily transformed
into government bonds yielding a guaranteed return of 200 thousand rubles, allowing a
fortunate owner of such capital to philosophically reflect on worldly matters under the sun
of Biarritz […]whereas investment in the sugar industrymeans randomness and insecurity.
(Moshenskii, 2014, p. 216)
There were two major stock market booms (azhiotazh) in Russia during the nineteenth century.
One occurred in 1857, when the government decreased the interest paid on deposits in state­controlled
banks from 5% to 4%. After the devastating Crimean War, the government sought to decrease its
obligations. At the same time, facilitating investment in non­state assets was perceived as a benevolent
goal by Tsar Alexander II and the finance minister (Shepelev, 1973, pp. 70–71). Unsurprisingly, these
were the newly created railroad corporations that benefited from the market boommost. In 1857–1858,
state banks lost 159 million rubles of private savings, while the government­guaranteed shares of the
Russian Railroad Co. (1857) attracted 75 million rubles, which was an enormous emission at the time
(Shepelev, 1973, pp. 74–75).
The second boom, which is the subject of this study, occurred in the 1890s. Like the previous one,
it was caused by a change in government policy. By the 1880s, state­subsidized railroad corporations
had proved to be corrupt and ineffective; the lack of uniform transportation standards increased the cost
of operation, while the low density of the railroads network did not allow corporations to benefit from
economies of scale. Instead of continuing to guarantee the 5% return on shares of these corporations,
the government forcefully purchased them or exchanged for 4% government bonds. Most railroad
corporations were repurchased between 1889 and 1894 (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3). Around the same
time, in 1889–1894, the government forcefully converted 5% bonds to 4% bonds, which happened
shortly after the French sovereign debt market became the main creditor of the tsarist government.
This took holders of Russian government debt by surprise, who, “having lost one­fifth of their revenue,
had to [find a way to] increase it” (Moshenskii, 2014, pp. 117–118). To signify the scale of the policy
change, of the 2,628 million rubles of new sovereign debt added during the tenure of Finance Minister
Ivan Vyshnegradskii (1887–1892), only 899 million were financed domestically.
The net effect of government interventions in 1889–1894 was that former shareholders had incen­
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Figure 2.3: The dynamics of the government­initiated capital shock, 1883–1901. The dashed vertical
line indicates the year when the first corporate charter with anti­Jewish restrictions was issued (1890).
The ruble values are deflated to the 1913 level using the price index in Strumilin (1954). See text and
Table 2.1 for additional information on how each observation is constructed.
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Table 2.1: Main government’s interventions on the domestic capital market, 1883–1901
Year Operation Value, millions of
rubles
Interest
decreased?
1883 Purchase of Tambov­Saratov Railway 7.5 Yes
1885 Purchase of Putilov Railway 1.0 Yes
1885 Purchase of Murom Railway 0.9 Yes
1887 Purchase of Ural Railway 14.5 No
1888 Purchase of Riazhsk­Morshansk Railway 3.5 Yes
1889 Purchase of Transcaucasia Railway 8.5 No
1889 Purchase of Riazhsk­Viazemsk and Morshansk­Syzran Railways 6.2 Yes
1890 Purchase of Tambov­Kozlov Railway 3.5 Yes
1891 Conversion of domestic sovereign debt 70.0 Yes
1891 Conversion of domestic sovereign debt 194.0 Yes
1891 Conversion of domestic sovereign debt 190.0 Yes
1891 Purchase of Kursk­Kharkov­Azov Railway 7.8 Yes
1891 Purchase of Libava­Romny Railway 4.6 Yes
1892 Purchase of Oryol­Griazi Railway 11.6 Yes
1892 Purchase of Orenburg Railway 10.1 Yes
1893 Purchase of Donetsk Railway 6.9 Yes
1894 Conversion of domestic sovereign debt 1120.0 Yes
1894 Purchase of Riga­Dvinsk Railway 9.5 Yes
1894 Purchase of Oryol­Vitebsk Railway 11.4 Yes
1894 Purchase of Russian Railroad Co. (RRC) 113.6 Yes
1894 Purchase of Riga­Mitava Railway 1.4 Yes
1894 Purchase of Dvinsk­Vitebsk Railway 19.1 Yes
1895 Purchase of Moscow­Kursk Railway 54.8 Yes
1895 Purchase of Lozovo­Sevastopol Railway 1.7 Yes
1896 Purchase of Warsaw­Terespol Railway 8.4 Yes
1896 Purchase of Moscow­Brest Railway 11.7 Yes
1896 Conversion of domestic sovereign debt 97.3 Yes
1897 Purchase of Baltiiskaia Railway 24.3 Yes
1897 Purchase of Privislinskaia Railway 7.6 Yes
1897 Purchase of RRC bonds 31.1 Yes
1898 Purchase of Iugo­Zapadnye Railway 50.8 Yes
1898 Conversion of domestic sovereign debt 2.7 Yes
1901 Purchase of Ivangorod­Dombrova Railway 10.0 Yes
Notes:
This table displays the major activities of the Ministry of Finance and the Committee of Ministers on the domestic
securities market between 1883 and 1902. Purchases of railway lines and bonds of railroad companies refer to forceful
purchases of these lines and bonds using cash or government­issued bonds. The ruble values in column (3) are expressed
in nominal terms for the indicated date. Column (4) indicates whether government­issued bonds used in the respective
operation offered a lower rate of return to the holders of the assets being replaced. Payments in cash are coded as
lower­interest bonds. Source: compiled by authors based on Ministerstvo Finansov (1902), Kislinskii (1902), and
Migulin (1903). See Appendix for the full references.
tives to seek for higher rates of return elsewhere, in particular, in the private equity market. As we
argue, this inflow of capital likely created a political economy conflict between market incumbents
and entrants, those who were more politically connected and those who were not. We expect that this
conflict was particularly acute in relatively capital­intensive industries.
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2.2.2 Russian Corporate Law
Incorporation is an important way for firms to attract external capital. Besides issuing equity, the legal
entity status, separate from any of its participants, allows corporations to lock in the assets, which in turn
provides them with the advantage of being able to invest in long­term, highly specific projects (Blair,
2003). Limited liability of equity investors, a third distinguishing feature of corporations as compared
to other enterprise forms, further facilitates inflow of capital, in particular from small investors who do
not play an active role in governance (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1985).
The Russian Corporate code, which was enacted in 1836, remained in place, with certain revisions,
until the end of the monarchy in 1917 (Owen, 1991). Despite the numerous attempts to reform the
Code by the finance ministers from Reutern to Witte to Kokovtsov, its main provision was left intact:
prospective entrepreneurs were required to seek permission of the central and local government to
establish a new corporation; the tsar himself approved incorporation by signing the corporate charter.6
It is no surprise that the concession system of incorporation gave rise to bureaucratic arbitrariness
(proizvol) (Owen, 1991). The processing time could vary from six months, as in the case of the Ramiba
Bentwood Furniture Company of Penza (Gregg, 2018, p. 10), to the sixteen years that it took the
Poznanski Cotton Company of Lodz to receive a new charter (see Figure 2.4). In 1900, Minister of
Finance Sergei Witte wrote to Tsar Nicholas II:
Even if corporations receive charters …these charters often restrict participation by for­
eigners and Jews …which makes it impossible for these corporations to have enough
starting capital. Many manufacturing industries are overseen by other Ministries, [such
as] theMinistry of Defense. […] Regardless of general regulation of enterprises, their fate
is at the mercy of numerous local officials, from lower­ranked police officers to general­
governors. (Quoted in Shepelev, ed, 1999, p. 357)
Not only draft charters went through the bureaucratic maze—so did initiatives to reform the system.
In 1892, the Department of Trade and Manufacture of the Ministry of Finance created a committee
6The system of incorporation by registration (iavochnaia sistema) was only introduced on April 1, 1917 by the new
Provisional Government (Owen, 1991, p. 190).
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Poznanski Cotton Textile Co. (Lodz, 1889) attempts to ex-
pand in Turkestan (Central Asia) and requests the Ministry
of Finance to allow purchase of cotton fields (1892, 1893)
The charter was not approved both times
A law passed on November 29, 1893 bans non-Christians (excl.
indigenous Muslims) from buying commercial property in Turkestan
A new clarifying memo allows the Committee of Minis-
ters to petition the Tsar for exemptions from the 1893 law
The Poznanskis applied again in 1897
Intensive correspondence b/w the Ministry of Finance, Min-
istry of Defense, and the general-governor of Turkestan. In
1900, the Ministry of Defense issues a favorable memo.
The charter of the new Poznanski Cotton Co. is finally approved
(1905). Jews were allowed to participate, while foreigners were not.
Figure 2.4: Example of the incorporation process: Poznanski Cotton Co. (1905). The Poznanski
brothers had Jewish background. The information is from Laverychev (1974, pp. 59–60).
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to “explore the possibility of removing barriers to incorporation” (Shepelev, 1981, p. 231). In 1894,
the committee’s proposal was sent to governors, municipal and rural (zemskiie) governments, and
advisory councils on trade andmanufacturing. The further development of the proposal stalled; in 1899,
the Ministry explained the delay by the “diverse interests that would be affected by this legislation”
(Shepelev, 1981, p. 232).
The subsequent proposals in the early twentieth century failed as well. The negative impact of the
concession system on the industrial growth was well understood by all ministers—the disagreement
was primarily due to the fact that incorporation by registration would make it harder to impose ad­hoc
restrictions (Shepelev, 1981, p. 234). Under the concession system, every charter was legislation in
its own right, and as such it could override the existing regulations and decrees pertaining to a given
industry. Therefore, by blocking the initiatives of the Ministry of Finance certain ministers and interest
groups sought to reserve the right to decline a charter or to include arbitrary provisions in it.7
2.2.3 Jews in the Russian Empire
2.2.3.1 Imperial Policy
After annexing large portions of Poland in the late 18th century, Russia became home to the largest
Jewish diaspora in the world. By the decrees of 1791, 1804, and 1835, the government restricted their
legal residence to the Pale of Settlement. As Gessen (1911) wrote, “the Pale of Settlement was the
result of the lobbying efforts of Moscow and Smolensk merchants who feared competition with Jews”
(p. 91).
Imperial policy towards Jews was not coherent nor consistent, while its enforcement was not thor­
ough and instead was arbitrary. On multiple occasions, certain tsarist ministers attempted to improve
the status of Jews, or weaken the enforcement of the previously passed discriminatory laws. The
most important for the subject of this paper is the decree of 1859 that allowed Jewish entrepreneurs—
merchants of the first guild—to permanently reside in any imperial city outside the Pale.8 As a result,
7Owen (1991) seems to disagree with our assessment of the role played by the finance ministers: “The most enlightened
ministers, including Reutern, Bunge, and Witte, all preferred the old way: rigid laws tempered by arbitrary exceptions for
favored petitioners” (p. 210).
8Jewish merchants of the second guild were allowed to reside in the “inner” provinces temporarily. In addition, first­
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the two centers of Russian commerce, Moscow and St. Petersburg, experienced a dramatic increase in
the Jewish population (Nathans, 2002).
In 1862, Minister of Finance Michael Reutern introduced a new legislation advocating for an even
more comprehensive equalization of rights of Jews and non­Jews. In particular, he questioned that Jews
were driving the Russians out of commerce. Instead, “society would be better off under the improved
allocation of human capital, decreased smuggling, with simultaneous growth in the manufacturing
sector.”9 Such initiatives, though often futile, were not uncommon among high­level officials even
at the height of the “official” anti­Semitism in the 1880s (during the reign of Alexander III). In other
cases, legislation that sought to soften discrimination was lobbied by local administration due to the
negative economic consequences of anti­Jewish restrictions (Raskin, 1993, p. 70). Figure 2.5 depicts
the overall dynamics of imperial legislation pertaining to Jews from 1810–1917.
2.2.3.2 Jewish Entrepreneurship
Who were Jewish entrepreneurs and how did they differ from the average inhabitant of the Pale of
Settlement? Rubinow (1975) points out that “notwithstanding a few individual cases, the number
of great Jewish capitalists [in the Pale of Settlement] is small, and that the majority of the Jewish
manufacturers are people of moderate means” (p. 541). Since only relatively wealthy individuals,
regardless of their background, could become members of the first guild and establish corporations,
these are the “individual cases” that we focus on in this paper.
Despite the unfavorable legal status of the Pale of Settlement, where Jewish entrepreneurs accumu­
lated capital initially, its geographic proximity to Western Europe was advantageous: “Non­Russian
merchants not only reaped commercial and investment advantages from their close and constant con­
tact with foreigners in the ports and frontier towns but also benefited from easy access to Western
technology and know­how” (Rieber, 1982, p. 75).10 Kahan (1983) argues that foreign trade was one of
the major sources of Jewish capital, at least in the first half of the nineteenth century (p. 108). External
and second­guild members were able to obtain an honorable citizen (pochetnyi grazhdanin) status, which also gave the
path to legal residence outside the Pale.
9As quoted in Ulianova (2010, pp. 324–325).
10We explore whether Jewish­owned factories were indeed more productive below.
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Figure 2.5: Laws concerning the status of Jews, passed by different branches of the central government
between 1810 and 1917. The plot is constructed based on the information in Table 1 in Raskin (1993).
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financing was also crucial:
[T]he Jewish banks made a special effort to attract savings from non­Jews and to bor­
row from Jewish banks abroad […] the banks were capable of paying high interest and
dividends and their connections with the Jewish banks in Germany and later in France,
resulted in capital imports and transfers to Russia. (Kahan, 1983, p. 110)
Over time, Jewish banking grew so important for attracting foreign capital that in 1913 Trade and
Manufacture Minister Sergei Timashev warned of the possible harmful impact of anti­Jewish discrim­
ination:
[B]anning Jews from boards of directors would be quite harmful as corporations not only
would be able to attract less Jewish capital […] but less foreign capital as well. The latter is
invested in our manufacturing sector not directly but via private banks, whose directors, in
many cases, are Jews. Therefore, prohibiting Jews to oversee individual corporations [in
the capacity of members of boards of directors] would decrease foreign capital attracted
by the affected corporations. (Quoted in Shepelev, 1987, p. 206)
Historians have pointed out that entrepreneurial activity of Jewish capitalists was not confined to
few industries, both in the Pale and beyond (Rubinow, 1975; Kahan, 1983).11
2.2.3.3 Jewish Entrepreneurs in Moscow
To illustrate the complex relations between the central government, local authorities, and Jewish en­
trepreneurs, we consider the case of Moscow in the 1890s.
In 1891–1905, the governor general of the Moscow region was Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich,
who was the brother of Tsar Alexander III and uncle of his successor, Nicholas II. Historians have
argued that, unlike his predecessor, Sergei Aleksandrovich had strong prejudice against Jews (Aizen­
berg, 2003, p. 337). Shortly after taking office, in 1891–1892, the general governor issued a decree
11“One could have encountered them at the oil wells of Baku, in the gold mines of Siberia, on the fisheries of the Volga
or Amur, in the shipping lines on the Dnepr, in the forests of Briansk, on railroad construction sites anywhere in European
or Asiatic Russia, on cotton plantations in Central Asia, and so forth” (Kahan, 1983, p. 111).
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that prohibited Jewish artisans from residing in the Moscow region. By some estimates, 86% of Jews
were expelled from Moscow over the course of few months (Aizenberg, 2003, p. 338). Jewish guild
merchants, including owners of factories and corporations, were allowed to stay. Moreover, during the
1890s the number of Jewish merchants in Moscow’s first guild increased steadily, reaching 267 (30%)
in 1898. Supported by Russian guild members who feared the growing (albeit exaggerated) influence
of Jews, in 1899 the Moscow general governor lobbied the tsarist government to impose a 33% cap
on Jewish membership in the first guild (Aizenberg, 2003, p. 354). This restriction remained in place
until the 1917 Revolution.
2.2.3.4 Anti­Jewish Clauses in Corporate Charters
Jews that moved from the Pale to the “interior” provinces of Russia following the liberalization in 1859
“met with the resistance of entrenched economic interests. […] There were indeed complaints about
the new ways of doing business introduced by the Jews, which did not sit well with old regulated forms
of trade stemming from a corporate organization and many local regulations against the Jews applied”
(Löwe, 1993, p. 58).
Starting from 1890, upon approval by the government, certain corporate charters received addi­
tional clauses that restricted management and ownership of the respective companies and their prop­
erty by Jews. Even if such clauses did not ban Jews altogether, they often made their participation
economically meaningless. For example, e.g., if a textile company owned by Jews was not allowed
to purchase or lease property in rural and/or cotton­growing areas, it could not successfully compete
against corporations that did not face such restrictions. The first charter issued with such discrimina­
tory clauses was that of the Zarozhan Mfg. Co. (1890), headquartered in Odessa. It said, “Jews can be
neither shareholders, nor members of the Board of Directors, nor real estate managers. This condition
must be indicated on the shares” (as quoted in Levin, 1902, p. 223).
Not all Jewish entrepreneurs faced discrimination. Wealthiest entrepreneurs, such as Goratsii
Günzburg, were creditors to the Tsar and were granted a nobility status.
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2.3 Construction of the Dataset12
2.3.1 Incorporations and Restrictions
Our main data source on corporations is the RUSCORP database (Owen, 1992), which contains infor­
mation on firms whose charters were accepted by the Ministry of Finance. The “legislative” nature of
each corporate charter is reflected in the fact that it was eventually published in the Complete Collec­
tion of Laws (Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii). These charters record characteristics of
corporations at inception, such as the amount of basic capital; their functions; restrictions, if any, on
their operations; basic information on their founders. While the compiler of the RUSCORP himself
acknowledges that distinguishing new corporations from re­chartered ones may be challenging (and
in our experience we have identified corporations that received charters but are not included in the
RUSCORP),13 this database has been used as the main reference in the literature (Hillmann and Aven,
2011; Gregg and Nafziger, 2017; Gregg, 2018).
The RUSCORP also codes anti­Jewish restrictions contained in corporate charters (the variables
PROP, OWN, andMAN), albeit using this information poses certain challenges. The first is that restric­
tions against Jews and foreigners, though possibly different in nature, were not clearly separated when
assigning the codes.14 Second, Owen (1992) notes that PROP and OWN “often appear in charters in
an inverse relationship to one another” (Codebook, p. 5). In the database itself, they always do, which
we believe is an artifact of compilation and does not necessarily reflect the nature of the historical ad­
ministrative process. Third, with the exception of Turkestan, the RUSCORP fails to specify whether
restrictions in a certain area or industry were idiosyncratic (i.e., Jews had full legal rights otherwise) or
whether a given corporation was discriminated according to general legislation. Fourth, by comparing
records in the RUSCORP and actual charters we have detected coding errors.15
12See Appendix for the full list of data sources.
13Some of these corporations are listed in Levin (1902).
14Additionally, the OWN variable in the database contains restrictions with code 7, which is not mentioned in the Code­
book.
15For instance, the Kerting Bros. Machinery Co. (1904) would have been coded as having no anti­Jewish capital restric­
tions according to the RUSCORP. However, the note to paragraph 3 of the charter says that Jews and foreigners cannot
own or lease property in certain areas. The charter can be accessed at https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01004732097.
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Given these challenges, our preferred source on anti­Jewish restrictions is Levin (1902), who lists
all corporations that were created by July 1902 and whose charters contained discriminatory clauses.
Despite the shorter time span (the RUSCORP extends to 1913), the information provided in Levin
(1902) is more complete and less ambiguous for our purposes. Levin (1902) classifies all charters by
three groups. The first one includes corporations whose charters had unconditional restrictions against
Jews regardless of where a given corporation operated. Those were restrictions that did not allow
Jews to be managing directors, and, in most cases, shareholders as well. The second category includes
certain corporations in the Pale of Settlement, in which Jews could not be shareholders and managing
directors. The last category includes those corporations that allowed Jewish ownership but could not
purchase property in the Pale of Settlement.
For the sake of comparison, we collapse all three types of restrictions from Levin (1902)16 and
the variables PROP, OWN, and MAN from the RUSCORP with at least some reference to Jews (see
Figure 2.6). In what follows, we use what Levin codes as restrictions of the “first type” as our outcome
variable. Figure 2.7 shows the intensity of these restrictions by province. As one can see, in some
provinces more than half of all new corporate charters contained anti­Jewish clauses, while in others
discrimination was absent.17
16Excluding the ones applied retrospectively, which are missing in the RUSCORP.
17It should be noted that Figure 2.7 does not reflect the significant variation in the total number of all incorporations
across provinces.
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Figure 2.6: Capital restrictions against Jews (all incorporations)
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2.3.2 Stock Returns
To test whether the change in government policy was expected by the market, we use the database on
the prices of stocks traded at the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange in 1865–1913 assembled byGoetzmann
and Huang (2018). We have calculated monthly returns (for two consecutive months), as well as annual
returns (the average of monthly returns in a given year). We have merged the stock returns data with the
RUSCORP using corporations’ names. The resulting number of the matched corporations is 155. We
use this data to test whether the stocks of corporations owned by Jews differentially underperformed
after 1890, which would imply that the stock market did not expect the change in government policy
(otherwise, the stock prices would have adjusted prior to the shock, and we would see no differential
performance after 1890).
2.3.3 Factories and Industries
Our main source on industry­level variables is Orlov (1894), who compiled official data from the
Department of Trade and Manufacture (Ministry of Finance) for the year 1890. Using Orlov (1894),
we have collected information on all factories in European Russia and manually classified them by
3­digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) industries.18 Exclusion of the so­called miscellaneous
industries,19 which are too broad to be meaningful, restricts our sample to 85 and 19313 factories. Of
these, we further exclude the industries where there were no incorporations between 1891 and 1902
(according to the RUSCORP), as well as the factories lacking the information on machine power and/or
the number of workers. The resulting sample that we use in the main part of our analysis includes 73.
For each industry, we measure capital intensity as the ratio of total horsepower (almost exclu­
sively, steam engine power) and the total number of workers. Ideally, to measure capital intensity, we
would prefer to use the ratio of aggregate capital and aggregate wages. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no reliable data that goes back to the nineteenth century that would allow us to calculate such
measures—not only for the Russian manufacturing sector, but also for industries in Western Europe
and North America. Great Britain, for example, conducted its first Census of Production in 1907. The
18Use of 3­digit SIC codes is common in the literature (e.g., Atack et al., 2008).
19They have the SIC codes of the form “XX99.”
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Figure 2.8: Capital restrictions against Jews by industry (percentage of corporations with discrimina­
tory clauses in charters)
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U.S. Census of Manufacturers was first carried out in 1850, and it reported the aggregate capital used
until 1919. In the subsequent years this information was not provided because that it was “so defective
as to be of little value except as indicating very general conditions. […] While there are some estab­
lishments whose accounting systems are such that an accurate return for capital could be made, this
is not true of the great majority, and the figures, therefore, do not show the actual amount of capital
invested” (Flux, 1924, p. 356).
We acknowledge the possible weakness of our measure of capital intensity, namely that the differ­
ential adoption of steam engines across industries can reflect the differences in the production process
(technological level) rather than capital intensity per se.20 Somewhat reassuringly, using the 1850–
1880 U.S. Census of Manufacturers data, Atack et al. (2008) find a strong correlation between capital
intensity and the percent of factories using steam or water power.
We deflate all the money variables (output in rubles, the amount of basic capital) to the 1913 level
using the price index in Strumilin (1954).
Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Incorporated factories
Statistic N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Revenue, ths of 1913 rub 457 1,646.93 740.74 2,564.41 2.68 20,148.15
Number of workers 457 661.63 342 1,265.64 2 17,252
Presence of a steam engine 457 0.89 1 0.31 0 1
Horsepower 457 255.26 91 673.26 0 6,952
Revenue per worker 457 4.29 1.94 16.28 0.09 325.93
Horsepower per worker 457 0.40 0.26 0.49 0.00 3.40
Jewish founder 410 1.14 1.00 0.35 1.00 2.00
Foreign founder 410 1.39 1.00 0.49 1.00 2.00
Joint­stock company 410 1.20 1.00 0.40 1.00 2.00
High­status founder 410 1.26 1.00 0.44 1.00 2.00
2.3.3.1 Comparison with the U.S. Census of Manufacturers
To cross­validate our measure of capital intensity, we use the information on fixed assets, wages paid,
and the number of workers in each industry from the 1890 U.S. Census of Manufacturers. We code
20E.g., Franck and Galor (2017) use the adoption of steam engines in France in the late nineteenth century as a measure
of technological progress.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics: Industries
Statistic N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Number of factories 73 235.67 46 588.16 1 3,799
Total output, ths of 1913 rub 73 22,525.47 4,122.11 52,903.56 48.89 285,243.60
Number of workers, total 73 11,562.84 2,585 25,465.17 32 157,433
Horsepower, total 73 3,386.14 382 9,020.76 0 57,335
Capital intensity (horsepower per worker) 73 0.28 0.15 0.37 0.00 2.06
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Table 2.4: Cross­validation of the capital intensity measure
Horsepower per worker Fixed assets per $1 of
wages
Fixed assets per worker
Capital Intensity, Russia 0.54 0.33 0.33
Notes:
This table displays correlations between the capital intensity measure we calculate for Russian industries using Orlov (1894),
and analogous measures for U.S. industries, calculated using the data from the 1890 Census of Manufacturers.
the U.S. industries using the same industrial classification as in Russia’s case. Because of the way the
data was aggregated and reported in the Census, we are not able to match a number of industries.21
We expect the measures of capital intensity for the U.S. and Russian industries to be positively
correlated. Table 2.4 suggests that there is indeed a positive, if modest, correlation. Unsurprisingly, the
capital intensity index for the U.S. industries measured the same way—total horsepower per worker—
has the highest correlation (0.54). The correlation of our index for Russian industries with the ratio of
fixed assets and total wages is 0.33 (in the U.S. data, this correlation equals 0.49).
2.3.4 Founders
We match founders from the RUSCORP database by their first, last, and middle names and dates of
incorporation (i.e., we ensure that the time span between the creation of a pair of corporations by the
same individual is not too large). For the manufacturing and banking sectors, we have identified 7,052
unique founders (out of 8,639). Overall, 66 percent of corporations had more than one founder. There
is one instance when a corporation had 77 shareholders, but on average there were roughly 3 founders
per corporation. This pattern is not surprising, since only 155 corporations had their shares publicly
traded at the St. Petersburg stock exchange. According to the RUSCORP data on corporations founded
between 1835 and 1913, the proportion of female founders was 6 percent. 11 percent of founders were
Jewish.
21Unfortunately, disaggregated data from the 1890 Census no longer exists because it was destroyed by a fire in 1921.
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Figure 2.10: Jewish founders by industry (percentage of corporations with at least one Jewish founder)
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics: Manufacturing corporations (new charters), 1891–1902
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Capital restrictions against Jews (Owen) 936 0.30 0.46 0 1
Capital restrictions against Jews (Levin) 936 0.13 0.33 0 1
Industry with an excise tax 936 0.23 0.42 0 1
Inside the Pale 936 0.43 0.50 0 1
Joint­stock company 936 0.68 0.47 0 1
New enterprise 936 0.29 0.45 0 1
Basic capital, ths of 1913 rubles 936 1,464.59 2,333.10 124.53 27,742.75
Foreign founder 936 0.18 0.38 0 1
High­status founder 936 0.23 0.42 0 1
Jewish founder 936 0.18 0.39 0 1
Founder banker (matched founders only) 910 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00
2.3.5 Guild Members
Traditionally, members of merchant guilds constituted a separate privileged estate. However, by the
1890s, the status of a guild member ceased to be hereditary and was instead an instrument of fiscal and
administrative control. All owners of factories, that had steam­powered machinery or employed more
than sixteen workers, had to obtain a first­ or second­guild certificate (Owen, 1991, p. 61). To become
a member of either guild, one was not required to obtain permission of other guild members—only to
purchase a certificate (i.e., pay an annual membership fee), the cost of which varied by location. Such
location was defined as the place the corresponding business activity took place. First­guild certificates
were more expensive but they also allowed their holders to run larger businesses. If one’s total annual
production exceeded 15,000 rubles, or if he or she engaged in wholesale trade, purchase of a first­guild
certificate was required.
We have collected data on all members of the first and second merchant guilds (as of 1890) in three
major commercial and industrial centers of the Empire—St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa—11,172
in total. We are not aware of similar data sources for other cities around 1890. While by necessity we
omit other important centers, such as Kiev, Riga, and Warsaw, we believe that this only affects the
interpretation (external validity) of our analysis and not internal validity.22 Also, due to the capitals’
22With more than one million inhabitants according to the 1897 Imperial Census, St. Petersburg and Moscow were the
two largest cities. Warsawwas the third­largest city (684,000), Odessa fourth (404,000), Riga sixth (282,000), Kiev seventh
(248,000).
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disproportionately large economic and political role, many merchants residing elsewhere sought to join
the first and second merchant guilds of St. Petersburg and Moscow. 6 percent of all merchants were
Jewish.
2.4 Empirical Analysis and Discussion
2.4.1 Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
We expect a positive relationship between an industry’s capital intensity and the probability of anti­
Jewish capital restrictions in that industry in the aftermath of the change in government policy, which
we define as the period from 1891 onward. While the government began repurchasing shares in railroad
corporations and converting government bonds earlier, we do not expect these measure to have taken
full effect until later in the 1890s, not least because the incorporation process was time­consuming.
The first recorded charters with anti­Jewish clauses—three in total—are dated 1890, and we drop them
from analysis. Additionally, we are only able to measure capital intensity as of 1890.
Because the timing of our “treatment”—increased investment activity in response to the abrupt
change in government policy—coincides with the beginning of anti­Jewish restrictions, we are not
able to use a differences­in­differences framework and to control for the unobserved time­invariant
characteristics of industries.23 Instead, we rely on identifying variation at the firm level.
In each cross­section, all incorporations were either existing establishments (factories) or new en­
terprises. The former could rely on cash flow from operations and were less dependent on external
finance than new enterprises. Conditional on that they already operated in the market, they were a
lesser threat to their competitors than entrants. Additionally, all else equal, owners of existing facto­
ries likely had greater political weight. Therefore, we expect that discrimination against corporations
that were new enterprises was more frequent. We test this proposition using a pooled probit model
with year fixed effects.
23In other words, the left­hand side part would be zero for all industries before 1890.
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2.4.2 Stock Returns
Using the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange data, we estimate the following process for stock returns:
Rijmrt = β1JewishFounderijrt + β2JewishFounderijrt × PostShockmt
+ γ′xijrt + δj + ψm + ξ t + νr + ϵijmrt,
(2.1)
where m is month, t year, j industry, i corporation, r region. Rijmrt are stock returns. JewishFounderijrt
is the indicator variable equal to one if one of the i­th corporation founders was Jewish (based on the
RUSCORP data). PostShockmt is the indicator variable equal to one after January 1890, when we
observe the first anti­Jewish restriction in the charters data. The corporation­level characteristics we
control for, x, are whether the corporation i has a high­status founder (a nobleman or senior official), a
Jewish founder, or a foreign founder. δj, ψm, ξ t, and νr are the full sets of fixed effects: industry, month,
year, and region. Region fixed effects roughly control for market access, based on the geographic
location of a corporation’s operations (from the RUSCORP).24 We cluster the standard errors at the
corporation level.
We test whether stock returns of corporations owned by Jews outperformed stock returns of other
corporations before 1890 but underperformed after. The estimation results are presented in Table 2.6.
The empirical pattern we observe is consistent with the explanation that the market did not expect
discrimination against Jewish entrepreneurs prior to the change in government policy. Corporations
with Jewish founders had higher stock returns before 1890 and lower returns after 1890, and the pattern
holds both for the monthly and annual data.25
We cannot estimate a more sophisticated model—with a separate process for volatility of stock
returns—because of the highly unbalanced nature of the panel. Another caveat is that we can only
calculate returns for the stocks traded at the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange due to the data availability.
Therefore, the results in Table 2.6 should be viewed as suggestive.
24The region is an aggregate variable equal to one of the following categories: the Central region, West, North, South,
Baltic, Volga­Ural, Poland, Finland, Siberia, and Caucasus. An additional category, defined in the RUSCORP as the ”entire
Empire,” is for corporations that operated in all regions.
25We use annualized returns to address the high volatility of monthly returns.
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Table 2.6: Stock returns at the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange do not predict capital restrictions against
Jews pre­1890
Dependent variable: Stock return
Monthly Annual
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jewish founder 0.279∗ 1.220∗∗∗ 0.186 1.096∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.207) (0.210) (0.287)
Jewish founder × Post­1890 −1.070∗∗∗ −1.153∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.363)
Foreign founder 0.287∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.308 0.340∗
(0.135) (0.129) (0.197) (0.194)
High­status founder −0.151 −0.173 0.033 0.001
(0.114) (0.113) (0.172) (0.168)
Industry FE 3 3 3 3
Month FE 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3
Region FE 3 3 3 3
Corporations 155 155 155 155
N 3,547 3,547 851 851
R2 0.138 0.142 0.270 0.279
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors, clustered by corporation, in parentheses.
Monthly returns are based on two consecutive months.
Annual returns are averages across monthly returns.
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2.4.3 Capital Intensity: Validity Check
As a next step, we investigate how accurately our measure of capital intensity reflects the underlying
differences across industries. We use the following intuitive benchmark. We test whether a corpora­
tion’s basic capital is correlated with capital intensity of its industry:
log(Basic capital)ijrt = βCIjr,1890 + γ′xijrt + λt + δr + γj + ϵijrt, (2.2)
where log(Basic capital)ijrt is the basic capital of the corporation i (in 1913 rubles); CIjr,1890 is capital
intensity of the industry j in the region j in 1890; λt, δr, and γj are the full sets of year, region, and
industry fixed effects; ϵijrt is an unobserved error. Year fixed effects absorb common shocks, such as
recessions. Similar to Equation (2.1), we control for corporation­level characteristics xijrt: whether the
corporation i has a high­status founder (a nobleman or senior official), a Jewish founder, or a foreign
founder. Controlling for social status is important because lobbying for restrictions could be more
successful when the founder of the new firm had connections in the government. We cluster standard
errors at the industry level.
Reassuringly, the results in Table 2.7 seem to be consistent with the notion that corporations in rela­
tively high capital­intensive industries tend to have larger basic capital. Also, this relationship appears
to be monotonic. In other words, our measure of physical capital—total horsepower per worker—
predicts the amount of financial capital reasonably well. We estimate Equation (2.2) separately for all
incorporations (models (1)–(2), Table 2.7) and for new corporations only (models (3)–(4), Table 2.7).
In baseline models (1) and (3) we do not include region and industry fixed effects, since a corporation’s
location, as well as its choice of industry, may be endogenous. Including both region and industry fixed
effects does not change our main result: capital intensity at the industry/region level remains positively
correlated with basic capital.
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Table 2.7: Measured capital intensity is correlated with financial capital
Dependent variable: log(Basic capital)
All incorporations New enterprises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital intensity 0.474∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗ 0.643∗∗
(0.172) (0.118) (0.299) (0.281)
Joint­stock company 0.375∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.087) (0.166) (0.186)
High­status founder −0.133∗∗ −0.051 0.039 0.153
(0.055) (0.061) (0.141) (0.153)
Jewish founder 0.309∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.099) (0.190) (0.173)
Foreign founder 0.052 0.034 −0.001 0.001
(0.058) (0.054) (0.108) (0.087)
Year FE 3 3 3 3
Region FE 3 3
Industries 73 73 73 73
Regions 11 11 11 11
N 936 936 269 269
R2 0.154 0.239 0.264 0.362
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors, clustered by industries, in parentheses.
Basic capital is measured in thousands of 1913 rubles.
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2.4.4 Capital Intensity: Probability of Restrictions
For corporation i formed in industry j, and year t, we estimate the following regression:
Pr(yijt = 1) = Φ(βCIj,1890 + γ′xijt + λt). (2.3)
Here, yijrt is a dummy that equals 1 if a capital restriction is imposed (the first category as classified
in Levin, 1902, i.e., unconditional restrictions against Jews, regardless of where a corporation operated).
CIj,1890 is capital intensity of the industry j in the region j in 1890. We include a set of control variables
at the industry j level, such as the size of the industry and whether this industry had an excise tax. For
each corporation, we control for whether its headquarters were located in the Pale of Jewish Settlement,
whether at least one of the founders had a noble status, and whether it was a joint­stock company. In
addition, we include a dummy for whether at least one of the founders was also a founder of a bank,26
which we use as a proxy for capital.
Table 2.8 displays the results of estimating Equation (2.3) using a probit model with year fixed
effects. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The first panel (models (1) and (2)) in
Table 2.8 shows the results for all incorporations. In the second panel (models (3) and (4)), we estimate
Equation (2.3) using the subsample of new enterprises. In Figure 2.11, we plot predicted probabilities
and conditional marginal effects of capital intensity for all incorporations (model (2)) and separately
for new enterprises (model (4)), along with their 95% confidence intervals.
It is easy to see that Equation (2.3) is plagued by a selection problem: given the high procedural
costs of incorporation, Jewish entrepreneurs could have rationally chosen not to incorporate if they
anticipated being discriminated against. Also, discrimination may have had an indirect effect on Jews
by deterring non­Jews from collaborating with them and thus decreasing the odds of successful incor­
poration.27 In either case, selection would bias our estimates downwards; therefore, the findings we
report here are conservative.
If a corporation increases its capital intensity from 0.08 (the lower 25th percentile of the capital
26Such overlap is possible because our main sample only includes manufacturing corporations.
27See Hillmann and Aven (2011) for suggestive evidence along these lines.
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Table 2.8: Capital restrictions are relatively more common in more capital­intensive industries (manu­
facturing, 1891–1902)
Dependent variable: Pr(Restriction against Jews=1)
All incorporations New enterprises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital intensity 0.547∗∗ 0.569∗∗ 0.982∗∗ 0.979∗∗
(0.249) (0.264) (0.483) (0.487)
Log(Industry size) −0.037 −0.033 0.019 0.034
(0.047) (0.046) (0.084) (0.084)
Industry with an excise tax 0.904∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.699 0.562
(0.205) (0.208) (0.458) (0.474)
Inside the Pale 0.329∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.412 0.437
(0.122) (0.120) (0.267) (0.267)
Joint­stock company −0.140 −0.169 −0.539∗ −0.579
(0.169) (0.185) (0.308) (0.398)
High­status founder 0.169 0.189 0.176 0.294
(0.156) (0.160) (0.272) (0.298)
Founder banker 0.597∗∗ 0.654
(0.292) (0.574)
Pr(Y=1) 0.128 0.128 0.123 0.171
Year FE 3 3 3 3
Industries 73 73 47 47
N 936 910 269 263
Log Likelihood −304.074 −286.081 −93.701 −87.761
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
This table displays the maximum likelihood estimates for Equation (2.3).
Standard errors, clustered by industries, in parentheses.
For each industry, capital intensity is defined as horsepower per worker.
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Figure 2.11: Predicted probabilities for capital intensity (models (2) and (4) in Table 2.8)
intensity distribution, i.e., low capital intensity) to 0.28 steam horsepower per capita (the upper 25th
percentile of the distribution, i.e., high capital intensity), the predicted probability of a capital restriction
increases roughly from 5.9 to 7.4 percent. The baseline probability of facing a capital restriction is 12.8
percent (model (2) in Table 2.8), therefore, the 1.5 p.p. increase is a substantively large effect. The risk
of anti­Jewish restrictions in a high capital­intensive industry was almost 11.7 percent higher than in a
low capital­intensive industry.
Whether a given industry had an excise tax could be an important confounding factor, at least as
far as the government’s interests are concerned. There are three such industries: production of wine,
tobacco, and sugar. On the one hand, the government may have favored the creation of monopolies
and therefore sought to limit competition. In the wine industry, the government introduced its own
monopoly in 1894. In the sugar industry, producers formed a formal government­approved syndicate
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in 1895. The tobacco industry was highly concentrated in the late 1890s, although the formal syndicate
was only formed in 1914. On the other hand, the stream of excise tax revenues should have remained
high enough, therefore, it was in the government’s industry to facilitate industrial growth by allowing
Jews to invest and create corporations. Which consideration prevailed is ultimately an empirical ques­
tion. For model (2) in Table 2.8, the average marginal effect of moving from an industry without an
excise tax to an industry with an excise tax is 15 p.p. (10 p.p. for model (4)). The average marginal
effect of having a founder who was also a founder of a bank is 10 p.p. in model (2) and 12 p.p. in model
(4). Combined, these patterns are consistent with the notion that non­Jewish entrepreneurs sought to
limit inflow of capital into their industries.
2.4.5 Factory Productivity
An alternative explanation for the mechanism of discrimination we suggest could be that factories
owned by Jews were more productive, and therefore Jewish entrepreneurs threatened their competi­
tors on the market. Higher productivity could stem from superior technology or better management
practices, which would be consistent with certain historical accounts of Jewish entrepreneurs and en­
trepreneurs from other minority backgrounds, such as Germans and Poles (Rieber, 1982; Owen, 1991).
We believe that was not the case. If anti­Jewish capital restrictions had been due to the differences
in productivity alone, they would have been in place before 1890, unless non­Jewish entrepreneurs
experienced a “catch­up” around 1890.
For a subsample of incorporated factories, i.e., those that were property of corporations, we can
test this proposition explicitly thanks to the information on founders’ ethnicity in the RUSCORP. By
merging our main factory dataset with the RUSCORP, we identify 457 factories that belonged to 321
unique corporations (some corporations owned multiple factories). Although incorporated factories
were not representative—they were, on average, larger and more productive (Gregg, 2018)—the richer
information on such factories allows us to test hypotheses that would be difficult to test otherwise. Ad­
ditionally, this bias would strengthen our previous results if we were to find that incorporated factories
owned by Jews were no more productive than those owned by non­Jews.
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We estimate the following equation:
log(Productivitypij) = α + βJewishFounderij + x′ijδ + ϵij, (2.4)
where factory p is owned by corporation i in industry j; xij is the vector of control variables. We cluster
standard errors by corporations, since one corporation could own several factories in the same industry.
First, following Gregg (2018), we use revenue per unit of labor as a proxy for a factory’s produc­
tivity. We also calculate firm­level productivity as total factor productivity of revenue (TFPR), based
on the approach in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Under the assumption of the Cobb­Douglas production
technology in each industry, TFPR can be calculated as follows:
TFPRpij ≈ (MRPKpij)αj (MRPLpij)1−αj , (2.5)
whereMRPK is a marginal product of capital,MRPL is a marginal product of labor.
Finally, following Franck and Galor (2017), we use horsepower per worker as another proxy for
advanced technology (48 factories out of 457 did not have a steam engine).
If the alternative explanation about the superior business practices and higher productivity of Jew­
ish entrepreneurs holds, we should observe a positive effect of having at least one Jewish founder on
the factory’s productivity. The results in Table 2.9 suggest that factories owned by Jews had similar
productivity in 1890 compared to the productivity of the factories owned by non­Jews (in terms of
revenuer per worker and horsepower per worker). The only statistically significant difference in pro­
ductivity that we find is for the TFPR measure. We can see in Table 2.9 that for TFPR the effect goes
in the opposite direction: productivity in 1890 was lower for factories owned by Jews compared to
factories owned by non­Jews.
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Table 2.9: Differential factory productivity by owners’ ethnicity (incorporated factories sample, 1890)
TFPR Revenue per worker Horsepower per worker
(1) (2) (3)
Jewish founder −0.255∗∗ −0.178 −0.056
(0.117) (0.124) (0.050)
Foreign founder −0.188∗∗ 0.056 0.127∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.086) (0.035)
Joint­stock company 0.185∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.105) (0.042)
High­status founder 0.032 0.058 0.085∗∗
(0.102) (0.099) (0.040)
Constant 1.474∗∗∗ 1.558∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.060) (0.024)
N 297 410 410
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.007 0.084
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors, clustered by corporations, in parentheses.
Revenue per worker is the total annual output (in 1913 rubles) per worker.
We use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the dependent variable.
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2.4.6 Guild Members: Decision to Incorporate
We examine the decision to create a corporation at the individual level estimating the following equa­
tion:
Pr(yijt = 1) =
4∑
T=−6
βTJewishij × I{t = T}+ δi + λt + ψjt+ ϵijt, (2.6)
where δi and λt are the sets of individual (merchant­specific) and time fixed effects. Jewishij is the
dummy variable whether the ith merchant in the jth city is Jewish. I{t = T} is the dummy variable
for a 5­year interval in the period 1860–1913 (1885–1890 is a baseline 5­year period). We also add
city­specific time trends, δit. If the discriminatory policies introduced by the tsarist government after
1890s had a deterrence effect on Jewish merchants, we expect to see negative coefficients βT after
1890.
The results in Table 2.10 suggest that there is no evidence in favor of the deterrence effect: Jewish
merchants were not less likely to incorporate compared to their non­Jewish competitors after the first
anti­Jewish restriction was introduced in 1890. In fact, we observe the opposite effect: Jews were
more likely to incorporate than non­Jews in 1860–1885, and even right after the restrictions were
introduced, in 1895–1900. These results should be viewed as suggestive. The overall percentage of
the merchants who incorporated during the period 1860–1913 is only 4.1 percent, therefore, if we look
at the probability of incorporation for a given merchant over time it becomes an extremely rare event.
2.5 Conclusion
In the Russian Empire, the incorporation process was highly politicized. Starting from 1890, the Rus­
sian government selectively restricted investment and ownership of corporations by Jews. This paper
explores the determinants of this discriminatory policy. We argue that the cross­industry variation in
anti­Jewish restrictions can be explained by increased competition between Jewish and non­Jewish en­
trepreneurs in the capital market. Between 1889 and 1894, the government forcefully converted bonds
and repurchased shares of railroad companies, decreasing the rate of return on the assets that were
previously deemed as safe and attractive investments. As a result of this intervention, large amounts
of private capital were freed and had to be reinvested elsewhere.
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Table 2.10: Incorporation by merchants of the first and second guild
Dependent variable: Pr(Incorporation=1)
All First guild Second guild
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jewish × 1860–5 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.00005)
Jewish × 1865–70 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.00003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0001)
Jewish × 1870–5 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Jewish × 1875–80 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Jewish × 1880–5 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.005∗ 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Jewish × 1890–5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Jewish × 1895–1900 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Jewish × 1900–5 0.0001 0.0001 0.00003 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0005)
Jewish × 1905–10 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Jewish × 1910–13 0.001 0.001 0.004 −0.00002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Pr(Y=1) 0.000842 0.000842 0.00288 0.000585
Year, merchant FE 3 3 3 3
City­specific trends 3
Merchants 11,172 11,172 1,256 9,916
Merchants incorporated 415 415 139 276
N 603,288 603,288 67,824 535,464
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.012 0.022 0.006
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors, clustered by merchant, in parentheses.
The reference period is 1885–1890.
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Using the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange data, we find that the capital market did not anticipate
anti­Jewish discrimination that followed the shock. In particular, stocks of corporations founded by
Jewish entrepreneurs outperformed the market before 1890 and underperformed after. Consistently
with the argument that the tsarist government sought to limit influx of capital into certain industries,
we find that anti­Jewish restrictions were more likely in more capital­intensive industries, as well as the
industries with a special fiscal regime (production of wine, tobacco, and sugar). In addition, to define
the pool of potential market entrants, we assemble novel datasets on members of major merchant guilds
in 1890. We do not find evidence that Jewish entrepreneurs were overall less likely to incorporate after
1890. Finally, we do not find support for the hypothesis that anti­Jewish discrimination was driven by
the differences in factory productivity between Jewish and non­Jewish entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER 3
Labor Mobility Restrictions and Urban Growth: Evidence from the
Russian Empire
3.1 Introduction
“Understanding serfdom is …necessary if one wishes to understand divergence or convergence in the
long­term growth performance of European societies” (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014, p. 483). In this paper,
we focus on the direct, yet understudied, mechanism whereby serfdom may have affected economic
development: restrictions on mobility of labor. In the Russian Empire, twenty­three million people,
who were serfs in 1858 and were not allowed to move to cities, were freed in the following twelve
years. Was removal of the mobility restrictions a major factor in the subsequent urban growth?
The answer to this question is theoretically ambiguous. Migration to a city is preferred to staying
in the countryside if: 1) the wages in the urban sector are higher than in the agricultural sector; 2) the
city is a generally more attractive place to live (e.g., due to access to higher­quality public goods); and
3) the transportation costs of moving are not too high. By imposing constraints on spatial allocation of
labor over an extended period of time, serfdom may have affected all three factors. As a first step in
our investigation, we develop a structural model of rural­urban migration, in which peasants face the
following decision­making problem. They can stay in the countryside or move to one of the existing
cities; serfs are only able to move after becoming free. In the model, moving to a particular city can
be a preferable option because of the specific features of that city or because cities in general are more
attractive to live in. Further, the cost of moving depends on the available modes of transportation. For
every period, the model predicts the share of peasants leaving each location in the countryside and the
total flow of migrants to each city. Out­migration from the countryside is (partly) compensated by the
natural population growth.
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We estimate this model using novel detailed data on peasants, cities, and railroads in the Russian
Empire, covering the period from 1811 to 1910. Besides Russia proper, this data also includes the
Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Finland, autonomous regions within the Empire that had
distinct historical institutions. The central part of out dataset is a balanced panel of 569 cities with four­
teen cross­sections. Identification of the model’s parameters hinges upon the observed changes in each
city’s population between consecutive time periods. The estimated parameters suggest that moving to
cities was not advantageous to peasants in and of itself. Instead, the single most important factor ex­
plaining rural­urban migration was construction of railroads. This is likely because allocation of rural
labor was not efficient historically, independently from the detrimental, yet relatively smaller, impact
of serfdom. Our within­model calculations suggest that by 1910, the total urban population enabled by
the railroad network was comparable to that in a counterfactual scenario in which serfdom never ex­
isted. By and large, our findings are consistent with Alexander Gerschenkron’s seminal research on the
economic development of the Russian Empire prior to World War I. He argued that, while abolition of
serfdomwas “an absolute prerequisite for industrialization,” it did not begin until “the railroad building
of the state assumed unprecedented proportions and became the main lever of a rapid industrialization
policy” (1962, p. 19).1
Our results complement the existing empirical studies of coercive institutions in various historical
contexts, from Latin America (Dell, 2010) to Europe (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Buggle and Nafziger,
2018; Markevich and Zhuravskaya, 2018) to Southeast Asia (Dell and Olken, 2018). Markevich and
Zhuravskaya (2018) have argued that abolition of serfdom in the Russian Empire led to increased pro­
ductivity of the agricultural sector due to improved incentives of peasants. Industrial output, measured
at the aggregate level, has also increased. Another set of papers has documented persistence of the neg­
ative effects of coercive institutions long after they were abolished (Buggle and Nafziger, 2018; Dell,
2010). Among the channels of persistence, three have been highlighted: inferior provision of public
goods (especially, transport infrastructure), low human capital accumulation, and path dependence due
to agglomeration effects.2
1By 1913, Russia’s railroad network became the second­largest in the world in terms of the total track length (TheWorld
Almanac and Encyclopedia, 1914, p. 213).
2Dell and Olken (2018) signify the importance of these channels for long­run development providing detailed micro­
level evidence in the context of the Dutch colony in Java.
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While these and other studies have investigated the effect of coercive institutions on urbanization,
or outcomes that are typically associated with it (industrial output), to the best of our knowledge, con­
straints on labor mobility as such have not yet been examined. This is understandable given the ana­
lytical challenge faced by the researcher: how to define a relevant unit of measurement for individuals
who, theoretically, could move anywhere? From a technical viewpoint, measuring coercive institutions
at some pre­defined administrative (provincial, district) level or the level created by the researcher (e.g.,
cell grid) limits potential mobility of rural labor to the areas bounded by the borders of respective units.
We believe that in this particular context, any choice of the level of measurement would be ad hoc and
cannot be supported by theory. To illustrate the scope of this measurement problem, in the Russian Em­
pire, according to the 1897 Imperial Census, just over half (53.3%) of all urban dwellers were born in
the same district, with substantial geographic variation in the percentage of non­locally born (Rashin,
1956, pp. 131–132). This, in turn, could explain some of the ambiguous or null findings regarding
the impact of abolition of serfdom (Buggle and Nafziger, 2018) and the seemingly unimportant role of
mobility constraints for industrialization in Russia (Cheremukhin et al., 2017). In our empirical design,
“effective” mobility restrictions are not defined by the chosen level of measurement but rather by the
institutional features (serfdom) and transportation costs, i.e., the historical context itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a brief historical back­
ground and discuss mobility restrictions that existed for various types of rural dwellers in the Rus­
sian Empire. In Section 3.3, we describe the data. In Section 3.4, we discuss a structural model of
rural­urban migration, its estimation, and the main results, including counterfactual analysis. The final
section concludes.
Geographic coverage Due to computational complexity of our model, which increases exponentially
with geographic coverage, and limited data availability in some cases, we confine our analysis to the
territory of European Russia, including the steppe part of the North Caucasus, Western Siberia (Tobolsk
Province), Finland, and Poland. The remaining part of Western Siberia and entire Eastern Siberia, the
mountainous part of the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia are beyond the scope of the
sections that follow.
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3.2 Historical Background
3.2.1 Legal Restrictions on Rural­Urban Mobility
We study how serfdom affected rural­urbanmobility. In doing so, we focus on the legal restrictions that
differentially affected a particular social group, serfs, compared to other categories of rural dwellers.
Straightforward as it may sound, empirical analysis of these restrictions poses certain conceptual and
practical challenges. First, to a certain extent, almost all social groups in Russia faced movement re­
strictions. Therefore, we need to “scale” their severity according to a common benchmark. Second,
serfdom was not brought about by a single decree or even a series of laws. As the Russian Empire grad­
ually acquired new lands, it also absorbed local legal traditions and customs, including those governing
coercive labor relations. The pre­existing laws in the new territories were not replaced but were rather
“amended” by Russian law. In Russia itself, all existing laws were only systematized and organized
by codes in 1832, when the first edition of the Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire (Svod zakonov
Rossiiskoi Imperii) was issued. Some of the local variations of serfdom were not labeled as such by
contemporaries, although we do include individuals governed by such institutions in our definition of
serfs below.
To better understand how serfdom affected rural­urbanmobility, it is worth discussingwhat it meant
to be a “rural” and “urban” subject in the Russian Empire—from the perspective of subjects themselves,
local authorities, and the central government. In the next two sections, we discuss the social relations
in the Empire overall and in European Russia and Siberia in particular. After that, we turn to the
periphery—Bessarabia, Finland, and Poland—and focus on the main differences in the treatment of
rural dwellers in each region.
3.2.1.1 On the Social Structure in the Russian Empire
In general, the legal status of a Russian subject at any point in time depended on the estate (soslovie)
they belonged to, as well as their sostoianie.3 The estates in the Russian Empire roughly corresponded
3Sostoianie (plural: sostoianiia) literallymeans “state” in Russian, however, we do not translate it here to avoid collision
with other meanings of the term. It should be noted that the discussion in this section is based on authors’ reading of the
Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire, in particular, the sections pertaining to the rights to movement. The compilers of
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to the estates of the realm in Western Europe, with each having a “natural” set of privileges and obli­
gations (nobles, merchants, peasants, etc.). Having a certain economic meaning at its inception, by
the nineteenth century the system of estates evolved to a legal, or political, reality (Mironov, 2000).
An individual’s estate was generally transmitted by inheritance, but it could also be acquired through
marriage or purchase of a certificate (for the urban estates).
On the other hand, the system of sostoianiia was peculiar to Russia. One’s religious affiliation,
the precedent of being included in a tax census in a certain location (or owning property there), and
the type of land they lived in (state­ or privately owned) were legally consequential for the individual’s
sostoianie. For instance, a Jewish urban dweller had a different sostoianie compared to his Christian
counterpart residing in the same city, but their sostoianiewould become the same if the former baptized.
To provide another example, from a perspective of a state peasant, moving from a privately to state­
owned land also meant a change in their sostoianie, even though the individual remained a member of
the same estate (state peasantry).4
Rural dwellers (sel’skie obyvateli) were represented by two major groups, state peasants and serfs.
Belonging to either estate did not necessarily imply an agricultural occupation: many state peasants
engaged in commercial activities and services, while many serfs were domestic servants. With some
qualifications, numerous other groups of rural dwellers, e.g., the cossacks in Little Russia, could be
equated to one of those two in terms of their rights tomovement. Because the data sources we use do not
always explicitly categorize such groups, the distinction between estates and sostoianiia, sometimes
subtle, turns out to be important for how variables are coded in practice (we discuss the data itself in
Section 3.3).
State peasants were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of State Property, which delegated the
administrative functions, including taxation, provision of justice and local public goods, and conscrip­
tion, to rural communes (obschina). Oversight and enforcement of these functions was left to local
the Digest and contemporary jurists did not necessarily distinguish between the estates and sostoianiia the same way. That
said, we believe that our interpretation is useful for comparing mobility restrictions.
4Loosely speaking, if one’s estate determined their corporate social identity, the sostoianie was rather idiosyncratic
and, from the perspective of the Russian legal code, subject to fewer rigid constraints (such as those determined at birth).
Whether specific constraints associated with one’s estate or sostoianiewere actually fixed or changed over a lifetime varied
from one individual to another.
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authorities and police, which only took an active role in administration if there were significant arrears
and abuses of law (Mironov, 2000, pp. 448). While not being a privileged social group, state peasants
enjoyed such individual rights as the right to purchase movable and immovable property in their name
and participate in commerce on their behalf (Mironov, 2000, pp. 391).
In contrast to state peasants, serfs were under double fiscal pressure: they owed duties both to the
state and their lords. These duties were either paid in kind, by performing labor service known as the
corvée system (barschina), or in a monetary form (quit rent, obrok). Each particular manorial estate
adopted one of the two forms of collection of duties, which in turn determined how serfs were admin­
istered. By the mid­nineteenth century, around 56 percent of serfs, living under the corvée system,
were governed directly by their lords or designated estate managers. The remaining 44 percent, living
under the quit­rent system, were organized into rural communes (Mironov, 2000, pp. 451).5 Within
communes, governance was based on customs and tradition, which were comparable to those existing
in communes of state peasants. Such similarity was confined to peasants’ internal affairs, however.
From the state’s perspective, all serfs were considered private property of their lords. As such, serfs’
individual rights were limited, and they could only participate in economic transactions (including pur­
chasing property) and civil disputes as agents of their lords. In turn, lords were legally responsible
for paying duties to the state on behalf of their serfs. Lords were also held liable if serfs failed to do
military service. It is perhaps this responsibility of lords that essentially left serfs’ right to movement
at the discretion of their lords, as we point out below.
An account of serfdom in pre­1861 Russia would be incomplete without addressing coercive la­
bor relations that existed at factories.6 As Tugan­Baranovskii (1970) wrote, “[i]n 1804, 45,625 out of
95,202 factory workers …were hired wage laborers” (p. 82). Forced factory workers included gentry­
owned serfs,7 possessional (posessionnye) peasants, and so­called ascribed (pripisnye) peasants.8 Dif­
5It has long been noted that the corvée system was more prevalent in the South, Ukraine, and Belarus, i.e., the regions
with more favorable agricultural conditions (Ignatovich, 1910, pp. 52–53).
6The recent empirical scholarship on Russian serfdom seemingly overlooks this category of forced laborers.
7Gentry­owned serfs might or might not be included in the aforementioned total number of factory workers, because
sometimes they were simply listed as “serf peasants” in official statistical publications.
8The specific titles of forced factory workers varied from one official publication to another. We use the homogenized
titles of such workers as they appear in the Tenth Revision.
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ferentiation between serfs and possessional peasants existed because, according to law, hereditary no­
bles had the exclusive right of owning serfs as private property. Possessional peasants were property
of the factory that employed them, hence such peasants were owned by merchants, non­hereditary no­
bles, and other privileged groups indirectly, through ownership of the factory in question. Ascribed
peasants were state peasants employed at factories of strategic importance, such as mining and met­
als, in Northern Russia, the Ural region, and Siberia, which sometimes was emphasized in their title
(gornozavodskie). Administratively, ascribed peasants were under the jurisdiction of the Mining De­
partment of the Ministry of Finance, although in practice factories employing them were controlled by
private managers and, therefore, their status was almost the same as that of possessional peasants de
jure and de facto. The rights to movement of these different groups of forced factory workers were
essentially the same before 1861, and as we will see, the Emancipation Manifesto did not distinguish
between them by the type of formal ownership. Almost all the mass of forced factory labor resided in
the countryside, even if agriculture was not their primary occupation. In what follows, we use the term
“serfs” with respect to forced factory workers as a shortcut, regardless of whether they were owned by
hereditary nobles or not.
3.2.1.2 Regulation of Movement of State Peasants and Serfs before 1861
Now we turn to comparison of specific laws governing movement of state peasants and serfs. After
serfdom was abolished, regulation became unified, therefore, we focus on the differences that existed
before 1861. Rural­urban mobility implies moving from the countryside to an urban settlement, either
for temporary or permanent residence. In the context of the Russian Empire, movement could be
understood: 1) as a physical activity (relocation), and 2) as acquisition of a legal status, associated with
a certain estate and sostoianie, that allowed one to reside in a city for an extended period. Both types of
movement were heavily regulated, and to a certain degree the possibility of one implied the possibility
of the other. For specific definitions and provisions, we rely on the last pre­reform edition of theDigest
of Laws (1857), in particular, the volume 9, Laws on the Sostoianiia (Zakony o sostoianiiakh), and the
volume 14, Digest of Regulations concerning Passports and Fugitives (Svod ustavov o pasportakh
i ssylnykh).
107
The very first article of the Digest of Regulations stated that nobody could leave their place of
permanent residence without a legal sanction or documentation appropriate to their status. In particular,
Article 111 required all traveling peasants to obtain a document of one of the three types, depending
on the distance between the final destination and their place of permanent residence, as well as the
expected travel duration. The three types were:
1. Permissionwritten on regular paperwas required if peasants aimed to travel for work no farther
than thirty versts (Article 112).9
2. Permission written on stamped paper was required if peasants aimed to travel for work farther
than thirty versts, for a period of up to six months (Article 118).
3. A passport was required if peasants aimed to travel for work farther than thirty versts and for a
period of more than six months (Article 141).
State peasants had to obtain an applicable document from local authorities, while serfs had to obtain
it from their lords (Articles 114, 119, 145, and 146). In the case of serfs, certain exemptions applied
if they sought permission to travel not for their own benefit but on behalf of their lords. Additional
minor exemptions applied to peasants who aimed to travel to sell their products at farmmarkets, as well
as to those living in the peripheral regions (in the North and Caucasus). Regulation of travel was not
simply formal but was actively enforced. For instance, “in 1847, as many as 10,000 seigniorial peasants
[serfs] left their homes in famine­struck Belorussia without permission to work on the construction of
the St. Petersburg­Moscow railroad. They were rounded up and returned” (Moon, 2002, p. 340).
Because the travel restrictions were defined in terms of peasants’ initial location, i.e., the place of
permanent residence, the severity of those restrictions in practice depended on: 1) how such a location
was defined according to law and 2) how hard it was for a peasant to change it. Article 10 defined the
place of permanent residence of state peasants and serfs as those settlements or manors in which they
were registered during the most recent revision (reviziia), or tax census. For forced factory workers,
their “place” of permanent residence was defined as the factory employing them. For household serfs
whose owners resided in a city, the place of permanent residence was the respective city. An important
9One verst is equal to 1.0668 km.
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addition to Article 10 allowed state peasants to have permanent residence in a city if they owned real
estate there (Article 11). Therefore, the respective law, enacted in 1827,10 made state peasants much
more mobile than serfs. According to Article 1138 of the Laws on the Sostoianiia, serfs were also
allowed to purchase real estate in cities. However, all transactions, including selling the existing prop­
erty, had to be first approved by their lords, and owning property in a city did not grant serfs the right
of permanent residence there.
Another way for rural dwellers to overcome the travel restrictions was to join the sostoianie of
urban dwellers (gorodskie obyvateli) in their desired destination, a socially heterogeneous group of
merchants, honorary citizens, artisans, and burghers (meschane). For urban dwellers, a city was the
place of permanent residence by definition.11 According to Articles 439–444, state peasants willing to
become urban dwellers had to first quit their rural commune. As a general rule, the commune could not
reject peasants’ request to quit unless they owed taxes, were subject to military service, or were under
criminal investigation (Article 444).12 Additionally, peasants seeking to become urban dwellers had
to receive approval from the municipal authorities in a desired destination. The central government,
which sought to make cities more viable economically, made the latter requirement a mere formality by
issuing a special decree in 1832 and thereby facilitatedmigration of state peasants to cities (Rydziunskii,
1958, pp. 176–177).
In contrast, it was practically impossible for serfs to become urban dwellers; the central government
only liberalized the process of transition for freed serfs (by the aforementioned decree of 1832). Article
1147 stated that serfs could only quit serfdom if they were freed by their lords or “by law.” The latter
could only happen in one of the following circumstances, listed in Article 1185:
1. A court trial established a non­serf origin of the individual.
2. The serf converted to Christianity, but their lord was non­Christian.
10The 1827 version of the law applied to all cities, except Moscow and St. Petersburg. In 1848, the law was extended to
the capitals (Rydziunskii, 1958, p. 185).
11All the estates comprising urban dwellers are listed under Article 424 of the Laws on the Sostoianiia. After 1870, the
differences between them essentially disappeared (Mironov, 2000).
12The rules were stricter for women and non­Orthodox Christians.
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3. The serf informed authorities of the lord’s treason or conspiracy against the tsar, and this infor­
mation was proved correct [reference to Article 1197].
4. The serf was captured by a foreign state outside Russia.
5. The serf was acquired by the state.
Serfs could not gain freedom otherwise. Leaving the lord temporarily was subject to the aforemen­
tioned restrictions and contingent on his or her consent. Violating these laws was a criminal offense.
If serfs did receive freedom, the process of acquiring a status of an urban dweller was essentially the
same as for state peasants.
Table 3.1 re­iterates the key differences in the rights to movement of state peasants and serfs.
Table 3.1: Classification of rural­urban mobility restrictions by peasants type before 1861
Type of
peasants
Travel/temporary
residence in a city (0–12
months)
Permanent residence in a
city
Transition to
urban
dwellers
State
peasants
Yes, with permission from
local authorities
Yes, if they owned
property
Possible
Serfs Yes, with permission from
their lord
Only as domestic servants
to their lords
Practically
impossible
Notes:
This comparison is based on regulation of movement in European Russia and Siberia. See text for
details on mobility restrictions in the Kingdom of Poland.
3.2.1.3 Rural Population and Labor Relations on the Empire’s Periphery
In the previous sections, we have provided a brief account of the pre­1861 legal conditions of rural
dwellers in European Russia and Siberia. The same regulation also applied to Russian subjects, origi­
nally from European Russia and Siberia, residing in Bessarabia, the Grand Duchy of Finland, and the
Kingdom of Poland. The native population of these regions continued to live under the local legal
codes after their annexation by Russia in the nineteenth century. The central government did exert ef­
fort to unify the legal system across the Empire, especially starting from the 1860s, but this process was
not complete by the 1917 Revolution. In the pre­1861 period, the differences in laws between Russia
proper and the periphery were particularly prominent, and they deserve an independent discussion.
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In Bessarabia,13 there were two groups of rural dwellers whose pre­1861 legal status was equivalent
to that of serfs in European Russia: household serfs of Russian origin and the Roma (krepostnye
tsygane). Together, they constituted less than two percent of Bessarabia’s total rural population. The
rest was mostly comprised of so­called tsarans, free but landless peasants who were obliged to pay a
quit rent or in kind for using land owned by nobles. Unlike Russian serfs, tsarans were allowed to
move from one landlord to another if they did not accumulate arrears. This right could be exercised
between October 1 and April 1 every year. Tsarans were also allowed to retain their movable property
when leaving their landlord. Most importantly for our purposes, as specified in Articles 898–901 of
the Laws on the Sostoianiia, tsarans were allowed to permanently move to cities on the terms similar
to those that existed for state peasants in European Russia. Therefore, we treat tsarans as state peasants
rather than serfs in our analysis, although some of the historical literature concerning the liberalization
of regulation of tsarans in the 1860s views it in the more general context of emancipation of serfs in
Russia (e.g., Zaionchkovskii, 1968).
The Grand Duchy of Finland became part of Russia in 1809, and it was soon granted an autonomy
by the tsarist government. Finnish rural population continued to live under the same regulations as dur­
ing Swedish rule. The most recent decree governing social relations was that of 1789, which confirmed
the equal status of all Finnish subjects in general and with respect to land ownership in particular. By
1864, peasantry owned more than half of all land in Finland. The remaining land was mostly state­
owned (35 percent). Peasants living on state­owned lands paid rent and could privatize them in return
for payment of a perpetual land tax (Obruchev, ed, 1871, pp. 226–227). Labor coercion did not exist
in Finland.
Before being annexed by Russia in 1815, the territory of the future Kingdom of Poland was part of
the Duchy of Warsaw, a buffer state created by French Emperor Napoleon I in 1807. The new state re­
ceived a Constitution (1807) and the Napoleonic Code (1808), which abolished serfdom (poddaństwo)
and declared equality of all subjects before the law. As a result, at least nominally, serfs received per­
sonal freedom and civil rights (Bardach et al., 2009, p. 380). Since the status of land according to the
Constitution remained ambiguous, a separate royal decree of 1807 clarified that peasants only had lim­
13Bessarabia is a historical region covering parts of present­day Moldova and southwestern Ukraine. It was under Ot­
toman rule until 1812.
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ited rights to the land they cultivated, in the form of temporary or permanent (hereditary) lease in return
for payment of a quit rent (czynsz). Peasants’ obligations to landlords were to be specified in contracts,
which in turn were to be registered by notaries who ensured that contracts were not imposed forcefully
(Bardach et al., 2009, p. 380). However, both the practice of the labor relations and subsequent legis­
lation, favoring the interests of the landed nobility (szlachta), demonstrated abuses of the civil code
enacted in 1808 and eventually led to reimposition of serfdom in all but name. Many peasants were
forcefully evicted from land without contracts being signed. If a peasant received financial assistance
from the landlord, he could not leave the land until after the loan was repaid. Further, peasants were
allowed to leave their village only with permission of the vogt (wójt), a village mayor, typically ap­
pointed by the landlord himself (Bardach et al., 2009, p. 381). Overall, besides the emergence of a large
class of landless peasants, the reforms in the Duchy of Warsaw led to partial return of peasants to the
feudal land tenure system (corvée, pańszczyzna), whereby peasants performed labor services in kind,
without contracts (Koryś, 2018, p. 95). Therefore, the economic rights of such peasants (pańszczyzni­
any), and the rights to property in particular, did not fall under the Napoleonic Code, even though their
personal rights were protected, if undermined. Only peasants who signed contracts and paid a quit
rent (czynszowy) were recognized by the Code as leasers of land, with the respective legal protections
(Kostiushko, 1962, p. 29).
After the Duchy of Warsaw was annexed by Russia and became known as the Kingdom of Poland,
the tsarist administration adopted a new constitution (1815), which confirmed the previously granted
liberties. TheNapoleonic Code remained in force, and so did the corvée system. Administrative control
over peasants was left at the hands of vogts, who continued to limit peasants’ mobility by denying
passports at their discretion (Bardach et al., 2009, p. 393). Enforcement of payments of peasants’
obligations was done by the military when necessary (Bardach et al., 2009, p. 423).
Before the reform of 1864, all landed peasants in Poland could be broadly classified by:
1. Whether they lived on private land or land owned by the state and local officials.
2. Whether they were in a corvée or quit­rent relationship with their landlord.14
14Note that the distinction between the two systems in the context of our discussion of the labor relations in European
Russia and Siberia only applied to serfs. Here, this distinction applies to all types of peasants who used land (except those
who were landowners themselves).
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There was also a significant number of peasants who lived under the mixed system (czynszowo­
pańszczyzniany). Such peasants paid a quit rent in return for tenancy. In addition, they were obliged
to perform labor services in kind for a certain number of days. In contrast to peasants under the “full”
corvée system, peasants under the mixed system did not perform such services regularly, on a weekly
basis (Grabski, 1904, p. 374).15 From the central government’s perspective, emancipation of peasants,
all of whom already had the personal rights enshrined in the Napoleonic Code, was understood as
transition from the corvée system to one based on a quit rent (Chistiakov, ed, 1989, p. 401). This
process, known as oczynszowanie,16 was actively facilitated by the government: half of all peasants
on state­controlled lands paid a quit rent by 1830 (Kostiushko, 1962, p. 27), and by 1859 the transition
was complete. In private lands, oczynszowanie was much slower due to resistance of the nobility. By
1859, almost 748,000 peasants—of the total rural population of approximately 3.6 million, excluding
nobles—still lived under the corvée system.17 In 1861, Minister Aleksander Wielopolski initiated
mandatory oczynszowanie for all peasants living on private lands, but by that time such measure was
deemed too coservative and was not implemented to due the outbreak of the so­called January Uprising
in 1863 (Bardach et al., 2009, p. 425).
To summarize, although from a legal viewpoint the system of pańszczyzna that existed in Poland
until 1864 was different from “classical” serfdom (poddaństwo), abolished in 1807, in practice the
conditions of peasants living on private lands under the corvée system were similar, or even more
severe, to the conditions of serfs in European Russia and Siberia. Pańszczyzniany peasants were not
owners of the land they were obliged to cultivate; obligations themselves were not regulated by the
civil code; peasants could not leave their landlord without permission; they could be evicted at any
point. For the purposes of our analysis, we treat all other types of Polish peasants, including those who
paid a quit rent and lived on private land, analogously to state peasants in European Russia and Siberia.
15Grabski (1904) groups peasants under the quit­rent and mixed systems together, and so do we.
16Oczynszowanie [of peasants] literally means “making [peasants] czynszowy” in Polish.
17Calculated based on the data presented in Section 3.3.
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3.2.2 The Legal Implications of the 1861 Manifesto for Rural­Urban Mobility
OnMarch 3 (O.S. February 19), 1861, Tsar Alexander II signed the EmancipationManifesto, nominally
abolishing serfdom in all of European Russia (except Poland) and Siberia. The Manifesto consisted of
two parts. The first was the General Law on Freed Peasants, which granted serfs the sostoianie of
free rural dwellers and the right to purchase land owned by their former lords. The second part included
the Provision on Household Serfs and the eight Local Regulations, which specified the conditions
of emancipation in certain provinces and for certain subgroups of serfs. The key changes pertaining
to serfs’ rights to movement, brought about by the Manifesto, are contained in the laws No. 36657,
36658, 36667–36669, and 36673 of the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire (Polnoe
sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, Collection Two, Volume XXXVI, 1863).18
The Manifesto’s provisions applied to household serfs and peasants according to how they were
registered by the Tenth Revision of 1858/1859. If a peasant became a household serf between the time
of the Tenth Revision and 1861, he or she was still subject to the respective provisions for peasants,
and vice versa. Household serfs, who were not tied to land, were required to continue serving their
lords until February 1863. Upon the end of this two­year transitory period (or earlier, if they were
freed by their lords), former household serfs were endowed with the full set of rights associated with
the sostoianie of free rural dwellers, with an additional option of immediately becoming urban citizens
and even being exempt from paying duties to the state for the first few years. The Local Regulations
for Bessarabia stated that all serfs would automatically acquire the status of tsarans (free peasants) after
a two­year period. For serfs employed at private factories, except those in Perm province, the transitory
period was also defined as two years. For ascribed and possessional peasants, and factory peasants in
Perm province, the transitory period was three years.
For all other categories of serfs, both theGeneral Law and the Local Regulations set the transitory
period at nine years, starting from 1861. As a result of the reform, peasants became the owners of
land they previously cultivated.19 They were not allowed to sell this land and to move to cities until
18Chistiakov, ed (1989) provides useful clarification of some of the provisions of the Manifesto.
19With the exception of Bessarabia. We do not focus on the land aspect of the reform as such in this paper. SeeMarkevich
and Zhuravskaya (2018) for a recent account of how the reform affected peasants’ incentives in agriculture.
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after the end of the transitory period. In all but three provinces, this condition could not be changed
even if lords desired to shorten the transitory period for their former serfs. The Local Regulations
for Volhynian, Kiev, and Podolian provinces contained clauses according to which peasants could sell
their land allotments and quit the rural commune before the end of the transitory period. In particular,
they would have to have enough capital to register as merchants or to purchase real estate of a certain
size.20
3.2.3 Post­1861 Legislation Concerning Serfs
TheGeneral Law and Local Regulations described how the process of emancipation was supposed to
unfold in most of the Empire, when the Manifesto was published in 1861. In 1863, a major rebellion,
known as the January Uprising, broke out in the Kingdom of Poland and soon spread to the former
territories of the Polish­Lithuanian Commonwealth in Western Russia.21 Considering that in Western
Russia the rebellion was primarily led by the Polish nobility, the central government sought to increase
its base of support among peasants in the affected regions by lifting the financial burden off former serfs
(Zaionchkovskii, 1968, p. 214). This is how the laws No. 39337, 39928, and 40172, all passed in 1863,
came into being.22 These laws amended the 1861 legislation by abruptly ending the transitory period
in the following provinces: 1) Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Volhynian, Kiev, Podolian, and part of
Vitebsk, where the transitory period ended in 1863; 2)Mogilev and the remaining part of Vitebsk, where
the transitory period ended in 1864. Simultaneously, the price at which former serfs were supposed
to buy out their land allotments according to the 1861 Local Regulations was decreased. Thus, the
January Uprising introduced a discontinuity in the duration of the transitory period for former landed
serfs: it was effectively two or three years in most of modern­day Belarus and Western Ukraine,23 as
opposed to nine years in the rest of European Russia and Siberia.
20Due to the events that followed, these clauses were not consequential.
21Along with Prussia and Austria, Russia participated in the Partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. As a result,
Russia acquired the territories of modern­day Lithuania, Western Belarus, and Western Ukraine, which had a sizable Polish
minority.
22Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection Two. Volume XXXVIII, 1866.
23This change in regulation occurred independently of the legislation on former serfs in Bessarabia, as well as household
serfs and forced factory workers elsewhere, for whom the transitory period was also between two and three years.
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In Poland itself, the rebellion received a wider popular support, having united pro­independence
activists and radical democrats (Kostiushko, 1962, pp. 54–55). The agrarian reformwas one of themain
policies that the Central National Committee (Centralny Komitet Narodowy), the main organization
of the rebellion, promised to pursue in the event that the rebellion succeeded. The decree of January 22,
1863 promised redistribution, with compensation, of land from landlords to peasants, who were then
under the corvée or quit­rent system; the remaining feudal obligations would be canceled (Kostiushko,
1962, pp. 56–57). These provisions applied to both private and state­owned estates. Another decree,
released on the same date, sought to attract support of landless rural dwellers by promising to provide
them with a land allotment, at the expense of state­owned estates, upon completion of military service
(Kostiushko, 1962, p. 57). Althoughmost peasants did not play an active role in the rebellion itself, they
sympathized with it, and stopped fulfilling their obligations to landlords (Kostiushko, 1962, pp. 62–
63). Therefore, the central government was forced to make even more generous concessions than in
Western Russia. The law no. 40609,24 published in 1864 exactly three years after the publication
of the 1861 Emancipation Manifesto, completely and immediately abolished the corvée system. It
also equalized all landed peasants in rights by replacing the existing payments in kind or a monetary
form with a universal land tax. The value of the latter was lower than the monetary equivalent of
both obligatory labor services and quit rent prior to 1864. Peasants became full owners of the land they
cultivated, regardless of whether it belonged to the state or private individuals. All existing arrears were
canceled. Although both peasants under the corvée and quit­rent system benefited from the reform, it
most significantly affected the conditions of the former. With newly acquired property rights, including
the right to sell their allotments, pańszczyzniany peasants no longer had to perform obligatory labor
services in return for tenancy, which had previously kept them tied to land.
24Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection Two. Volume XXXIX, 1867.
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Table 3.2: The dynamics of emancipation after the 1861 Manifesto
Year Serfs freed, total
1863 6,136,887
1864 2,045,497
1870 14,848,187
Total 23,030,571
Notes:
This table displays the total number of serfs who
resided in the sample districts in 1858/1859
and who were emancipated in the indicated
year. The year of emancipation refers to the
end of the transitory period following the
official publication of the law abolishing
serfdom. At the estimation stage, these figures
are multiplied by the respective increase in the
total population between 1858 and the year when
migration flows are estimated (see Section 3.4).
3.3 Data Construction
In this section, we describe construction of the database and discuss the issues pertaining to measure­
ment. The complete list of the data sources we use is provided in Appendix. As a first step, we describe
the creation of the GIS map that “nests” our main variables and that is used for some calculations.
3.3.1 GIS Map of the Russian Empire in 1858
We have created an original GIS map of the Russian Empire with the province and district borders
corresponding to 1858, one of the two years covered by the Tenth Revision (tax census).25 To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first GIS map of Russia whose administrative units are consistent with the
years of the Tenth Revision. Additionally, the map covers the regions in which the Tenth Revision was
not conducted, namely the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Finland. Correctly defining the
administrative borders is particularly important because the phenomenon we study—urbanization—is
25Most of the primary information for the revision was collected by the end of 1859, except for the Far East, where the
revision ended in 1860.
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an outcome of a spatial optimization problem, and most of the data on rural population we use is from
the Tenth Revision.
The first­level administrative unit in the Empire, comparable to a U.S. state, was a province (gu­
berniia, oblast’). Provinces tended to be too large and heterogeneous to be used as primary “building
blocks” in construction of the database. Instead, we measure our non­city­level variables at a lower
level of aggregation, which we refer to as a district (roughly equivalent to a U.S. county).26 Uyezd
served as such a unit in most of Russia proper, except the South, Caucasus, and Siberia, where some
provinces were divided into several okrugs. In the Baltic, uyezd (kreis in German) was a third­level
unit, while in most cases statistical information was reported at the okrug level, which we define as a
district for our purposes. The term powiat, used for describing second­level subdivisions within the
Kingdom of Poland, was typically translated as “uyezd” in official publications in Russian. Although
historically powiats and uyezds were not equivalent, we use powiats as districts because their degree
of granularity was comparable. In the Grand Duchy of Finland, the system of uyezds was rarely used
by the local administration, despite being adopted by the central government in St. Petersburg. Instead,
Finnish officials and statistical agencies reported information separately for cities and rural communes,
as during Swedish rule. Rural communes were represented by parishes (församling), which sometimes
were further divided into chapels (kapell).27 Parishes and chapels were relatively small and numerous
(almost 470 in total in 1860). We aggregate them at the district, i.e., uyezd, level, as defined by the
central government, by matching the boundaries as depicted on the base map. We also use several
statistical publications in Russian that provide (incomplete) correspondence between parishes, chapels,
and uyezds.28 In almost all cases, we are able to perfectly match these different subdivisions, except
for several parishes.29 The resulting number of districts in the territory of the Empire we study is 589.
The main base map we use isKarta Evropeiskoi Rossii i Kavkazskogo kraia [A map of European
26To be more precise, we measure those variable at districts’ centroids.
27We use the terms in Swedish because it was the only official language of the Duchy until 1863. In some Russian
sources, the German term kirchspiel is also used when referring to parishes.
28Those are the same publications that we use as the population data sources. See the complete list in Appendix.
29Given that the remaining ambiguities only concern parishes and chapels that share a common border, and that their
combined population is relatively small, the resulting measurement error is unlikely to have a significant impact on our
analysis.
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Russia and the Caucasus], created by the Imperial Russian Geographic Society between 1857 and
1860 and published in 1862.30 The district borders on this map mostly correspond to the 1858 borders,
except for the mountainous part of the North Caucasus (not in the sample) and several other districts.
For Western Siberia, we use General’naia karta Zapadnoi Sibiri s Kirgizskoi Step’iu [A general
map of Western Siberia with the Kirghiz Steppe], with the border corrections as of 1855. Due to the
vast territory of the Empire, both base maps were printed on separate pages, which we stack together
after georeferencing. Though we believe that the overall quality of georeferencing is high, the resulting
vector images of certain provinces are distorted because pieces of their raster counterparts are scattered
across several images. To correct for these distortions, and, where necessary, to make the district
borders consistent with those existing in 1858, we additionally use raster maps of individual provinces
created by the Ministry of the Interior, military agencies, and third parties.
Because the reliability of our empirical results to a large extent depends on how accurately the GIS
map reflects the proportions of the historical districts,31 we perform the following quality check. We
compare the areas (in square kilometers) of the 1858 districts, as calculated by contemporary statisti­
cians, and the areas of the same districts calculated using the GIS software. We are able to do such
comparison for 540 out of 590 districts; for the remaining districts, we lack the historical data. Fig­
ure 3.3 plots the areas of the districts from our GIS map against the areas measured by contemporaries
(in log terms). Reassuringly, the deviations from the 45­degree line do not seem systematic in either
direction across the spectrum. Also, the deviations are small in magnitude.32
3.3.2 Urban Population in 1811–1910
3.3.2.1 Defining a City in Imperial Russia
Unlike their counterparts inWestern European states, cities in the Russian Empire often did not develop
organically from rural settlements but instead acquired their status via governmental legislation. For
30For more detail, see the accompanyingObiasnitel’naia zapiska [An explanatory note], published along with the map.
31Preserving the relative proportions is important because all our district­level variables, including rural population, are
defined, and measured, at the centroid of each district.
32It should also be noted that contemporary measurement is not inherently preferable, because the level of technology in
the 1860s, when the area calculations were made, was not very high.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the district areas calculated by contemporaries (the x­axis) and by GIS soft­
ware (the y­axis). In the latter case, the st_geod_area function from the sf package for R is used, so that
area calculation is not projection­specific. The blue line represents the 45­degree line. The log scale
is used because several districts were disproportionately large. Source of the GIS map: constructed
by authors. Source of contemporary area measurement: Materialy po delam Tsarstva Pol’skogo...
(1864) for the Kingdom of Poland, Bidrag til Finlands officiella statistik (1870) for the Grand Duchy
of Finland, and Bushen (1863) for the rest of the Empire (see the references in Appendix).
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instance, during the reign of Empress Catherine the Great (1762–1796), 216 new “cities” replaced
former villages, many of which failed to live up to their new status (Rydziunskii, 1958, p. 7). Social
historians have pointed out the difficulty that the definition of a “typical” city poses for comparison of
urbanization in Russia and elsewhere (Mironov, 1990). This ambiguity is confined to Russia proper,
which is most of our sample. In Poland and Finland, cities were explicitly defined as such because all
of them had a charter.
There was only one census in the Russian Empire in the modern sense of the word—that of 1897.
It was meant to capture the entire urban and rural population on the same date (O.S. January 28). In all
other years before the 1917 Revolution, official statistical publications did not account for at least some
segment of the population. To define the universe of cities, we took a union of all settlements listed
as cities in the Sixth Revision (1811), and all settlements mentioned in official statistical publications,
dedicated to cities, published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior.33
These publications appeared under different titles and nominally contained snapshots of urban popu­
lation for the following years: 1825, 1833, 1840, 1847, 1856, 1858, 1863, 1867, 1870, 1885, 1897,
1904, 1910. In other words, for a given year, our definition of a city includes any settlement that was
deemed important enough to be included in the official statistical publication for that year among cities
“proper.”34 Some cities lost their legal status between 1811 and 1910, while some former villages
were granted this status; yet other groups of settlements, such as posads and mestechkos (shtetlekh),
were never deemed “proper” cities, however, they were historically important as centers of trade and
manufacturing.35
As a next step, we geocode all cities using the coordinates from Google Maps, Yandex Maps, and
Wikipedia.36 To verify these coordinates, we plot all the cities on our GIS map. For cities present
on the base maps, we manually check if their (georeferenced) location is consistent with the actual
location. We also check if cities map onto the 1858 districts as expected, using the information on the
33See the complete list of these publications in Appendix.
34Mironov (1990, 2000) follows the same approach for defining a city.
35Henceforth we will refer to all settlements in the resulting database as “cities” as a shortcut, which may or may not
reflect their actual legal status in a given year.
36The latter also contains the coordinates of settlements that no longer exist.
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city­district correspondence from a 1858 publication. For cities that are missing in that publication, we
use the information from Wikipedia and the National Library of Russia website37 to make sure that all
the cities and 1858 districts are matched correctly.
Due to the evolution of the legal status of settlements and the lack of contemporaneous information
possessed by the Ministry of Interior, the panel that we constructed initially contained many missing
observations. We appended this panel by the information from other sources (see below). The resulting
balanced panel consists of 569 cities.38 Concentration of cities, in terms of their number per area,
was highly unequal historically. The Kingdom of Poland had the highest concentration, followed by
Central Russia, Ukraine, and Western Belarus; in the North, South, and East, the concentration was
the smallest. With the exception of the Kingdom of Poland, our panel largely reflects these regional
differences (Figure 3.4).
3.3.2.2 On the Data Sources
The sources we use include printed publications and archival material, prepared by the central gov­
ernment and local civil and religious authorities. We also use publications by contemporary academic
societies, such as the Imperial Russian Geographic Society, that either explicitly cited official sources39
or plausibly had access to them. We never use “guesstimates” of population from travelers’ memoirs
and similar unofficial and non­academic sources.
Unfortunately, all official statistical publications suffer from imperfect measurement. Another is­
sue is the lack of consistency in reporting from year to year and from city to city. Prior to the 1860s, the
main variation in reporting is due to the purpose of the collected information (fiscal, administrative).
Starting from the 1860s, publications primarily differ in methodology of reporting, by including or not
including suburbs and temporary dwellers.40 Table 3.3 groups the sources we use by the origin of data.
Revisions, the predecessor of modern censuses, were conducted in European Russia and Siberia,
37http://nlr.ru/res/refer/r_imp/bd/town_list.php. Accessed on March 24, 2019.
38As the reader will see at the estimation stage in Section 3.4, having a balanced panel is crucial for our purposes.
39In a small number of cases, we also rely on the secondary literature satisfying this criterion.
40See the discussion in Mironov (2000, p. 313–314).
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Table 3.3: Primary sources on the population of cities and their coverage, 1811–1910
Origin of data Years covered Type of population
recorded
Revisions 1811, 1833, 1858 Registered
Church data (European Russia, Siberia) 1811 Present
Church data (Finland) 1811–1910 Present
Police data (Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical
Committee)
1825–1910 Registered/Present
Reports of governors and other local authorities 1825–1910 Present
Reports of local statistical committees 1840–1910 Present
City/provincial censuses 1867–1910 Present
Imperial Census 1897 Present
primarily for tax purposes, until 1858. Importantly, all the revisions in the nineteenth century also
included the population that were exempt from taxation (nepodatnye sosloviia), such as nobility and
clergy. For a number of cities, the Sixth (1811) and Eighth (1833) Revisions only indicated the number
of males, which we multiplied by 2 to get an estimate of the total population. To a varying degree,
most pre­1840 estimates of urban population in Russia proper, including reports by local governors
and police, were initially based on the updated figures from the most recent revision (Kabuzan, 1963;
Mironov, 1990).
Table 3.4: The total number of freed and fugitive serfs arriving in cities before the 1861 Manifesto
Period Freed serfs Fugitive serfs
1816–1819 5,198 1,672
1820–1824 9,486 749
1825–1829 8,176 964
1830–1834 16,108 194
1835–1839 11,272 2,773
1840–1844 6,053 1,738
1845–1849 5,660 523
1850–1854 27,860 1,470
Total 89,813 10,083
Notes:
Source: Rydziunskii (1958, p. 376).
This table displays the number of serfs who acquired the sostoianie
of urban dwellers in European Russia and Siberia.
For several settlements in Russia that did not yet have a city status in 1811, we used the information
collected by the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church was required to keep registers that recorded
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births, deaths, marriages, baptisms, and confessions at the parish level starting from 1722. This in­
formation was then aggregated at the national level by the Most Holy Synod, a separate branch of the
central government. Comparison of estimates of population made by the Church with the revisions and
police data suggests that the former were of high quality, at least as far as the Orthodox population was
concerned (Mironov, 1990).41 We rely on the Church’s data more extensively in the cases of Finland
and Poland, where religious authorities served as the primary providers of the information on popula­
tion both before and after each region was annexed by the Russian Empire (Kabuzan, 1992). In Poland,
civil authorities replaced the Church in that capacity in the 1850s. In Finland, in addition to clerical
registers that continued to be regularly updated, there were one­day censuses in the largest cities every
five years starting from 1870. Overall, the population data in Finland was deemed of such high quality
that the tsarist government decided not to conduct the 1897 Imperial Census there (Kabuzan, 1992).
If multiple population estimates exist for a given city and year, we prioritize: 1) one­day censuses
over other forms of measurement; 2) provincial and local sources over reports by the central govern­
ment; and 3) the information on the present, rather than registered, population. Wherever applicable
and possible, we subtract the population of military garrisons and sailors, and use consistent administra­
tive units. In particular, we either collapse the population of two settlements in the entire panel, if they
merged at some point between 1811 and 1910, or we disaggregate the combined population, provided
that the separate estimates for each city are available. Unfortunately, such consistency comes at the
expense of the loss of certain observations.42 For many post­1897 publications (i.e., corresponding to
the years 1904 and 1910), one recurring issue is that local statistical committees in certain provinces
stopped accounting for in­ and out­migration, and instead they reported the 1897 figures plus the net
natural increase (the number of births minus the number of deaths in the period following 1897). This
issue was well understood by contemporary and Soviet historians (Kabuzan, 1982, p. 101). In some
cases, we were able to find alternative official sources that did not suffer from the problem of ignoring
the net migration flows.
41All the settlements in question were located in religiously homogeneous areas, which minimizes the possible bias.
42For example, Gomel (Belarus) became the new center of former Belitsa district in 1854, while Belitsa itself became a
suburb of Gomel. From 1856 on, Gomel­Belitsa are reported jointly in all official publications, while prior to 1856, only
Belitsa is reported. We were able to find a separate estimate for Gomel in 1847, but not for the earlier years, which is why
both Belitsa and Gomel are not included in the balanced panel.
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It should be noted that not only most sources failed to reflect the population of cities on the same
date, but sometimes the difference in the moment of measurement could be as large as one year within
the same cross section, or even more.43 If the information on a certain city was missing in the primary
statistical publication for a given year (e.g., 1840), we tried to find another estimate of population from
an official source, dated within two years before and after that year (1838–1839 and 1841–1842). The
concern of the date mismatch is partly mitigated by the fact that our cross sections are at least three
years apart from each other, with the exception of 1856 and 1858.44 The total number of mismatched
city­year observations in the balanced panel is 120, which is negligibly small compared to the total
number of observations (7,966).
43If population is reported as of January 1 of a given year, we consider it as population in the previous year for our
purposes.
44In the latter case, we counted all observations from 1857 as those from 1858, preventing the possibility of overlap.
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3.3.3 Rural Population in 1858/1859
Due to frequent boundary changes, it is not possible to construct a consistent panel of rural population
for the period we study, neither at the province nor district level. Instead, we create one snapshot using
the observed rural population data. For the other years, we calculate the hypothetical population based
on our assumptions about the rate of natural population growth and the model of rural­urban migration
(see below), holding the district boundaries fixed.
We choose 1858/1859 as the “baseline” year for two reasons. First, this is when the last compre­
hensive census of serfs was conducted before their emancipation in European Russia, Siberia, and the
Kingdom of Poland. Second, there were no significant changes in the external boundaries of the Em­
pire after 1858 (within the limits we study). Our main data source is the Tenth Revision, conducted
in 1858 and 1859.45 Among the reported groups of rural dwellers, we exclude the following: foreign
colonists (such as German settlers), nomadic tribes (e.g., the Kalmyks), the Jews, peasants exempt from
taxation (na l’gote). Together, they constituted a relatively small fraction of the total rural population.
We also exclude the nobility, military, and clergy. Due to certain ambiguity in the titles of peasants,
we cross­check the information in the Tenth Revision with that in Statisticheskii obzor… (1861). We
classify as state peasants those who were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of State Property, other
ministries and their departments, as well as former serfs (and their descendants) in the Baltic provinces,
where serfdom was abolished in the 1810s. We classify as serfs the following groups: land­cultivating
serfs, domestic servants, serfs at gentry­owned factories, possessional peasants, and ascribed peasants.
For Poland, where the Tenth Revision was not conducted, we use alternative sources. For
pańszczyzniany and czynszowy peasants living on private lands, we use the information from
Kalendarz Wydawany… (1860). For all other Polish peasants, including those who were landless,
we use the information from Materialy po delam Tsarstva Pol’skogo… (1864). In both cases, the
data is given for 1859. We exclude the nobility and Jews from the number of state peasants, which
otherwise includes all rural dwellers except pańszczyzniany peasants living on private lands. Finally,
for Finland, where serfdom did not exist, and where the Tenth Revision was not conducted either,
45This data is available in Perepisi naseleniia Rossii… (1972). For this and other sources, see the full references in
Appendix.
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we define as “state” peasants all rural dwellers reported in Bidrag til Finlands officiella statistik…
(1870). This information is given for 1860.
We define the moment of emancipation of serfs as the end of the transitory period following the of­
ficial publication date of the respective law abolishing serfdom. Note that the aforementioned sources
report the information on population at the district level. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume
that within each district, the full mass peasants was concentrated at the district’s centroid. One impli­
cation of this assumption, which we discuss below, is that some peasants, who may have resided in
cities, are counted as though they resided in the countryside.46
3.3.4 Population Growth
Because we only observe the rural population in 1858/1859, it is important to account for population
change over time to approximate the true size—actual or counterfactual—of migration flows in the
periods before and after 1858/1859. Assuming that the rate of natural population growth—net increase
in a given year over the total population in the previous year—was uniform across all districts, one can
measure it using the empire­wide increase in the total population. We use the data from Statisticheskii
ezhegodnik Rossii. 1913 g. [A statistical yearbook of Russia. 1913] (1914), which reports the total
population of the Empire, including Poland and Finland, at annual intervals between 1800 and 1913.
Column (2) in Table 3.5 displays the total population in the relevant years. Column (3) displays the
ratio of the total population in a given year over the total population in 1858 (the base year). These
ratios serve as factors by which the remaining rural population, i.e., net of out­migration, is multiplied
at the estimation stage.
3.3.5 Transportation and Least­Cost Distance
The cost of transportation is one of the most important factors in the decision to migrate. By the
beginning of 1911, the three most important types of transportation, in terms of the total network
length, were dirt (unpaved) roads, waterways (rivers, canals, lakes, seas), and railroads. In European
46This issue is mostly a concern for the Tenth Revision data. The Polish and Finnish sources separated urban and rural
population more explicitly.
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Table 3.5: Change in the total population of the Russian Empire (relative to 1858)
Year Total population,
millions
Total
population/Total
population in 1858
1825 53.5 0.72
1833 59.9 0.80
1840 63.9 0.86
1847 68.1 0.91
1856 73.3 0.98
1858 74.5 1.00
1863 76.1 1.02
1867 81.8 1.10
1870 86.3 1.16
1885 111.0 1.49
1897 128.9 1.73
1904 144.2 1.94
1910 163.8 2.20
Notes:
The total population includes parts of the Caucasus and
Siberia, as well as Central Asia, that are not in the sample.
Source: calculated by authors using the information from
Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossii. 1913 g. (1914)
(see the reference in Appendix).
Russia, including the Caucasus and Poland, the total length of each network was 526, 188, and 61
thousand versts, respectively.47 We assume that dirt roads only enabled traveling afoot. Travel through
waterways was typically provided by steamship services. Use of the latter “declined substantially
toward the end of the [nineteenth] century, and retained a significant share of passenger transportation
only in Siberia” (Metzer, 1976, p. 97). Paved roads constituted the fourth largest network, with the total
length of 33.5 thousand versts by 1911.48 These roads were used by stagecoach services (diligences),
which “had been reduced to an insignificant level as early as the 1860’s” (Metzer, 1976, p. 96). Due to
their relative insignificance, we do not include diligences in our model.
For land surface, rivers, lakes, and seas, we use the readily available shapefiles from the Natural
47The figures are from the table on p. 5 in Statisticheskii sbornik Ministerstva putei soobschenia. Vypusk 124 [A
statistical digest of the Ministry of Transportation. Volume 124]. St. Petersburg, 1914. Here, the length of the waterways
network only includes rivers and canals.
48The figure is for European Russia, as above.
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Earth website.49 Because these shapefiles only contain major rivers and lakes, from which we exclude
the reservoirs created in the twentieth century, we assume that all of them were navigable between
1811 and 1910. As for the railroad network, we have created a new GIS map of all railway lines
built in the Russian Empire between 1838, when the first public line50 was opened, and 1910. This
GIS map is based on shapefiles corresponding to the modern railroad network of the now­independent
states that used to be part of the Russian Empire. These shapefiles are part of the Digital Chart of
the World (DCW), a project of the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) developed on
commission for the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency.51 After merging the individual shapefiles, we
assign the opening year to each railway line, if the line was opened by 1911. The rest of the railroad
network, that exists today but did not exist until after 1911, is removed. We use Afonina (1995) as the
main reference on construction of railroads starting from 1838. We verify the information in Afonina
(1995) by comparing it to historical maps of railway lines released in 1862, 1893, and 1913.52 After
georeferencing these maps, we append the railway lines that existed historically but do not exist today
(and hence are missing in the DCW shapefiles). Figure 3.5 displays the expansion of the railroad
network using the resulting GIS map, overlayed with the waterways network.
49http://www.naturalearthdata.com. Accessed on May 19, 2019.
50Tsarskoye Selo Railway.
51The data was first released to the public in 1992. The project specification is available on the website of the National
Geo­Spatial Intelligence Agency (http://earth­info.nga.mil/publications/specs/printed/89009/89009_DCW.pdf). Currently
the shapefiles can be downloaded at http://www.diva­gis.org (accessed on May 19, 2019). The scale of the database is
1:1,000,000.
52See the list of these maps in Appendix.
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For any given route between two points, the total transportation cost includes the fare cost and
the opportunity cost. Both components are functions of time spent (i.e., speed) en route; the fare
could also depend on the travel class. For consistency, we define the opportunity cost for the same
income level across all modes of travel. Following Metzer (1976), we set this level at 12 kopecks per
hour, which is equivalent to the estimated average wage of all railroad passengers in 1907 (p. 103).
Further, we assume that passengers in our model pay third­class fares, which means a lower quality
of accommodation than the first and second class but higher than the special fares that existed for
migrants and prisoners. According to Metzer (1976), a typical third­class fare for railroads was 1.44
(1.35) kopecks per verst (km) in 1906. The estimate for a third­class steamship fare in 1900, obtained by
Metzer (1976), is 0.62 (0.58) kopecks per verst (km). Naturally, the “fare” for traveling afoot is zero.53
We list other fare estimates for the sake of comparison in column (1) in Table 3.6. One important
difference between traveling afoot and other modes of travel is a daily limit to one’s physical ability
to walk. We assume that a typical peasant could travel no more than seven hours a day at a speed of 5
versts (5.334 km) per hour.54 Because the capacity of railroads and steamship services is twenty­four
hours a day,55 the “effective” speed of traveling afoot is 7∗ 5.334/24 = 1.556 km per hour. The speed
estimates for railroads and steamships are provided by Metzer (1976) (see column (2) in Table 3.6).
To calculate the opportunity cost for each transportation type, expressed in kopecks per km, we divide
the aforementioned hourly wage, 12 kopecks, by the effective hourly speed (column (3)). Finally, the
corresponding total cost is a sum of column (2) and column (3).
To calculate the least­cost distance between the sample cities and district centroids, we first rasterize
the GIS map by creating a 1000 by 1000 grid of cells. We overlay this grid with three shapefiles—one
corresponding to land surface, the waterways network, and the railroad network—and assign a dummy
to each cell indicating whether the cell enables transition through it using a given transportation type.
After that, we define the cost of transition through each cell as the minimum of the inverse of the total
53We do not account for the cost of food and lodging during the travel.
54This number of hours per day is likely to be too high, considering that many peasants traveled with their families.
55Strictly speaking, this is not correct. Steamship services only operated during the navigation period between May and
October every year. To calculate the actual capacity of steamship services, as expressed in hours per year, one has to make
assumptions about the degree of substitution between railroads and the waterways network, and how this substitution would
be reflected in the observed fares for both modes of travel.
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Table 3.6: Comparison of the travel costs for different modes of transportation in the early twentieth
century
Mode Fare, kopecks per
passenger­km
Effective speed,
km per hour
Opportunity cost,
kopecks per km
Total cost,
kopecks per km
Afoot (no transportation) 0.00 1.56 7.71 7.71
Railroad, first class 3.21 35.20 0.34 3.55
Water, first 1.27 7.47 1.61 2.87
Water, second 0.86 7.47 1.61 2.47
Railroad, second class 2.03 35.20 0.34 2.37
Water, third, fourth, and
migrant
0.58 7.47 1.61 2.19
Railroad, third class 1.35 35.20 0.34 1.69
Railroad, migrant class 0.91 35.20 0.34 1.25
Railroad, fourth class 0.67 35.20 0.34 1.02
Notes:
Source: authors’ calculations based on Metzer (1976).
Metzer (1976) expressed all the variables in versts, which we convert to kilometers. The steamship fares are given for 1900.
The railroad fares are given for 1906. In the model, we use the third­class fares both for railroads and steamship services. See
text for more detail.
cost from Table 3.6 over the set of applicable transportation types. Essentially, this procedure assigns
a negative weight to every grid cell. To calculate the least­cost distance between a pair of points on
the grid, we apply the costDistance function from the gdistance package for R.56 Finally, to improve
performance of numerical optimization, we scale the least­cost distance, dividing it by the maximum.
For the sake of illustration, in Figure 3.6 we show the least­cost path between the centroid of Kholm
district (Pskov province) and the city of Pskov given the available modes of transportation in each
period between 1811 and 1910 and the aforementioned assumptions about the travel costs. Note that
until St. Petersburg–Warsaw Railway went through Pskov province in 1859, all travel had to be done
afoot or using the relatively costly waterways network. The increasing access of railroads reshaped the
optimal route between the two points (effective starting from 1863). Given that among the three modes
of transportation we consider, only the railroad network evolved over time. Because its expansion
greatly reduced the cost of travel, albeit heterogeneously across time and space, we view availability
of railroads as a useful “policy parameter” that will be manipulated in counterfactual analysis (see
Section 3.4).
56This function uses Dijkstra’s algorithm, representing the grid as a graph.
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3.3.6 Other Variables
Here we describe additional variables that we use as proxies for “pull” and “push” factors in rural­urban
migration.
City status in 1858 We control for the administrative status of cities as a proxy for the level of
provision of local public goods. The central government distinguished among four types of cities:
1) the capitals (St. Petersburg and Moscow); 2) province centers; 3) district centers; 4) others.57 We
use the information on each city’s administrative status as of 1858, the last pre­1861 period, using the
same sources as for urban population in 1858. In addition, we cross­check this information with the
1855–1860 raster maps.
Seaport in 1904/1910 We also create a dummy for whether a given city was a seaport, which could
be an important determinant of growth due to trade and access to foreign markets. For European Russia
and Siberia, we use the information from the two main statistical publications for 1904 and 1910.58 For
Finland, we treat all cities located within 10 km from the coastline as seaports.
Land suitability We use land suitability as a proxy for income in the agricultural sector. Other things
equal, more favorable agricultural conditions lead to higher productivity and, therefore, higher income
(in the absence of serfdom). In turn, higher income in the agricultural sector decreases peasants’ will­
ingness to move to a city. Following other literature, e.g., Nunn and Qian (2011), we construct an index
of land suitability using the current (2012) version of the FAO GAEZ database.59 This database pro­
vides information on the potential yield for each crop at a given input level and water supply. Rye was
the single most important crop in the Russian Empire, because it could grow well in low­fertility soils;
it was (and still is) often planted in the fall. Oat, the second most popular crop, was cultivated under
57Because the primary second­level administrative unit in Finland was a parish, there were no district centers.
581904: Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Goroda Rossii v 1904 godu [Russian cities in 1904],
St. Petersburg: Tipografiia N. L. Nyrkina, 1906. 1910: Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Goroda
Rossii v 1910 godu [Russian cities in 1910], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia N. L. Nyrkina, 1914. We use both sources
because each of them contains errors and omissions.
59http://gaez.fao.org. Accessed on May 19, 2019.
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comparable climatic and soil conditions. The third most popular crop, wheat, was primarily grown in
the South. Combined, these three crops accounted for around eighty percent of the total agricultural
output between 1801 and 1914 (Mironov, 1985, p. 44).60 The level of granularity in the FAO GAEZ
database is 5 arc minutes by 5 arc minutes. For our purposes, we calculate the rye, oat, and wheat
suitability indexes, divided by their respective maxima, at the centroid of each district (analogously to
how we calculate the rural population mass above). To approximate the historical conditions as much
as possible, we use the versions of the indexes corresponding to the 1961–1990 period, low input level,
and rain­fed water supply.
Table 3.7 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables used in analysis.
Table 3.7: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Panel A. Rural population in 1858/1859
Number of serfs (by district) 589 39,102 30,721 0 130,517
Number of state peasants (by district) 589 43,784 39,429 0 223,162
Panel B. District characteristics
Land suitability, rye (by district) 589 0.35 0.35 ­1 0.82
Land suitability, oat (by district) 589 0.34 0.38 ­1 0.76
Land suitability, wheat (by district) 589 0.51 0.3 ­1 0.8
Panel C. Urban population in 1811–1910
Total population (by city and year) 7,966 13,065 51,508 100 1,637,100
Panel D. City characteristics
Capital (by city) 569 0 0.06 0 1
Province center in 1858 (by city) 569 0.1 0.31 0 1
District center in 1858 (by city) 569 0.73 0.45 0 1
Seaport in 1904/1910 (by city) 569 0.05 0.22 0 1
Panel E. Origin­city characteristics
Travel cost (by origin, city, and year) 4,356,833 0.25 0.14 0.003 1
Notes:
Historically, the capitals were also province centers and province centers were also district centers. To study the differential
impact, we define these categories as mutually exclusive in the data.
60Excluding Poland and Finland.
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3.4 Model and Estimation
3.4.1 Formal Setup
For the sake of brevity, we refer to all rural dwellers, including domestic servants and factory workers,
as peasants (male). We index locations in the countryside with o (for “origin”) and cities with d (for
“destination”). We parametrize the mobility status of all peasants at origin o and time t using a dummy
variable, xot, which takes the value of 0 if their movement is restricted and the value of 1 otherwise.
By assumption, if mobility is unrestricted in a given period, it remains so in all future periods. Further,
we denote with ciot the movement choice of peasant i at origin o and time t. It is equal to the index of
the desired city, d, if the peasant decides to leave the countryside and 0 otherwise.
If ciot = 0, peasant i attains the utility equal to viot = δot + μiot. Here, δot is the average utility of
all peasants at origin o and time t. It can account for the local labor market conditions. The term μiot
is the idiosyncratic component of utility. We assume that μiot are i.i.d. Extreme Value Type I random
variables. If ciot = d, peasant i attains the utility equal to viodt = δodt + μiodt. The term δodt is the
average component of utility of all peasants from origin o arriving in city d. It can account for such
factors as the cost of moving from origin o to city d, the differential labor market conditions in city
d as compared to some other city d˜, d˜ ̸= d, and the overall advantage of living in a city as compared
to the countryside, which we refer to as the urban premium. Analogously, the term μiodt captures the
idiosyncratic component and is distributed as i.i.d. Extreme Value Type I. Moving from origin o to
city d is only rational if viodt > viot. Given our assumptions about the distribution of the idiosyncratic
terms, μiot and μiodt, the probability of moving can be defined for every city d as:
Pr(ciot = d) =
eδodt−δot
1+
∑
d eδodt−δot
, (3.1)
which is a choice probability of the multinomial logit model.
Note that the probability in Equation (3.1) is only defined with respect to origin o and city d,
whereas the difference between the probability of moving from o to d and from o to d˜, d˜ ̸= d, is
implicitly reflected in the term δodt.61 We use this probability to match the observed outcomes with the
61Still, the presence of the term δodt by itself does not address the peculiar substitution pattern, known as the property
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structural parameters of interest, δot and δodt. To that end, we first define the origin­level counterpart
of Equation (3.1):
sodt =
eδodt−δot × xot
1+
∑
d eδodt−δot × xot
for every o, d, and t, (3.2)
where sodt is the share of peasants at time t who prefer to move to city d over staying at origin o given
xot = 1.
Let not be the number of peasants at origin o and time t. Then, the number of peasants arriving to
city d from origin o between periods t− 1 and t is equal to
flowdt =
∑
o
(not × sodt) for every d and t. (3.3)
To account for the natural population change in the countryside, net of out­migration, we assume
that the number of peasants at origin o changes over time according to the following law of motion:
not = no,t−1 × (1−
∑
d
sod,t−1)× gt for every o and t, (3.4)
where the term
∑
d sod,t−1 captures the total migration to cities from origin o and gt is the rate of
population growth.
In turn, the population growth of cities is given by
popdt = popd,t−1 + flowdt + εdt for every d and t, (3.5)
where εdt is the idiosyncratic error term.
Note that in Equations (3.3) to (3.5) the observed quantities are no,1858, popd,t−1, and popdt. All
other terms need to be assumed or estimated from the data.
of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA), induced by the choice probabilities in Equation (3.1). See Train (2009)
for a textbook treatment.
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3.4.2 Assessing the Modeling Assumptions
Before we proceed to estimation, we deem it important to assess the modeling assumptions in light of
our previous discussions of the historical context and data.
3.4.2.1 Issues Pertaining to Measurement of State Peasants and Serfs
In the model, state peasants and serfs are “switched” at different times, which is captured by term xot in
Equation (3.2). State peasants optimize their location, subject to parameters δot and δodt, in each period
starting from 1811. In contrast, serfs’ choice set is defined as empty before emancipation. Because
our “treatment” is a dichotomous variable—whether a particular group of rural dwellers was at all
allowed to move to cities or not—measurement error could lead to a significant bias in the estimated
counterfactuals. On one hand, this bias could be due to imperfect measurement of serfs residing in
cities. On the other hand, the bias could be caused by the error in the assumed choice set available
to serfs in each time period. Even if serfs decided not to move to a city when they had a choice, the
incorrectly defined choice set would distort the structural parameters capturing serfs’ opportunity cost
of moving. Because both types of error, if present, would likely co­vary with the spatial distribution
of serfs,62 here we provide additional evidence that, as we believe, mitigates these concerns.
Additional barriers to migration of state peasants Taking the transportation costs as given, how
safe is the assumption of state peasants being able to move to cities as they wished? One barrier that
could prevent them from leaving the countryside was the cost of obtaining a passport, which had to
be renewed from time to time.63 In addition, before moving to a city, state peasants were obliged to
make an advance payment of their annual taxes in one installment.64 A combination of the passport
cost and liquidity constraints, effectively increasing the total cost of moving for state peasants, could
have led to smaller rural­urban migration flows than our model allows for. In practice, those additional
costs incurred by state peasants were usually covered by their employers in cities (Crisp, 1976, p. 233).
62In other words, these measurement errors would likely be location­specific and would not be absorbed by the common
observable variables.
63Passports were valid for a period up to three years (Digest of Regulations, Article 142).
64If they stayed in the countryside, the taxes could be paid in smaller portions.
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Therefore, we believe that the transportation costs, the wage differential between a city and the coun­
tryside, and the urban premium—all absorbed by terms δot and δodt—were of the first order compared
to other factors explaining state peasants’ decision to migrate.
“Missing” serfs in cities Next, as mentioned in Section 3.3, a significant number of our sources
on urban population in the pre­1861 period explicitly or implicitly draw from the results of the Sixth
(1811), Eighth (1833), and, to a lesser extent, Tenth (1858) Revisions. Because revisions primarily
served as tax censuses, they only counted the registered (pripisnoe), or permanent, population of cities.
A general issue of using the revisions data is that those dwellers who were required to pay their duties
to an authority in a certain location did not necessarily reside in the same jurisdiction. Also, recall that
for European Russia and Siberia we assume that all state peasants and serfs, measured in 1858/1859,
resided in the rural part of their respective districts. The inconsistency in how the registered and present
population was counted is perhaps more problematic for studying rural­urban migration of serfs than
state peasants. As discussed in Section 3.2, the only category of serfs who were allowed to legally
reside in cities on a permanent basis were domestic servants, and they were counted as urban dwellers
in revisions. In contrast, the present population, reported by police and local statistical authorities, also
included: 1) those serfs who arrived in cities for short­term service jobs (otkhodniki) or to sell their
products in markets (with permission from their lords but were counted as urban dwellers by accident);
2) those who were freed by their lords between revisions (vol’nootpuschennye); 3) fugitives, i.e., those
who escaped from their lords (beglye). As for the last two categories of serfs, their total number in all
cities in European Russia and Siberia was estimated at just below 100,000 during the period between
1816 and 1854 (see Table 3.4). As for household serfs, included both in the registered and present
population of cities, their share in the total urban population continuously decreased: they comprised 8
percent in 1802 and 4 percent in 1857, on the eve of emancipation (Mironov, 2000, p. 325). Therefore,
measurement error due to miscounting serfs residing in cities before emancipation is likely to be small
compared to the total population of cities. However (in)significant the number of serfs living in cities
before 1861 may have been, the inflow of state peasants during the same period was greater by an
order of magnitude. According to one account, a total of around 726,000 state peasants became urban
dwellers between 1826 and 1851 (Crisp, 1976, p. 234).
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3.4.2.2 Zero Natural Population Growth of Cities
Equation (3.5) posits that the natural growth rate of urban population is zero, and all observed changes
in population are due to inflow of rural dwellers and random shocks. While this is a convenient tech­
nical assumption, we also believe that it reflects the the fact that rural­urban migration was the single
most important source of the growth of cities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Un­
fortunately, we lack the data on births and deaths at the city level to support this thesis in a systematic
fashion. For the sake of illustration, in Table 3.8 we display the population growth of Moscow in
1867–1912, which was the second­largest city in the Empire (after St. Petersburg) and for which we
have data at relatively frequent intervals. As one can infer from the changes in the total population
between consecutive observations, the net natural growth must have been by an order of magnitude
smaller than the growth rate due to migration.
Table 3.8: The total population and net natural increase in Moscow, 1867–1912
Year Total population,
thousands
Net natural increase,
thousands
Net natural increase,
% of total
1867 399.30 11.4 2.85
1878 696.10 2.2 0.32
1880 – 2.7 –
1882 759.30 ­1.7 ­0.22
1885 753.50 4.4 0.58
1890 879.00 3.4 0.39
1892 – 0.0 –
1895 – 3.5 –
1897 999.70 4.6 0.46
1900 – 4.4 –
1902 1,174.70 7.8 0.66
1907 1,359.09 8.3 0.61
1912 1,617.20 9.1 0.56
Notes:
Source: compiled by authors based on Gavrilova (2001, pp. 415–417). The net natural
increase is the difference between all births and deaths in a given year. The total
population in 1885 is from authors’ database. The total population in 1882 and 1897
is given for the end of each year.
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3.4.3 Estimation and Counterfactuals
3.4.3.1 Parametric Specification
We specify our structural parameters entering Equation (3.2) as follows. Let
δot = suitabilityryeo + βoat × suitabilityoato + βwheat × suitabilitywheato for every o and t, (3.6)
where each suitabilityjo term is the corresponding land suitability index as defined in Section 3.3.
Next, for every o, d, and t we assume that
δodt = βcost × costodt + βseaport × seaportd
+ βcapitalt × capitald + βprovincet × provinced + βdistrictt × districtd + φt,
(3.7)
where costodt is the cost of travel from origin o to city d at time t, seaportd is a dummy for whether city
d is a seaport in 1904/1910, capitald, provinced, and districtd are dummies for city d’s administrative
status in 1858 (capital, provincial center, or district center, respectively), φt is the urban premium.
We allow the coefficients in capitald, provinced, and districtd to vary over time to capture the po­
tentially differential return to migration to cities of different types at different points in time. Note that,
like in other discrete choice models, the absolute levels of utility are irrelevant. The choice probabil­
ities defined by Equation (3.1) only depend on the difference between peasant i’s utility from staying
at origin o, viot, and his utility from moving to city d, viodt. One of the parameters has to be normalized
to zero to set the level of utility with respect to which other alternatives are evaluated. (This is why
there is no constant term in Equation (3.6).) Then, the urban premium, φt, captures the average effect
of unincluded factors on the utility of moving to city d relative to staying at origin o. Identification
of the model is further restricted because we infer the “choice” of staying at origin o indirectly, via
the changes in the observed population of cities. As a consequence, one of the coefficients in Equa­
tion (3.6) has to be normalized to one to set the scale of utility.65 We normalize the coefficient in
65Without such normalization, multiplying all parameters entering δot by the same factor would not affect the ratio of
the probability of moving to city d relative to the probability of moving to city d˜, d˜ ̸= d. However, that would affect the
probability of staying at origin o, which we would not be able to detect.
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3.4.3.2 Iterative Optimization Procedure
Recall that Equation (3.3) describesmigration flows as predicted by themodel. To obtain an “empirical”
counterpart of the left­hand side of this equation, we rearrange the terms in Equation (3.5):
f̂lowdt = popdt − popd,t−1 for every d and t. (3.8)
Here, the term f̂lowdt differs from the term flowdt in Equation (3.5) in that the unobserved shocks,
εdt, do not enter Equation (3.8). Assuming that the model of migration (given by Equation (3.3)), the
models of rural and urban population growth (Equations (3.4) and (3.5)), and the structural parameters
(Equations (3.6) and (3.7)) are specified correctly, the theoretical and observed quantities are related
via the true, unobserved parameters, (β, φ), as follows:
f̂lowdt = flowdt(β, φ) + ϵdt for every d and t, (3.9)
where ϵdt are i.i.d. shocks.
Finally, to obtain estimates for (β, φ), we solve the following optimization problem:
min
β,φ
∑
d
∑
t
(
f̂lowdt − flowdt(β, φ)
)2
. (3.10)
Because at every time t the remaining population at origin o, defined by Equation (3.4), and
flowdt are co­determined, we use the following iterative procedure to make this optimization problem
tractable.
1. We start with some initial values of the parameters, (β0, φ0).
2. For each origin o, we calculate the share of peasants that left o between 1856 and 1858, sod,1856.
To that end, we plug in (β0, φ0) into Equation (3.2).
66Implicitly, all coefficients in Equation (3.6) are divided by βrye.
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3. We calculate the total number of peasants at origin o in 1856, no,1856, according to Equation (3.4).
We use the observed population in 1858, no,1858, the population growth between 1856 and 1858,
g1858 (the third column in Table 3.5), and the share of peasants who left, sod,1856, from the previous
step.
4. We proceed to calculating (sodt, not) for each origin o and the years 1847, 1840, 1833, and 1825.
For the period 1858–1910, the procedure is analogous.
5. Once we have a complete “panel” of population at each origin o, {not}t=1910t=1825, we calculate flowdt
by replacing the unobserved parameters in Equation (3.3) with (β0, φ0) for each d and t. (Its
empirical counterpart, f̂lowdt, is calculated according to Equation (3.8) once for all iterations.)
6. Solving the optimization problem (3.10) yields the new values of the parameters, (β1, φ1).
7. Return to step 2.
We repeat this procedure until convergence in the value of the minimand (3.10).
3.4.3.3 Results
The upper panel in Table 3.9 and Figure 3.7 display the estimates of the “pull” (city­specific) factors.67
Expectedly, the coefficient in costodt is negative: other things equal, the more expensive it is for peas­
ants to reach a certain city the less likely they are to migrate there. Further, seaports seem to be more
attractive destinations, controlling for other factors. As for the time­varying coefficients, we do not see
any particular trend in the value of the urban premium, φt. This means that cities by themselves did not
become more or less attractive to live in compared to the countryside (at least according to our model
and data). As the coefficients in capitald, provinced, and districtd show, this observation applies to
cities regardless of their administrative status. The observed “anomaly” around the year 1858 is likely
due to the short length of the interval between 1856 and 1858. Together, the estimated coefficients in
the city status dummies and φ1858 seem to “even out” the spike in that year.
The bottom panel in Table 3.9 displays the estimates of the “push” (origin­specific) factors. As
one can see, the signs of the coefficients in suitabilityoato and suitabilitywheato are inversely related. This
67Note that our solution to the optimization problem (3.10) does not allow for inference. Because the main goal of this
study is to conduct counterfactual analysis, point estimates are sufficient for our purposes.
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likely reflects the fact that oat, like rye, was primarily grown in the North and wheat was primarily
grown in the South. Therefore, the residual North­South variation, not captured by other variables, is
absorbed by the land suitability indexes.
Table 3.9: Estimated parameters (time­invariant)
Parameter Estimate
City­specific
Travel cost ­124.41
Seaport 2.80
Origin­specific
Land suitability, oat 7.96
Land suitability,
wheat
­6.87
Notes:
All coefficients are estimated relative to the land
suitability index for rye. For the estimates of the
time­varying parameters, see Figure 3.7.
3.4.3.4 Counterfactual Analysis and Fit
Because we fully specify the processes of migration and population growth in the model, we are able
to make counterfactual predictions about rural­urban migration in different years by altering the values
of certain parameters of interest. We define the “baseline” scenario as the one that actually happened,
with the end of the transitory period in 1863, 1864, and 1870, and the gradual expansion of the rail­
road network in 1838–1910. The alternative scenarios that we consider include: completely removing
the railroad network in all periods, abolishing serfdom in 1811, and combination of the two. To con­
struct the counterfactual population of city d at time t under different scenarios, we sum its estimated
population at time t− 1 and the estimated inflow of migrants at time t:
p̂opdt = p̂opd,t−1 + flowdt(β̂, φ̂), (3.11)
where p̂opd,1811 = popd,1811, the observed population in 1811.
Figure 3.8 displays the result of applying this procedure to all 569 cities in the balanced sample.
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Figure 3.7: Estimated parameters (time­varying). All coefficients are estimated relative to the land
suitability index for rye. See Table 3.9 for the estimates of the time­invariant parameters.
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Scenario (2) represents the baseline case.68 Comparison between scenarios (1) and (2) suggests that the
negative consequences of serfdomwere mitigated to a large extent due to construction of railroads. The
considerable divergence between the two scenarios begins as early as in 1870, and by 1910 the gap con­
stitutes several million people added to the total urban population. Importantly, the estimated impact of
railroads does not seem to be an artifact of some unobserved interaction between railroad construction
and serfdom.69 As one can see, the gap in the total urban population in 1910 between scenarios (3) and
(4), neither of which implies the existence of serfdom historically, is roughly proportional to the gap
between scenarios (1) and (2). Also, because we do not find a significant increase in the attractiveness
of cities themselves, the apparent mechanism that explains an almost twofold increase in the total urban
population between 1870 and 1910 (under scenario (2)) is that the transportation constraints had indeed
been binding to peasants before the expansion of the railroad network. This is not to say that serfdom
did not matter—the absolute level of population in 1910 under scenario (4) is higher than the baseline
prediction. However, so long as the transportation costs were not too high, freed peasants moved to
cities at an accelerating rate, and eventual convergence of the lines representing scenarios (2) and (4)
seems plausible.
In addition, Figure 3.8 provides comparison of the counterfactual scenarios with the observed data.
If our model and the chosen parameters described the data perfectly, the observed urban population
(black line) and the population predicted by scenario (2) (solid red line) would have coincided. Overall,
we underestimate rural­urbanmigration throughout the period 1825–1910. This could occur for several
reasons. First, our geographic coverage is confined to European Russia and Western Siberia, therefore,
we do not account for out­migration of rural population to Transcaucasia, Eastern Siberia, and Central
Asia. Second, our balanced panel does not include a large number of cities due to missing observations,
especially in Poland and Finland. Because by necessity we restrict the choice set available to peasants,
the parameters predicting migration to the sample cities are distorted. Third, the specification of the
structural parameters (Equations (3.6) and (3.7)) is likely subject to omitted variable bias. In particular,
it lacks the covariates capturing agglomeration effects and cross­city spillovers (urban potential).
68The difference between what we refer to as the baseline scenario and observed data is that the former relies on the
estimated structural parameters, while the latter is generated by a process that we do not observe.
69One example of such interaction could be that the central government intentionally constructed railroads in the areas
with high historical prevalence of serfdom.
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Figure 3.8: Observed urban growth and four counterfactual scenarios. Each line displays the total
population of cities in the balanced sample in a given year. In each counterfactual scenario, the pre­
dicted population is constructed by plugging in the estimated parameters, displayed in Table 3.9 and
Figure 3.7, into Equation (3.11). Scenarios (1) and (3) imply removing the entire railroad network
during the period of study. Under scenarios (1) and (2), serfdom is abolished in the same years as in
the observed data. Scenarios (3) and (4) imply removing mobility restrictions for all peasants starting
from 1811.
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That being said, we believe that within­model comparisons are still instructive for evaluating the
degree to which removing railroads or abolishing serfdom earlier could have affected rural­urban mi­
gration, had the model predicted the data more accurately.
3.5 Conclusion
Historically, serfdom was an institution that tied affected agents to a certain location, such as a manor,
mine, or master’s house. While constraining mobility provided owners of serfs with sizable economic
rents, it also likely distorted the spatial allocation of labor away from its most productive use. Can the
market alone restore efficient allocation of labor once serfdom is abolished?
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study approaching this question via explicit
examination of mobility restrictions. We propose a structural model linking restrictions on mobility
of rural laborers, serfs, to an important dimension of economic development: urbanization. We es­
timate this model using novel detailed data covering one century of Russia’s history. The estimated
levels of the total urban population under different counterfactual scenarios suggest that railroads had
a first­order positive impact on urbanization. This effect was seemingly independent from abolition of
serfdom (or, rather, complementary to it). In that sense, and in line with Gerschenkron’s (1962) account
of Russia’s economic development, the central government’s investment in construction of railroads
proved effective at mitigating the negative consequences of serfdom, if not completely eliminating
them by 1910.
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3.6 Appendix: Data Sources
All the sources below are listed in the chronological order of their publication.
3.6.1 Laws (Official Publications)
Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, izdaniia 1857 goda. Tom 9. Zakony o sostoianiiakh [In Russian:
Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire, 1857 Ed. Volume 9. Laws on the Sostoianiia], St. Petersburg:
Tipografiia Vtorogo Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1857.
Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, izdaniia 1857 goda. Tom 14. Svod ustavov o pasportakh i ssyl­
nykh [In Russian: Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire, 1857 Ed. Volume 14. Digest of Regu­
lations Concerning Passports and Fugitives], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo Otdeleniia Sob­
stvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1857.
Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Sobranie vtoroe. Tom XXXVI. Otdelenie pervoe [In
Russian: Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection Two. Volume XXXVI.
Part One], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1863.
Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Sobranie vtoroe. Tom XXXVIII. Otdelenie vtoroe [In
Russian: Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection Two. Volume XXXVIII.
Part Two], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1866.
Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Sobranie vtoroe. Tom XXXIX. Otdelenie pervoe [In
Russian: Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection Two. Volume XXXIX.
Part One], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1867.
3.6.2 Laws (Secondary Sources and Commentary)
Chistiakov, O. R., ed., Rossiiskoe zakonodatel’stvo X–XX vv. Dokumenty krestianskoi reformy. Tom
7 [Russian laws in the 10th to 20th centuries. Documents on the Peasant Reform. Volume 7],
Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1989.
Bardach, Juliusz, Bogusław Leśnodorski, and Michał Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego, 6
ed., Warsaw: LexisNexis, 2009.
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3.6.3 Raster Maps of the Russian Empire
3.6.3.1 Main Maps (Administrative)
Shtab Otdel’nogo Sibirskogo korpusa (1855). General’naia karta Zapadnoi Sibiri s Kirgizskoi
Step’iu [A general map of Western Siberia with the Kirghiz Steppe], [St. Petersburg:] Voenno­
topograficheskoe depo.70
Imperatorskoe Russkoe geograficheskoe obschestvo (1862). Karta Evropeiskoi Rossii i Kavkazskogo
kraia [A map of European Russia and the Caucasus], [St. Petersburg:] Voenno­topograficheskoe
depo.71
3.6.3.2 Supplementary Maps (Administrative)
Spetsial’naia karta Kievskoi gubernii [A special map of Kiev Province], 1852.
Zuev, N., Podrobnyi atlas Rossiiskoi Imperii [A detailed atlas of the Russian Empire], 1860.
Karta Kazanskoi gubernii [A map of Kazan Province], 1860.
Karta Tavricheskoi gubernii izdaniia Il’ina 1860 goda [A map of Taurida Province, published by
Il’in in 1860], 1860.
Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Spisok naselennykh mest Simbirskoi gubernii
[A list of settlements in Simbirsk Province], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia K. Vul’fa, 1863.
Il’in, A. A., Podrobnyi atlas Rossiiskoi Imperii s planami glavnykh gorodov [A detailed atlas of the
Russian Empire with maps of the major cities], 1876.
70The place of publication is missing.
71The place of publication is missing.
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3.6.4 Urban Population in 1811–1910
3.6.4.1 Official Publications Used to Define the Universe of Cities
German, Karl, Statisticheskie issledovaniia otnositel’no Rossiiskoi Imperii [Statistical research on
the Russian Empire], St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia akademiia nauk, 1819.
Shter, M., Statisticheskoe izobrazhenie gorodov i posadov Rossiiskoi Imperii po 1825 god [A sta­
tistical description of towns and posads in the Russian Empire through 1825], St. Petersburg: Ti­
pografiia Ivana Glazunova, 1829.
Ministry of the Interior,Obozrenie sostoianiia gorodov Rossiiskoi Imperii v 1833 godu [A review of
the state of towns in the Russian Empire in 1833], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Karla Kraiia, 1834.
Ministry of the Interior, Statistics Department, Statisticheskie tablitsy o sostoianii gorodov Rossiiskoi
Imperii, Velikogo Kniazhestva Finliandskogo i Tsarstva Pol’skogo [Statistical tables on the state of
towns in the Russian Empire, the Grand Duchy of Finland, and Kingdom of Poland], St. Petersburg:
Tipografiia Karla Kraiia, 1842.
Ministry of the Interior, Statistics Department, Statisticheskie tablitsy o sostoianii gorodov Rossiiskoi
Imperii [Statistical tables on the state of towns in the Russian Empire], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia
Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, 1852.
Ministry of the Interior, Statistics Department, Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi Imperii. Vypusk 1
za 1856 god [Statistical tables of the Russian Empire. Vol. 1, for 1856], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia
Vtorogo Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1858.
Ministry of the Interior, Gorodskie poseleniia v Rossiiskoi Imperii. T. 1–7 [Urban settlements in
the Russian Empire. Vols. 1–7], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia tovarischestva “Obschestvennaia pol’za,”
1860–1864.
Ministry of the Interior, Statistics Department, Statisticheskii vremennik. Seriia I [Statistical year­
book. Series I], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia K. Vul’fa, 1866.
Ministry of the Interior, Statistics Department, Statisticheskii vremennik. Seriia II, vypusk 1 [Statsti­
cal yearbook. Series II. Vol. 1], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. Bezobrasova i Ko, 1871.
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Ministry of the Interior, Statistics Department (1875). Statisticheskii vremennik. Seriia II, vypusk 10
[Statstical yearbook. Series II. Vol. 10], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. Bezobrasova i Ko.
Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Statistika Rossiiskoi Imperii. Sbornik svedenii
po Rossii za 1884–1885 gg. [Russian Empire Statistics. A digest of information on Russia in 1884–
1885], St. Petersburg, 1887.
Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Statistika Rossiiskoi Imperii. XXV. Sbornik
svedenii po finliandskim guberniiam [Russian Empire Statistics. XXV. A digest of information on
Finnish provinces], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Bezobrazova i Ko., 1892.
Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Okonchatel’no ustanovlennoe pri razrabotke
perepisi nalichnoe naselenie gorodov [The finally determined present population of towns accord­
ing to the Census.], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia “Obschestvennaia pol’za,” 1905.
Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Goroda Rossii v 1904 godu [Russian cities in
1904], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia N. L. Nyrkina, 1906.
Ministry of the Interior, Central Statistical Committee, Goroda Rossii v 1910 godu [Russian cities in
1910], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia N. L. Nyrkina, 1914.
3.6.4.2 Supplementary Sources (Official and Academic Publications)
The list below only includes the sources not already mentioned above.
Arseniev, Konstantin, Nachertanie statistiki Rossiiskogo gosudarstva. Chast’ pervaia. O sostoianii
naroda [A sketch of statistics of Russia. Part one. On population], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia
Imperatorskogo vospitatel’nogo doma, 1818.
Królestwo Polskie, Komisja Rządowa Spraw Wewnętrznych i Policji, Tabella miast, wsi, osad,
Królestwa Polskiego : z wyrażeniem ich położenia i ludności alfabetycznie ułożona. Tom 1,
Warsaw: W drukarni Łątkiewicza przy ulicy Senatorskiéy Nro 467, 1827.
Królestwo Polskie, Komisja Rządowa Spraw Wewnętrznych i Policji, Tabella miast, wsi, osad,
Królestwa Polskiego : z wyrażeniem ich położenia i ludności alfabetycznie ułożona. Tom 2,
Warsaw: W drukarni Łątkiewicza przy ulicy Senatorskiéy Nro 467, 1827.
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Svedeniia o Chernomorskom voiske, neobkhodimye dlia sostavleniia proekta polozheniia o Cher­
nomorskom voiske [Information on the Black Sea Cossack Host], 1833.
Ministry of the Interior, Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennikh del. Period I. Chast’ 15 [The digest of
the Ministry of the Interior. Period I. Part 15], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Karla Kraiia, 1835.
Ministry of the Interior, Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennikh del. Period I. Chast’ 16 [The digest of
the Ministry of the Interior. Period I. Part 16], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Karla Kraiia, 1835.
Ministry of the Interior, Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennikh del. Period I. Chast’ 18 [The digest of
the Ministry of the Interior. Period I. Part 18], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Karla Kraiia, [1835].
Ministry of the Interior, Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennikh del. Period I. Chast’ 22 [The digest of the
Ministry of the Interior. Period I. Part 22], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Meditsinskogo departamenta
MVD, 1836.
Skal’kovskii, Apollon, Khronologicheskoe obozrenie istorii Novorossiiskogo kraia. 1730–1823.
Chast’ 2. S 1796 po 1823 [A chronological review of Novorossiya. 1730–1823. Part 2. From
1796 to 1823], Odessa: Gorodskaia tipografiia, 1838.
Statisticheskie svedeniia o Chernomorskom voiske [Statistical information on the Black Sea Cos­
sack Host], 1839.
Ministry of the Interior, Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennikh del. Period I. Chast’ 37 [The digest of
the Ministry of the Interior. Period I. Part 37], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Ministerstva vnutrennikh
del, 1840.
Murzakevich, Nikolai, Ocherk uspekhov Novorossiiskogo kraia i Bessarabii v istekshee dvatsatipi­
atiletie, t.e. s 1820­go po 1846­i g. [An account of the successes of Novorossiya and Bessarabia
over the past twenty­five years, i.e., from 1820 to 1846], [Odessa], 1846.
Sobieszczański, Franciszek Maksymilian, Rys historyczno­statystyczny wzrostu i stanu miasta
Warszawy od najdawniejszych czasów aż do 1847 roku, Warsaw: S. Strąbski, 1848.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom III. Chast’ 3. Novgorodskaia guberniia
[A military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. III. Part 3. Novgorod province],
St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1849.
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Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom XI. Chast’ 1. Khersonskaia guberniia
[A military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. XI. Part 1. Kherson province],
St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1849.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom XV. Chast’ 2. Plotskaia guberniia [A
military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. XV. Part 2. Płock province], St. Peters­
burg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1849.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom XV. Chast’ 5. Radomskaia guberniia [A
military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. XV. Part 5. Radom province], St. Pe­
tersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1849.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom I. Chast’ 3. Abo­Bierneborgskaia gu­
berniia [A military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. I. Part 3. Åbo and Björneborg
province], St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1850.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom I. Chast’ 6. Vyborgskaia guberniia [A
military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. I. Part 6. Vyborg province], St. Peters­
burg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1850.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom XIII. Chast’ 2. Voronezhskaia guberniia
[A military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. XIII. Part 2. Voronezh province],
St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1850.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom XV. Chast’ 3. Warshavskaia guberniia
[A military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. XV. Part 3. Warsaw province],
St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1850.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom I. Chast’ 1. Uleoborgskaia guberniia
[A military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. I. Part 1. Uleåborg province],
St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1851.
Voenno­statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi Imperii. Tom I. Chast’ 2. Kuopioskaia guberniia [A
military and statistical review of the Russian Empire. Vol. I. Part 2. Kuopio province], St. Peters­
burg: Tipografiia Departamenta general’nogo shtaba, 1851.
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